The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron D. Miller, Bantam, New York, 2008, 385 pp. $26.00.
In 2003, Aaron David Miller, who had served as a deputy to Dennis Ross on the US Mideast negotiating team, retired from the State Department after 20 years of service. He played a major role in American Mideast policy during the George Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. The following year his former boss, Dennis Ross, published "The Missing Peace" –a blow by blow account of his years in the Clinton administration negotiating peace, along with a brief chapter summarizing his role in the Bush Sr. administration. Unlike Ross’s narrative account, Miller’s book is analytical in scope and covers the peace process all the way from 1973 to 2003.
Miller’s work is divided into five parts. The first deals with American interests and goals in the region and domestic constraints. Miller deals with American Jewry and AIPAC at length and concludes that while AIPAC lobbying is a constraint, it is an obstacle that a determined administration can overcome, as did Ford and Kissinger in 1975 and Bush and Baker in 1991.
The second part deals with American successes in Mideast diplomacy and consists of three chapters covering the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy of the mid-1970s, Carter’s involvement from 1977-79, and James Baker from 1989 to 1991. In each period he focuses on the key American actor and the motivations and methods employed. The chapter for each is labeled with a short one-word synopsis of the actor: Kissinger—strategist; Carter—missionary; and Baker—negotiator.
The material for this part and the following two parts are based on a careful reading of participants’ memoirs, his own experiences and extensive interviews with American, Israeli, and Palestinian decision makers. The list of interviewees and dates at the rear of the book includes three former presidents, one former vice president, and every former secretary of state from Kissinger to Powell along with current Secretary of State Condi Rice. Miller apparently used the memoirs as a treasure trove for the interviews and then used the answers from the interviews along with a few quotes from the memoirs. Those wishing to learn in-depth the issues and details of the 1970s diplomacy will be disappointed. They should turn to William Quandt’s "Peace Process" for those details.
The fourth part is devoted to Clinton’s two terms and the diplomacy on the Palestinian and Syrian tracts. Unlike other American decision makers such as Ross, Madeleine Albright, and President Clinton and Israelis Shlomo Ben-Ami and Ehud Barak, he does not blame the failure at the Camp David II summit in July 2000 exclusively on Yasir Arafat. The book seems to be a synthesis of the conventional American-Israeli school and the conclusions of Clayton Swisher, whose "The Truth About Camp David" blamed poor American preparation and strategy for the failure, along with an Israeli failure of nerve. Miller blames the American team, Arafat and the Palestinians, Ehud Barak and even Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. Assad is blamed for refusing to make the sort of political gestures that both Sadat and Arafat were willing to make to reassure the Israeli electorate before major territorial concessions. This resulted in Barak wasting precious time on the Syrian track at the expense of the Palestinian track. He faults his own side for failing to make it clear to Assad that such gestures would be required and to the Israelis that a full withdrawal from the Golan would be necessary.
The fifth and final part consists of two chapters. The first is a review of the junior Bush administration’s record, concluding that Bush’s "hands off" approach won’t work in the Middle East. In the final chapter, Miller argues that successful Middle East diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is possible but not likely. He argues that to be successful the US would have to employ the deviousness of Kissinger, the missionary focus and attention to detail of Carter, and the ruthlessness of Baker.
He is clearly stating that successful diplomacy will not translate into domestic popularity. Each of these three previous successful figures is anathema to large portions of the "American organized Jewish community." Israelis understood that they were not paying for Kissinger’s salary, but many American Jews failed to understand that Kissinger’s first loyalty should be to his employer. Miller doesn’t cover the Reagan presidency, because he doesn’t feel that Reagan left any lasting legacy to Mideast peacemaking. Reagan and Clinton were domestically the most successful presidents during this period and neither succeeded in Mideast peacemaking. The diplomatic successes of Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and George H. W. Bush were not rewarded at the polling places.
Miller also deals briefly with the fact that the Mideast team of both Baker and Clinton was a Gentile-free zone. He mentions that the Palestinians referred to him, Ross and Dan Kurtzer, the American ambassador to Israel as "the three rabbis" and Israelis close to Shamir referred to them as "Baker’s Jewboys."
I recently watched an episode from the sixth season of "The West Wing" in which the Bartlett administration successfully mediates a Mideast peace agreement without the participation of the secretary of state, the national security advisor, or the assistant secretary of state for the Near East. Instead, the issues are debated among the president, his chief of staff, and two Jewish domestic affairs advisors. I wonder what Arabs, not fully versed on the realities of American television and Hollywood thought, when they saw it. Even if the episode was not shown in the Middle East, imagine all of the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Palestinian students who might have seen it. While I don’t fault the participation, qualifications, or loyalty of any of the individuals in the team, I question the collective impact of having Middle East diplomacy dominated by one particular ethnic group, even if the individuals are faithfully executing the policy of the elected president. Israelis complained that Kissinger gave Israel a worse deal because he was an assimilated Jew. Arabs must have felt justified insofar as they had antisemitic suspicions. Imagine what American Jews and Israelis would think if the team was made up exclusively of Arab Americans.
If I were teaching a course in regional conflict management, I would use this book as a basic course text, along with Jonathan Powell’s "Great Hatred, Little Room" on Tony Blair’s diplomacy in Northern Ireland.
Thomas Mitchell is a graduate of Hebrew University and the doctoral program in international relations at the University of Southern California. He specializes in research on deeply divided societies – particularly Arab-Palestine, Northern Ireland, and 19th century America.
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Thursday, May 29, 2008
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Review of 'Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace'
Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East edited by Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky; published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008, 190 pp., $16 (paperback). Reviewed by Thomas Mitchell, Ph.D.
In 2006, the U.S. Institute of Peace assembled a team of writers to interview participants from Israel, the Arab countries and Palestinians, and the U.S. on the lessons gleaned from American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the Cold War. The result was published by the USIP Press in early 2008, edited in part by Daniel Kurtzer, a former American ambassador to Israel and a veteran of the peace team from the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations.
The book covers three administrations: George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The first of the three is only briefly discussed, as it was involved in only one initiative. Most of the book deals with Clinton administration peacemaking efforts. Members of the team in addition to the two editors include: William Quandt, the distinguished historian of the peace process who worked on the National Security Council in the Carter administration; Steven Spiegel, an expert on American involvement in the Middle East and the domestic context of U.S. Mideast policy; and Shibley Telhami, a former Israeli Palestinian and now a prominent American scholar on the Middle East conflict. In the spirit of full disclosure I should mention that this reviewer studied under Telhami two decades ago when he still had hair and was relatively unknown nationally.
The book includes: "ten lessons" (pp. 1-73), a number of brief recommendations to the incoming administration (pp. 73-84), a chronology of events in the peace process (pp. 85-122), a number of selected documents relevant to the peace process (pp. 123-77), a bibliography and a list of online sources. It seems to be aimed at the incoming administration.
The first and least controversial lesson is that the U.S. is indispensable to progress in the Middle East peace process. The remaining nine lessons mainly focus on the mistakes of the Clinton administration. They seem to echo the comments made by Aaron Miller in his own recently published book. The most important of these is that policy should be formulated in Washington rather than in the region, by either its clients or its envoys. But that envoys to be effective must have the backing of the president. The authors fault Clinton for being too personally involved in the peace process during 2000 and too accessible to Prime Minister Barak, thereby devaluing his personal intervention at Camp David II.
The authors fault the junior George Bush with not enough active involvement in Middle East diplomacy, particularly after his 2003 Roadmap initiative. They, and this is probably Quandt’s input, advise the president to hit the ground running early in his administration with a speech on the region. They fault both Clinton and the younger Bush for waiting until too late in their administrations to get seriously involved. Clinton’s parameters are dismissed as ineffective because he noted that they would be withdrawn at the end of his administration. This had the effect of rendering his last-minute effort doomed from the start.
Bush Jr. sponsored the Annapolis conference after many of the regional players had already given up on his administration and decided to wait it out. And then he failed to follow up.
The lessons do not assess blame for the failure of the Oslo process—they are concentrated on American actions rather than those by the parties. But the need to monitor compliance with agreements is noted; the Clinton and Bush administrations are faulted for failing to adequately monitor and punish both the Israelis and Palestinians for non-compliance. Israel failed to comply with the need to remove outpost settlements and the Palestinians for failing to collect arms and to end incitement. This volume, especially coupled with The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron D. Miller, is a good starting place for the next administration, whether it is led by John McCain or Barack Obama.
But in this reviewer’s opinion it fails to adequately take into account the consequences of failure when urging an American initiative in early 2009. The failure of the Oslo process resulted in the center-left "peace camp" Labor and Meretz parties losing half of their strength as compared with 1992. The failure also made Ehud Barak, the new Labor leader, wary of another peacemaking initiative with the Palestinians. While conditions need not be perfect, they should forecast a reasonable expectation of success before the new administration puts its prestige and those of its regional allies at risk. This is where a comparison of the relative chances of success in the Palestinian and Syrian tracks should come into consideration.
Dr. Mitchell is an independent scholar who has authored works on ethnic conflicts and peace processes in comparative perspective.
In 2006, the U.S. Institute of Peace assembled a team of writers to interview participants from Israel, the Arab countries and Palestinians, and the U.S. on the lessons gleaned from American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the Cold War. The result was published by the USIP Press in early 2008, edited in part by Daniel Kurtzer, a former American ambassador to Israel and a veteran of the peace team from the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations.
The book covers three administrations: George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The first of the three is only briefly discussed, as it was involved in only one initiative. Most of the book deals with Clinton administration peacemaking efforts. Members of the team in addition to the two editors include: William Quandt, the distinguished historian of the peace process who worked on the National Security Council in the Carter administration; Steven Spiegel, an expert on American involvement in the Middle East and the domestic context of U.S. Mideast policy; and Shibley Telhami, a former Israeli Palestinian and now a prominent American scholar on the Middle East conflict. In the spirit of full disclosure I should mention that this reviewer studied under Telhami two decades ago when he still had hair and was relatively unknown nationally.
The book includes: "ten lessons" (pp. 1-73), a number of brief recommendations to the incoming administration (pp. 73-84), a chronology of events in the peace process (pp. 85-122), a number of selected documents relevant to the peace process (pp. 123-77), a bibliography and a list of online sources. It seems to be aimed at the incoming administration.
The first and least controversial lesson is that the U.S. is indispensable to progress in the Middle East peace process. The remaining nine lessons mainly focus on the mistakes of the Clinton administration. They seem to echo the comments made by Aaron Miller in his own recently published book. The most important of these is that policy should be formulated in Washington rather than in the region, by either its clients or its envoys. But that envoys to be effective must have the backing of the president. The authors fault Clinton for being too personally involved in the peace process during 2000 and too accessible to Prime Minister Barak, thereby devaluing his personal intervention at Camp David II.
The authors fault the junior George Bush with not enough active involvement in Middle East diplomacy, particularly after his 2003 Roadmap initiative. They, and this is probably Quandt’s input, advise the president to hit the ground running early in his administration with a speech on the region. They fault both Clinton and the younger Bush for waiting until too late in their administrations to get seriously involved. Clinton’s parameters are dismissed as ineffective because he noted that they would be withdrawn at the end of his administration. This had the effect of rendering his last-minute effort doomed from the start.
Bush Jr. sponsored the Annapolis conference after many of the regional players had already given up on his administration and decided to wait it out. And then he failed to follow up.
The lessons do not assess blame for the failure of the Oslo process—they are concentrated on American actions rather than those by the parties. But the need to monitor compliance with agreements is noted; the Clinton and Bush administrations are faulted for failing to adequately monitor and punish both the Israelis and Palestinians for non-compliance. Israel failed to comply with the need to remove outpost settlements and the Palestinians for failing to collect arms and to end incitement. This volume, especially coupled with The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron D. Miller, is a good starting place for the next administration, whether it is led by John McCain or Barack Obama.
But in this reviewer’s opinion it fails to adequately take into account the consequences of failure when urging an American initiative in early 2009. The failure of the Oslo process resulted in the center-left "peace camp" Labor and Meretz parties losing half of their strength as compared with 1992. The failure also made Ehud Barak, the new Labor leader, wary of another peacemaking initiative with the Palestinians. While conditions need not be perfect, they should forecast a reasonable expectation of success before the new administration puts its prestige and those of its regional allies at risk. This is where a comparison of the relative chances of success in the Palestinian and Syrian tracks should come into consideration.
Dr. Mitchell is an independent scholar who has authored works on ethnic conflicts and peace processes in comparative perspective.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
State of Israel’s ‘fears’
While Daniel Levy, writing on "Israel at 60" at The American Prospect website, is correct that Israel's fears are an impediment to peace, so are the enemies who create those fears. The agents of fear – Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran– are external. Daniel Levy is a valuable and gifted advocate of our pro-Israel/pro-peace perspective, but like many progressive Israelis, he has trouble adjusting to the fact that our camp in the Diaspora must also respond to an anti-Israel left which often demonizes Israel and/or Jews.
It's a problem that so much of the left hates Israel, completely negating its legitimate security concerns. It's an even greater problem that more mainstream liberals or moderate leftists like Tony Judt and even centrist figures like Jimmy Carter, Mearsheimer and Walt now see Israel (or even the idea of a "Jewish state") as of dubious moral worth. It's true that we want to see more forward looking, hopeful and pacific policies emanating from Jerusalem, but I think we play into one-sided anti-Israel forces when we downplay the reality of Israel's enemies. We also lose the possibility of influencing mainstream American-Jewish opinion with such an approach.
Too much of the world accepts the narrative of Israel as a kind of superpower (e.g., the "fourth major world military power" and other such exaggerations). Israel may well have the fourth most powerful air force in the world, but a country as small in both population and area as Israel is, that could lose nearly 1,000 civilians killed (in the recent Intifada) by people who don't even have an army, is highly vulnerable.
That's one reason that it's so desperately important for Israel to pursue policies that are more pro-peace. But the fact that Hamas has emerged as a major contender for power among the Palestinians is a major complicating factor; this makes concessions in the form of withdrawals and the lifting of roadblocks more difficult to sell to an electorate that feels itself increasingly threatened. It's Israel's vulnerability that makes peace so vital, even as it makes its obtainment harder politically.
Contrast this with Russia in Chechnya; Russia's survival does not at all depend upon it making peace with the Chechens. Nor does China absolutely need to make a final peace with the Tibetans, the Uighars or Taiwan.
It's a problem that so much of the left hates Israel, completely negating its legitimate security concerns. It's an even greater problem that more mainstream liberals or moderate leftists like Tony Judt and even centrist figures like Jimmy Carter, Mearsheimer and Walt now see Israel (or even the idea of a "Jewish state") as of dubious moral worth. It's true that we want to see more forward looking, hopeful and pacific policies emanating from Jerusalem, but I think we play into one-sided anti-Israel forces when we downplay the reality of Israel's enemies. We also lose the possibility of influencing mainstream American-Jewish opinion with such an approach.
Too much of the world accepts the narrative of Israel as a kind of superpower (e.g., the "fourth major world military power" and other such exaggerations). Israel may well have the fourth most powerful air force in the world, but a country as small in both population and area as Israel is, that could lose nearly 1,000 civilians killed (in the recent Intifada) by people who don't even have an army, is highly vulnerable.
That's one reason that it's so desperately important for Israel to pursue policies that are more pro-peace. But the fact that Hamas has emerged as a major contender for power among the Palestinians is a major complicating factor; this makes concessions in the form of withdrawals and the lifting of roadblocks more difficult to sell to an electorate that feels itself increasingly threatened. It's Israel's vulnerability that makes peace so vital, even as it makes its obtainment harder politically.
Contrast this with Russia in Chechnya; Russia's survival does not at all depend upon it making peace with the Chechens. Nor does China absolutely need to make a final peace with the Tibetans, the Uighars or Taiwan.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Benny Morris on ‘Democracy Now’
It was fascinating to see Israel’s premier "New Historian" on the "Democracy Now" program, Friday, May 16. Prof. Morris held his own surprisingly well, even though host Amy Goodman did all she could to stack the odds against him. (For background on Benny Morris, see this posting on David Remnick’s New Yorker article.)
On the previous day’s program, the English-Palestinian author and physician, Dr. Ghada Karmi, had the run of most of the hour, with no other viewpoint and only the accompaniment of a nationalistic Palestinian "hip hop" group. Dr. Karmi is a very sympathetic individual, a child refugee of Israel’s victory of 1948. But hers is totally a narrative of Palestinian victimhood – nothing of the Palestinian effort to destroy the Jewish community rather than go along with the UN partition plan of 1947. She also maddeningly speaks of "Zionism" as postulating an exclusively Jewish state, something that even Zeev Jabotinsky, the patron saint of "Revisionist" (right-wing) Zionism, did not advocate. There was no acknowledgment, perhaps even no awareness, that the Arab war against the Jews was not an attempt to establish a shared Arab-Jewish state – au contraire.
The next day, "Democracy Now" set the stage for Benny Morris with the first third of the broadcast given over to an anti-Zionist Israeli, Tikva Honig-Parnass, a woman who was a Hagana veteran in 1948 – again with no rebuttal offered to her opinion. Then came Morris sandwiched between two anti-Zionist figures, one Saree Makdisi, a writer and professor at UCLA and the other Norman Finkelstein. Finkelstein interrupted and filibustered Morris in his highly insulting way, but Morris shut him up when he indicated that Finkelstein’s writings are largely based upon Morris’s research.
Makdisi presented himself as a man of reason, but his one-state view, identical to that of Dr. Karmi, is pie in the sky. Forcing two long-warring peoples together into one polity is like throwing two hungry rats into a single sack. Naked power, not fairness, will triumph.
Makdisi also morally undermined his position when he railed against the fact that the UN partition plan would have made 400,000 or more Arabs "a minority in their own country." They would have been a very large minority next door to a 100 percent or very nearly 100 percent Arab-Palestinian state. That the Jews were a minority everywhere else, generally to their detriment – subject to recurring acts of discrimination, persecution, expulsion or massacre – meant nothing to him. So for the Jews to be a minority, even a vulnerable oppressed minority, was fine; for Arabs to be a minority in one little corner of the Arab world was intolerable.
From this program with Morris, I now better understand Morris’s incendiary view expressed in an interview in Haaretz a couple of years ago in which he said that, in retrospect, Ben-Gurion should have completed the ethnic cleansing campaign in 1948 to the Jordan River. Morris was hypothesizing that this would have brought an end to the ethnic conflict in the same terrible but effective way that the expulsion of ethnic Greeks from Turkey and Turks from Greece did in the 1920s.
One could also see a parallel in the massive exchange of populations between Pakistan and India in 1947, but to my mind, in the same way that the Indian-Pakistani conflict was not ended in 1947, the Arab-Israeli conflict would not have ended with a more total expulsion of Arabs from what became Israel and eventually the occupied territories as well. Nevertheless, Morris repeated on "Democracy Now," as he had stated in that interview in Haaretz, that he did not support such an expulsion, on either moral or practical grounds, as a solution today.
On the previous day’s program, the English-Palestinian author and physician, Dr. Ghada Karmi, had the run of most of the hour, with no other viewpoint and only the accompaniment of a nationalistic Palestinian "hip hop" group. Dr. Karmi is a very sympathetic individual, a child refugee of Israel’s victory of 1948. But hers is totally a narrative of Palestinian victimhood – nothing of the Palestinian effort to destroy the Jewish community rather than go along with the UN partition plan of 1947. She also maddeningly speaks of "Zionism" as postulating an exclusively Jewish state, something that even Zeev Jabotinsky, the patron saint of "Revisionist" (right-wing) Zionism, did not advocate. There was no acknowledgment, perhaps even no awareness, that the Arab war against the Jews was not an attempt to establish a shared Arab-Jewish state – au contraire.
The next day, "Democracy Now" set the stage for Benny Morris with the first third of the broadcast given over to an anti-Zionist Israeli, Tikva Honig-Parnass, a woman who was a Hagana veteran in 1948 – again with no rebuttal offered to her opinion. Then came Morris sandwiched between two anti-Zionist figures, one Saree Makdisi, a writer and professor at UCLA and the other Norman Finkelstein. Finkelstein interrupted and filibustered Morris in his highly insulting way, but Morris shut him up when he indicated that Finkelstein’s writings are largely based upon Morris’s research.
Makdisi presented himself as a man of reason, but his one-state view, identical to that of Dr. Karmi, is pie in the sky. Forcing two long-warring peoples together into one polity is like throwing two hungry rats into a single sack. Naked power, not fairness, will triumph.
Makdisi also morally undermined his position when he railed against the fact that the UN partition plan would have made 400,000 or more Arabs "a minority in their own country." They would have been a very large minority next door to a 100 percent or very nearly 100 percent Arab-Palestinian state. That the Jews were a minority everywhere else, generally to their detriment – subject to recurring acts of discrimination, persecution, expulsion or massacre – meant nothing to him. So for the Jews to be a minority, even a vulnerable oppressed minority, was fine; for Arabs to be a minority in one little corner of the Arab world was intolerable.
From this program with Morris, I now better understand Morris’s incendiary view expressed in an interview in Haaretz a couple of years ago in which he said that, in retrospect, Ben-Gurion should have completed the ethnic cleansing campaign in 1948 to the Jordan River. Morris was hypothesizing that this would have brought an end to the ethnic conflict in the same terrible but effective way that the expulsion of ethnic Greeks from Turkey and Turks from Greece did in the 1920s.
One could also see a parallel in the massive exchange of populations between Pakistan and India in 1947, but to my mind, in the same way that the Indian-Pakistani conflict was not ended in 1947, the Arab-Israeli conflict would not have ended with a more total expulsion of Arabs from what became Israel and eventually the occupied territories as well. Nevertheless, Morris repeated on "Democracy Now," as he had stated in that interview in Haaretz, that he did not support such an expulsion, on either moral or practical grounds, as a solution today.
Sunday, May 18, 2008
No time to beat around the Bush
As I write these lines, President Bush is on his way out of Israel, headed for Saudi Arabia, having just concluded one of the more anti-climactic visits to Jerusalem that I can recall.
When this second Presidential visit to Israel within 4 months was announced in early 2008, it was looked upon as a potential milestone event, a key marker in the timeline for peace that began back in Annapolis, MD on November 27.
Indeed, while Meretz USA supporters stood alongside our progressive Zionist friends in the Maryland capital that day, registering our continued belief in the peace process, the American President was promising Israelis and Palestinians a fully committed US diplomatic effort: "President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert," he told the peoples through their leaders, "I pledge to devote my effort during my time as president to do all I can to help you achieve this ambitious goal."
If we are to judge by his public statements in Israel, Mr. Bush has long since reneged on his undertaking. His address to the Knesset referred to peace in only the most utopian of language, avoiding any mention of a "flesh-and-bones" peace process. When coupled with his trite remarks at a brief press conference with Ehud Olmert, the speech reinforced the underwhelming impression left by earlier reports, which indicated that Bush would forego a three-way meeting with Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas ("This did not seem the time," we were told), and would, "not be carrying any new ideas with him when he travels to the region".
True, at a time when Israel's Prime Minister is facing the umpteenth criminal investigation against him ("the most severe one of all", we are told), one might argue that the moment is not opportune for a major diplomatic advance. But such investigations can be no excuse for standstill - especially when one considers that every Israeli Prime Minister since Shimon Peres in 1996 has been the subject of at least one major criminal probe (go ahead, check!), and not one of them has been forced from office.
Indeed, in a week when a Grad-type Katyusha rocket slammed into a shopping mall in Ashkelon, wounding dozens, some seriously, it was sad to see an American president reciting platitudes about Hamas instead of rolling up his sleeves to help find a way out of the morass.
And at a time when settler groups continued their efforts to create annexationist facts on the ground, it was unfortunate to see a president who knows no better way to express his friendship for Israel than to stroke its ego. Mr. Bush apparently hit his mark: His words to the Knesset were warmly endorsed by Israel's most right-wing Knesset members as an expression of solidarity with their supernationalist agenda.
Something is amiss when the right-religious bloc in Israel issues calls for George W. to replace the country's Prime Minister. Something is wrong when an American president offers the Knesset no program more practical than "to have faith". It's passed time for the president to do something right: To honor his pledge at Annapolis and to start doing the hard work of peace. It's time to stop beating around the bush.
When this second Presidential visit to Israel within 4 months was announced in early 2008, it was looked upon as a potential milestone event, a key marker in the timeline for peace that began back in Annapolis, MD on November 27.
Indeed, while Meretz USA supporters stood alongside our progressive Zionist friends in the Maryland capital that day, registering our continued belief in the peace process, the American President was promising Israelis and Palestinians a fully committed US diplomatic effort: "President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert," he told the peoples through their leaders, "I pledge to devote my effort during my time as president to do all I can to help you achieve this ambitious goal."
If we are to judge by his public statements in Israel, Mr. Bush has long since reneged on his undertaking. His address to the Knesset referred to peace in only the most utopian of language, avoiding any mention of a "flesh-and-bones" peace process. When coupled with his trite remarks at a brief press conference with Ehud Olmert, the speech reinforced the underwhelming impression left by earlier reports, which indicated that Bush would forego a three-way meeting with Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas ("This did not seem the time," we were told), and would, "not be carrying any new ideas with him when he travels to the region".
True, at a time when Israel's Prime Minister is facing the umpteenth criminal investigation against him ("the most severe one of all", we are told), one might argue that the moment is not opportune for a major diplomatic advance. But such investigations can be no excuse for standstill - especially when one considers that every Israeli Prime Minister since Shimon Peres in 1996 has been the subject of at least one major criminal probe (go ahead, check!), and not one of them has been forced from office.
Indeed, in a week when a Grad-type Katyusha rocket slammed into a shopping mall in Ashkelon, wounding dozens, some seriously, it was sad to see an American president reciting platitudes about Hamas instead of rolling up his sleeves to help find a way out of the morass.
And at a time when settler groups continued their efforts to create annexationist facts on the ground, it was unfortunate to see a president who knows no better way to express his friendship for Israel than to stroke its ego. Mr. Bush apparently hit his mark: His words to the Knesset were warmly endorsed by Israel's most right-wing Knesset members as an expression of solidarity with their supernationalist agenda.
Something is amiss when the right-religious bloc in Israel issues calls for George W. to replace the country's Prime Minister. Something is wrong when an American president offers the Knesset no program more practical than "to have faith". It's passed time for the president to do something right: To honor his pledge at Annapolis and to start doing the hard work of peace. It's time to stop beating around the bush.
Friday, May 16, 2008
YIVO event on Poland and the Jews
Prof. Jan Gross is a Princeton University historian who dialogued with Holocaust professor Deborah Lipstadt at the YIVO Institute on the evening of May 8. He has gained fame and notoriety from his research on violent Polish antisemitism, during and after World War II.
Gross pointed out that rural shtetl Jews were more exposed to the Nazis during the war and to Polish violence after the war, than the more assimilated and mixed Jewish population in big cities. Polish liberal intelligentsia often helped their Jewish friends and relatives. But in the countryside, returning Jews in particular were threatened and victimized by whole communities of Poles who shared a material interest in keeping the Jewish properties that they had seized.
There was a decree issued by the Polish government in exile in London to compensate losses and return properties to Jews, but contacts in the Polish underground reported back that this wouldn't happen. It wasn't clear to me if they were reporting a fact or indicating an intension, but I think it was the former.
Lipstadt emphasized the fact that the Holocaust was the doing of the Germans, not the Poles. Gross mentioned that in some cases, known antisemites acted on behalf of Jews. In these instances, he speculated that there was a contradiction between their abstract hateful notions about Jews and the flesh & blood reality of individuals in dire need who were in front of their eyes.
Many in the audience were frustrated by the speakers because they wanted the Poles to be condemned more uniformly than the speakers were willing to. Several brought up the noxious role of the Church. Gross and Lipstadt were not really making excuses for the clergy or other Poles, but they were historians plying their trade in citing nuances and making distinctions. There were those in the audience who did not understand what professional historians properly do.
Interestingly, Gross's latest book, "Fear" – which depicts the widespread Polish persecution and murder of Jews after WW II – sold 80,000 copies in Poland during its first six weeks of publication early this year. In traveling in Poland, he said that he was often congratulated for his work by people he encountered. He also had to put up with an attempt to prosecute him for "anti-Polish" slander.
Gross pointed out that rural shtetl Jews were more exposed to the Nazis during the war and to Polish violence after the war, than the more assimilated and mixed Jewish population in big cities. Polish liberal intelligentsia often helped their Jewish friends and relatives. But in the countryside, returning Jews in particular were threatened and victimized by whole communities of Poles who shared a material interest in keeping the Jewish properties that they had seized.
There was a decree issued by the Polish government in exile in London to compensate losses and return properties to Jews, but contacts in the Polish underground reported back that this wouldn't happen. It wasn't clear to me if they were reporting a fact or indicating an intension, but I think it was the former.
Lipstadt emphasized the fact that the Holocaust was the doing of the Germans, not the Poles. Gross mentioned that in some cases, known antisemites acted on behalf of Jews. In these instances, he speculated that there was a contradiction between their abstract hateful notions about Jews and the flesh & blood reality of individuals in dire need who were in front of their eyes.
Many in the audience were frustrated by the speakers because they wanted the Poles to be condemned more uniformly than the speakers were willing to. Several brought up the noxious role of the Church. Gross and Lipstadt were not really making excuses for the clergy or other Poles, but they were historians plying their trade in citing nuances and making distinctions. There were those in the audience who did not understand what professional historians properly do.
Interestingly, Gross's latest book, "Fear" – which depicts the widespread Polish persecution and murder of Jews after WW II – sold 80,000 copies in Poland during its first six weeks of publication early this year. In traveling in Poland, he said that he was often congratulated for his work by people he encountered. He also had to put up with an attempt to prosecute him for "anti-Polish" slander.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Abu Vilan’s scenarios for peace and war
Friends of Meretz USA benefitted from the insights of Meretz MK Avshalom (Abu) Vilan, May 5, on one of his frequent visits to New York. Vilan’s "positive scenario" is for Israel to come to a ceasefire agreement with Hamas via Egypt's mediation, for Marwan Barghouti to be released as part of a prisoner exchange for the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and for Barghouti to be elected the next Palestinian president who will conclude a peace agreement with Israel.
The bad scenario would be for Israel to go to early elections with Netanyahu likely to win. We heard it from Abu first (before the press reports) that Olmert's legal problem has to do with an allegedly illegal half million dollar contribution from the US during the 1999 Likud leadership primary. He sees this as potentially very serious, but regards Olmert as a better leader for Israel than any of the likely alternatives, including Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, let alone Bibi Netanyahu of Likud. He distrusts Livni because she lacks experience in managing people and institutions. Livni would become caretaker prime minister for 100 days, at the very least, if Olmert resigns and she cannot hold together his coalition to avoid early elections. (Abu did not reflect upon recent survey data that indicates that Livni would defeat Netanyahu narrowly -- 27 seats to 23 -- in a pending election.)
He warned against any notion of a one-state alternative to the two-state solution he and we support for Israel and the Palestinians. He sees any rejection of peace between Israel and a future state of Palestine in favor of one unified state as a completely impractical agenda, which Israelis would never support, that would condemn both sides to conflict and injustice for generations to come.
The bad scenario would be for Israel to go to early elections with Netanyahu likely to win. We heard it from Abu first (before the press reports) that Olmert's legal problem has to do with an allegedly illegal half million dollar contribution from the US during the 1999 Likud leadership primary. He sees this as potentially very serious, but regards Olmert as a better leader for Israel than any of the likely alternatives, including Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, let alone Bibi Netanyahu of Likud. He distrusts Livni because she lacks experience in managing people and institutions. Livni would become caretaker prime minister for 100 days, at the very least, if Olmert resigns and she cannot hold together his coalition to avoid early elections. (Abu did not reflect upon recent survey data that indicates that Livni would defeat Netanyahu narrowly -- 27 seats to 23 -- in a pending election.)
He warned against any notion of a one-state alternative to the two-state solution he and we support for Israel and the Palestinians. He sees any rejection of peace between Israel and a future state of Palestine in favor of one unified state as a completely impractical agenda, which Israelis would never support, that would condemn both sides to conflict and injustice for generations to come.
Monday, May 12, 2008
Uri Avnery’s view of 1948
This account of the war of 1948 by the radical Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery conforms with my understanding of these events and as I’ve gleaned from the writings of Morris, Benvenisti and Segev . (I usually agree and disagree with the non-Zionist Avnery in about equal measure.)
Avnery was a combat veteran of this war. It is perceived by him as "an ethnic war," which "the Arabs started," in which both sides engaged in what we now call "ethnic cleansing." Among other things, Avnery counters popular anti-Israel notions about the Hagana's Strategic Plan D: "as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies." The following is almost all of this interview with Avnery posted on May 10 by Gush Shalom:
- How was this war different from others?
First of all, it was not one war but two, which followed one another without a break.
The first war was fought between the Jews and the Arabs in the country. It started on the morrow of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, which decreed the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state. It lasted until the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. That day marked the start of the second war - the one between the State of Israel and the neighboring countries, which threw their armies into the battle.
This was not a war between two countries for a piece of land between them, like the wars between Germany and France over Alsace. Neither was it a fratricidal struggle, like the American Civil War, where both sides belonged to the same nation. I categorize it as an "ethnic war".
Such a war is fought out between two different peoples who live in the same country, each of which claims the whole country for itself. In such a war, the aim is not only to achieve a military victory, but also to take possession of as much of the country as possible without the population of the other side. That is what happened when Yugoslavia broke up and when, not by accident, the odious term "ethnic cleansing" was born.
- Was the war inevitable?
At the time, I hoped until the last moment that it could be avoided (about that, later.) In retrospect it is clear to me that it was already too late.
The Jewish side was determined to establish a state of its own. This was one of the fundamental aims of the Zionist movement, founded 50 years earlier, and was strengthened a hundredfold after the Holocaust, which had come to an end only two and a half years before.
The Arab side was determined to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in the country which they (rightly) considered an Arab country. That's why the Arabs started the war.
- What did you, the Jews, think when you went to war?
When I enlisted at the beginning of the war, we were totally convinced that we were faced with the danger of annihilation and that we were defending ourselves, our families and the entire Hebrew community. The phrase "There Is No Alternative" was not just a slogan, but a deeply felt conviction. (When I say "we", I mean the community in general and the soldiers in particular.) I don't think that the Arab side was imbued with quite the same conviction. That was their undoing.
This explains why the Jewish community was totally mobilized from the first moment on. We had a unified leadership (even The Irgun and the Stern Group accepted its authority) and a unified military force, which rapidly assumed the character of a regular army.
Nothing like this happened on the Arab side. They had no unified leadership, and no unified Arab-Palestinian army, which meant they could not concentrate their forces at the crucial points. But we learned this only after the war.
- Did you think that you were the stronger side?
Not at all. At the time, the Jews constituted only a third of the population. The hundreds of Arab villages throughout the country dominated the main arteries that were crucial to our survival. We suffered heavy casualties in our efforts to open them, especially the road to Jerusalem. We honestly felt that we were "the few against the many".
Slowly, the balance of power shifted. Our army became more organized and learned from its experience, while the Arab side still depended on "faz'ah" - the one-time mobilization of local villagers equipped with their own old weapons. From April 1948 on, we started to receive large quantities of light weapons from Czechoslovakia, which were sent to us on Stalin's orders. In the middle of May, when the expected intervention of the Arab armies was approaching, we were already in possession of a contiguous territory.
- In other words, you drove the Arabs out?
This was not yet "ethnic cleansing" but a by-product of the war. Our side was preparing for the massive attack of the Arab armies and we could not possibly leave a large hostile population at our rear. This military necessity was, of course, intertwined with the more or less conscious desire to create a homogeneous Jewish territory.
In the course of the years, opponents of Israel have created a conspiracy myth about "Plan D", as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies.
- Do you say that at this stage there was not yet a basic decision to drive all the Arabs out?
One has to remember the political situation: according to the UN resolution, the "Jewish state" was to include more than half of Palestine (as it existed in 1947 under the British Mandate). In this territory, more than 40% of the population was Arab. The Arab spokesmen argued that it was impossible to set up a Jewish state in which almost half the population was Arab and demanded the withdrawal of the partition resolution. The Jewish side, which stuck to the partition resolution, wanted to prove that it was possible. So there were some efforts (in Haifa, for example) to convince the Arabs not to leave their homes. But the reality of the war itself caused the mass exodus.
It must be understood that at no stage did the Arabs "flee the country". In general, things happened this way: in the course of the fighting, an Arab village came under heavy fire. Its inhabitants - men, women and children - fled, of course, to the next village. Then we fired on the next village, and they fled to the next one, and so forth, until the armistice came into force and suddenly there was a border (the Green Line) between them and their homes. The Deir Yassin massacre gave another powerful push to the flight.
Even the inhabitants of Jaffa did not leave the country - after all, Gaza, where they fled, is also a part of Palestine.
- In that case, when was the start of the "ethnic cleansing" you spoke about?
In the second half of the war, after the advance of the Arab armies was halted, a deliberate policy of expelling the Arabs became a war aim on its own.
For truth's sake, it must be remembered that this was not one-sided. Not many Arabs remained in the territories that were conquered by our side, but, also, no Jew remained in the territories that were conquered by the Arabs, such as the Etzion Bloc kibbutzim and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jewish inhabitants were killed or expelled. The difference was quantitative: while the Jewish side conquered large stretches of land, the Arab side succeeded only in conquering small areas.
The real decision was taken after the war: not to allow the 750 thousand Arab refugees to return to their homes.
- What happened when the Arab armies entered the battle?
At the beginning, our situation looked desperate. The Arab armies were regular troops, well trained (mostly by the British), and equipped with heavy arms: warplanes, tanks and artillery, while we had only light weapons -- rifles, machine guns, light mortars and some ineffective anti-tank weapons. Only in June did heavy arms start to reach us.
I myself took part in the unloading of the first fighter planes that reached us from Czechoslovakia. They had been produced for the German Wehrmacht. Over our heads "German" planes on our side (Messerschmitts) were fighting "British" planes flown by Egyptians (Spitfires) .
- Why did Stalin support the Jewish side?
On the eve of the UN resolution, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, gave a passionately Zionist speech. Stalin's immediate aim was to get the British out of Palestine, where they might otherwise allow the stationing of American missiles. A sometimes forgotten fact should be mentioned here: the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize Israel de jure, immediately after the declaration of independence. The US recognized Israel at the time only de facto.
Stalin did not turn his back on Israel till some years later, when Israel openly joined the American bloc. At that time, Stalin's anti-Semitic paranoia also became apparent. The policy-makers in Moscow were then of the opinion that the rising tide of Arab nationalism was a better bet.
- What did you personally feel during the war?
On the eve of the war, I still believed in a "Semitic" partnership of all the inhabitants of the country. One month before the outbreak of war I published the booklet "War or Peace in the Semitic Region", in which I propounded this idea. In retrospect it is clear to me that this was far too late.
When the war broke out, I immediately joined a combat brigade (Givati). In the last days before I was called up I managed - together with a group of friends - to publish another booklet, entitled "From Defense to War", in which I proposed conducting the war with a view to the nature of the subsequent peace. (I was much influenced by the British military commentator Basil Liddell Hart, who advocated such a course during World War II.)
My friends at the time tried very strongly to convince me not to enlist, so I could remain free for the much more important task of voicing my opinions throughout the war. I felt that that they were quite wrong - that the place of every decent and fit young man at such a time was in the combat units. How could I stay at home when thousands of my age-group were risking their lives day and night? And besides, who would ever listen to my voice again if at the crucial moment of our national existence I did not fulfill my duty?
At the beginning of the war I was a private soldier in the infantry and fought around the road to Jerusalem, and in the second half I served in the Samson's Foxes motorized commando unit on the Egyptian front. That allowed me to see the war from dozens of different vantage points.
Throughout the war I wrote up my experiences. My reports appeared in the newspapers at the time and were later collected in a book entitled "In the Fields of the Philistines, 1948" (which will soon appear in English). The military censors did not allow me to dwell on the negative sides, so immediately after the war I wrote a second book called "The Other Side of the Coin", disguised as a literary work, so I did not have to submit it to censorship. There I reported, inter alia, that we had received orders to kill every Arab who tried to return home.
- What did the war teach you?
The atrocities I witnessed turned me into a convinced peace activist. The war taught me that there is a Palestinian people, and that we shall never achieve peace if a Palestinian state does not come into being side by side with our state. That this has not yet happened is one of the reasons why the 1948 war is still going on to this very day.
Avnery was a combat veteran of this war. It is perceived by him as "an ethnic war," which "the Arabs started," in which both sides engaged in what we now call "ethnic cleansing." Among other things, Avnery counters popular anti-Israel notions about the Hagana's Strategic Plan D: "as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies." The following is almost all of this interview with Avnery posted on May 10 by Gush Shalom:
- How was this war different from others?
First of all, it was not one war but two, which followed one another without a break.
The first war was fought between the Jews and the Arabs in the country. It started on the morrow of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, which decreed the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state. It lasted until the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. That day marked the start of the second war - the one between the State of Israel and the neighboring countries, which threw their armies into the battle.
This was not a war between two countries for a piece of land between them, like the wars between Germany and France over Alsace. Neither was it a fratricidal struggle, like the American Civil War, where both sides belonged to the same nation. I categorize it as an "ethnic war".
Such a war is fought out between two different peoples who live in the same country, each of which claims the whole country for itself. In such a war, the aim is not only to achieve a military victory, but also to take possession of as much of the country as possible without the population of the other side. That is what happened when Yugoslavia broke up and when, not by accident, the odious term "ethnic cleansing" was born.
- Was the war inevitable?
At the time, I hoped until the last moment that it could be avoided (about that, later.) In retrospect it is clear to me that it was already too late.
The Jewish side was determined to establish a state of its own. This was one of the fundamental aims of the Zionist movement, founded 50 years earlier, and was strengthened a hundredfold after the Holocaust, which had come to an end only two and a half years before.
The Arab side was determined to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in the country which they (rightly) considered an Arab country. That's why the Arabs started the war.
- What did you, the Jews, think when you went to war?
When I enlisted at the beginning of the war, we were totally convinced that we were faced with the danger of annihilation and that we were defending ourselves, our families and the entire Hebrew community. The phrase "There Is No Alternative" was not just a slogan, but a deeply felt conviction. (When I say "we", I mean the community in general and the soldiers in particular.) I don't think that the Arab side was imbued with quite the same conviction. That was their undoing.
This explains why the Jewish community was totally mobilized from the first moment on. We had a unified leadership (even The Irgun and the Stern Group accepted its authority) and a unified military force, which rapidly assumed the character of a regular army.
Nothing like this happened on the Arab side. They had no unified leadership, and no unified Arab-Palestinian army, which meant they could not concentrate their forces at the crucial points. But we learned this only after the war.
- Did you think that you were the stronger side?
Not at all. At the time, the Jews constituted only a third of the population. The hundreds of Arab villages throughout the country dominated the main arteries that were crucial to our survival. We suffered heavy casualties in our efforts to open them, especially the road to Jerusalem. We honestly felt that we were "the few against the many".
Slowly, the balance of power shifted. Our army became more organized and learned from its experience, while the Arab side still depended on "faz'ah" - the one-time mobilization of local villagers equipped with their own old weapons. From April 1948 on, we started to receive large quantities of light weapons from Czechoslovakia, which were sent to us on Stalin's orders. In the middle of May, when the expected intervention of the Arab armies was approaching, we were already in possession of a contiguous territory.
- In other words, you drove the Arabs out?
This was not yet "ethnic cleansing" but a by-product of the war. Our side was preparing for the massive attack of the Arab armies and we could not possibly leave a large hostile population at our rear. This military necessity was, of course, intertwined with the more or less conscious desire to create a homogeneous Jewish territory.
In the course of the years, opponents of Israel have created a conspiracy myth about "Plan D", as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies.
- Do you say that at this stage there was not yet a basic decision to drive all the Arabs out?
One has to remember the political situation: according to the UN resolution, the "Jewish state" was to include more than half of Palestine (as it existed in 1947 under the British Mandate). In this territory, more than 40% of the population was Arab. The Arab spokesmen argued that it was impossible to set up a Jewish state in which almost half the population was Arab and demanded the withdrawal of the partition resolution. The Jewish side, which stuck to the partition resolution, wanted to prove that it was possible. So there were some efforts (in Haifa, for example) to convince the Arabs not to leave their homes. But the reality of the war itself caused the mass exodus.
It must be understood that at no stage did the Arabs "flee the country". In general, things happened this way: in the course of the fighting, an Arab village came under heavy fire. Its inhabitants - men, women and children - fled, of course, to the next village. Then we fired on the next village, and they fled to the next one, and so forth, until the armistice came into force and suddenly there was a border (the Green Line) between them and their homes. The Deir Yassin massacre gave another powerful push to the flight.
Even the inhabitants of Jaffa did not leave the country - after all, Gaza, where they fled, is also a part of Palestine.
- In that case, when was the start of the "ethnic cleansing" you spoke about?
In the second half of the war, after the advance of the Arab armies was halted, a deliberate policy of expelling the Arabs became a war aim on its own.
For truth's sake, it must be remembered that this was not one-sided. Not many Arabs remained in the territories that were conquered by our side, but, also, no Jew remained in the territories that were conquered by the Arabs, such as the Etzion Bloc kibbutzim and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jewish inhabitants were killed or expelled. The difference was quantitative: while the Jewish side conquered large stretches of land, the Arab side succeeded only in conquering small areas.
The real decision was taken after the war: not to allow the 750 thousand Arab refugees to return to their homes.
- What happened when the Arab armies entered the battle?
At the beginning, our situation looked desperate. The Arab armies were regular troops, well trained (mostly by the British), and equipped with heavy arms: warplanes, tanks and artillery, while we had only light weapons -- rifles, machine guns, light mortars and some ineffective anti-tank weapons. Only in June did heavy arms start to reach us.
I myself took part in the unloading of the first fighter planes that reached us from Czechoslovakia. They had been produced for the German Wehrmacht. Over our heads "German" planes on our side (Messerschmitts) were fighting "British" planes flown by Egyptians (Spitfires) .
- Why did Stalin support the Jewish side?
On the eve of the UN resolution, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, gave a passionately Zionist speech. Stalin's immediate aim was to get the British out of Palestine, where they might otherwise allow the stationing of American missiles. A sometimes forgotten fact should be mentioned here: the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize Israel de jure, immediately after the declaration of independence. The US recognized Israel at the time only de facto.
Stalin did not turn his back on Israel till some years later, when Israel openly joined the American bloc. At that time, Stalin's anti-Semitic paranoia also became apparent. The policy-makers in Moscow were then of the opinion that the rising tide of Arab nationalism was a better bet.
- What did you personally feel during the war?
On the eve of the war, I still believed in a "Semitic" partnership of all the inhabitants of the country. One month before the outbreak of war I published the booklet "War or Peace in the Semitic Region", in which I propounded this idea. In retrospect it is clear to me that this was far too late.
When the war broke out, I immediately joined a combat brigade (Givati). In the last days before I was called up I managed - together with a group of friends - to publish another booklet, entitled "From Defense to War", in which I proposed conducting the war with a view to the nature of the subsequent peace. (I was much influenced by the British military commentator Basil Liddell Hart, who advocated such a course during World War II.)
My friends at the time tried very strongly to convince me not to enlist, so I could remain free for the much more important task of voicing my opinions throughout the war. I felt that that they were quite wrong - that the place of every decent and fit young man at such a time was in the combat units. How could I stay at home when thousands of my age-group were risking their lives day and night? And besides, who would ever listen to my voice again if at the crucial moment of our national existence I did not fulfill my duty?
At the beginning of the war I was a private soldier in the infantry and fought around the road to Jerusalem, and in the second half I served in the Samson's Foxes motorized commando unit on the Egyptian front. That allowed me to see the war from dozens of different vantage points.
Throughout the war I wrote up my experiences. My reports appeared in the newspapers at the time and were later collected in a book entitled "In the Fields of the Philistines, 1948" (which will soon appear in English). The military censors did not allow me to dwell on the negative sides, so immediately after the war I wrote a second book called "The Other Side of the Coin", disguised as a literary work, so I did not have to submit it to censorship. There I reported, inter alia, that we had received orders to kill every Arab who tried to return home.
- What did the war teach you?
The atrocities I witnessed turned me into a convinced peace activist. The war taught me that there is a Palestinian people, and that we shall never achieve peace if a Palestinian state does not come into being side by side with our state. That this has not yet happened is one of the reasons why the 1948 war is still going on to this very day.
Friday, May 09, 2008
Extraordinary piece on Benny Morris
David Remnick has written a masterful article about the life and works of Benny Morris, the pioneering Israeli historian, in the May 5, 2008 issue of the New Yorker. Morris refuses to conform to type. He is an unrelenting chronicler of Israel’s original sins who also documents the dark side of Palestinian nationalism. I appreciate Morris’s pessimism but do not share his conclusion that the Palestinians will never accept a peace agreement with Israel. I excerpt this long article below but could not cut it down much further without losing important nuances of this story:
For nearly forty years, Israeli histories and textbooks, with few exceptions, endorsed the notion that the more than seven hundred thousand Arabs who left Palestine as refugees in the years between 1947 and 1950 did so voluntarily or at the urging of their leaders. ...
In the late eighties, Israel encountered its first revisionist historians, a group of rigorous young scholars intent on seeing clearly the founding and development of the state, come what may. At the head of that small and diverse movement was Benny Morris, a Sabra and a Cambridge-educated leftist, who, like Israel itself, was born in 1948. His latest book on that pivotal year of war and transformation, "1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War" (Yale; $32.50), is a commanding, superbly documented, and fair-minded study of the events that, in the wake of the Holocaust, gave a sovereign home to one people and dispossessed another.
Remarkably, the book makes every attempt at depth and balance, even though its author has professed a "cosmic pessimism" about the current situation in the Middle East and has denounced the Palestinian leadership in the harshest terms imaginable....
In 1988, Morris published "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949," which revolutionized Israeli historiography and, to a great extent, a nation’s understanding of its own birth. Relying less on testimony than on the newly available documents, Morris described how and why sixty per cent of the Palestinians were uprooted and their society destroyed. It was a far more complex picture than many Israelis were prepared to accept. The book features a map that shows three hundred and eighty-nine Arab villages, from upper Galilee to the Negev Desert. Morris revealed that in forty-nine of these villages the indigenous Arabs were expelled by the Haganah and other Jewish military forces; in sixty-two villages, the Arabs fled out of fear, having heard rumors of attacks and even massacres; in six, the villagers left at the instruction of Palestinian local leaders. ...
Morris’s aim was not simply to invert the standard Zionist narrative. He provided a stark picture of the anti-Semitism that infected the Arab leadership, including the influential mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, who refused any compromise with the Zionists and, in the forties, promoted anti-Jewish propaganda from Berlin and recruited Bosnian Muslims for the S.S. Morris quoted the many leaders among the Palestinians and the Arab countries who vowed to eliminate the nascent state of Israel and force the European Jewish arrivals back to where they came from. But he also wrote at length about acts of wartime cruelty committed by the Jewish victors against the Palestinians. ... He said that there were about two dozen acts of massacre, some involving four or five executions but others involving many more, at Saliha, Deir Yassin, Lydda, and Dawayima. ...
Between 1993 and 1998, amid the optimism of the Oslo Accords and the possibility that the century-long conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs might be coming to a negotiated end, Morris worked on a comprehensive survey of the confrontation. The title, "Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001," attests to the book’s historical and imaginative sympathy both for the Zionists, who acquired a homeland but never a sense of security, and for the Palestinians, whose demand for a homeland remained unsatisfied. Like all Morris’s work, ... its attempt at balance is obvious: where there is anti-Arab racism among the Zionist forefathers, it is quoted; where there is venality among the early Palestinian leadership, it, too, is pointed out. ...
Yasir Arafat’s rejection of the peace proposals proffered by Ehud Barak in 2000 at Camp David and at Taba, Egypt, coupled with the second intifada, which followed, disillusioned Benny Morris to the point of embitterment. Morris, who has always voted for parties on the left, said that Arafat had "defrauded" the Israelis, and he decided that the Palestinians had no intention of forging a compromise. Morris was not at all persuaded by explanations and press reports claiming that Clinton and Barak had offered Arafat an unfair, hastily prepared deal. Even if Israel returned to its pre-1967 borders, Morris concluded, the Palestinians would consider that only a step in a "phased plan" to eliminate a "crusader state" from sacred Arab lands. After 2000, he said in a 2004 interview with Ha’aretz, "I understood that they were unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all. Lod and Acre and Jaffa." Morris did criticize the Israeli government for continuing to build on occupied territory, but, especially in his role as pundit and polemicist, he was no longer giving equal weight to two "righteous victims."
In the Ha’aretz interview, Morris took a tone that was in scant evidence in his earlier journalism or scholarly work. He spoke of a "deep problem in Islam," of a world in which "life doesn’t have the same value it does in the West." The Arabs belonged to a "tribal culture" in which "revenge" played a "central part," a society so lacking in "moral inhibitions" that "if it obtains chemical or biological or atomic weapons, it will use them."
... He described the Arab world as "barbarian," and said that the Israeli massacres committed in 1947-48 were "peanuts" compared with those in Bosnia. Then, there was his call to build "something like a cage" for the Palestinians: "I know that sounds terrible. It is really cruel. But there is no other choice. There is a wild animal that has to be locked up in one way or another." Upon reflection, even Morris was appalled by those words and later apologized.
To some extent, Morris has been writing the same book throughout his scholarly life, and one theme that has been pronounced is that of "transfer." In all his work, he has explored the thorny question of whether or not Ben-Gurion and his colleagues explicitly endorsed a policy of "transferring"—exiling—the Arab population from Israel.
By the time of the 2004 Ha’aretz interview, Morris had adopted a harsher, more prescriptive tone that was sometimes chilling to the liberal audience that had first welcomed him. Fearing the loss of a Jewish majority and the rise of an Arab fifth column, some right-wing politicians have advocated transferring either the Palestinian Arabs or the Israeli Arabs, or both, to Jordan—a country they refer to as the true Palestinian state. (That was once a theme of Ariel Sharon’s.)
Although Morris does not endorse such a policy—"It is neither moral nor realistic"—he does say that, historically speaking, BenGurion "faltered" in 1948. "If he was already engaged in expulsion, maybe he should have done a complete job," he told Ha’aretz. "I know that this stuns the Arabs and the liberals and the politically correct types. But my feeling is that this place would be quieter and know less suffering if the matter had been resolved once and for all." Morris acknowledged that ethnic cleansing was "problematic" but later pointed out catastrophic situations in which it could be "beneficial for humanity." He cited the Turkish expulsion of the Greek minority, Greece’s expulsion of its Turkish minority after the First World War, and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. ...
Four years ago, Morris said that only "apocalyptic" circumstances would demand that Israel carry out a policy of transfer. By January, 2007, writing in the Jerusalem Post, he seemed convinced that apocalypse was around the corner. The United States has been driven to isolationism by its "debacle" in Iraq, Russia and China are "obsessed with Muslim markets," and Israel, led by a "party hack of a prime minister," who botched the war with Hezbollah in 2006, will now be "like a rabbit caught in the headlights" as Iran prepares to launch nuclear-tipped Shihab missiles at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Be’er Sheva. In this scenario, which Morris implied is nearly inevitable, the Israeli leadership knows that it cannot launch a unilateral attack on Iran, for fear of igniting a "world-embracing" terror campaign....
What is so striking about Morris’s work as a historian is that it does not flatter anyone’s prejudices, least of all his own.
The stridency and darkness of some of his public pronouncements is not a feature of "Righteous Victims," which is the most useful survey of the conflict, or of "1948," which is the best history of the first Arab-Israeli wars. In "1948," the assembled compendium of aspiration, folly, aggression, hypocrisy, deception, bigotry, violence, suffering, and achievement is so comprehensive and multilayered that no reader can emerge without a feeling of unease—which is to say, a sense of the moral and historical intricacy of the conflict.
One of the lingering mythologies that Morris set out to confront in "1948" is the iconography of strength and weakness, the competition between Jews and Palestinians for the role of underdog and chief victim.
There were two wars following the U.N. partition resolution: first, the immediate Palestinian uprising against the Yishuv, and then, after the Palestinian defeat, the coördinated invasion by the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. Morris concludes that the Arabs were demographically and geopolitically stronger—the Palestinians outnumbered the Jews of the Yishuv two to one, and the surrounding Arab states had a population, all told, of forty million.
But in the years leading to the war the Yishuv had organized political and military institutions that were suited to crisis. Troop call-ups, expert foreign military personnel, and weapons-procurement systems were in place. By contrast, very few Palestinians came from the Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus areas to aid their fellow Palestinian Arabs in Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, and the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys. "The Yishuv had fought not a ‘people,’ " Morris concludes, "but an assortment of regions, towns, and villages." When the four Arab armies invaded, on May 15, 1948, they, too, were disorganized and—compared with the Jews, who were fighting for their survival—far less motivated.
About six thousand Jews and twelve thousand Palestinians died in the conflict; the Egyptians lost fourteen hundred men; the Iraqis, Jordanians, and Syrians lost several hundred each. Not long afterward, ... the Jewish minorities in the Islamic world—in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Libya—experienced anti-Semitic demonstrations, pogroms, threats, internments, bomb attacks, synagogue fires. This, too, was a product of the war, and half a million Jews, the Sephardim, eventually left Islamic countries for Israel and, largely because of the circumstances of their exile, formed the Likud rank and file. ...
If you have the patience, I suggest you go back and read Remnick’s entire article online, which includes the origins of the belief that Palestine was "a land without a people for a people without a land."
For nearly forty years, Israeli histories and textbooks, with few exceptions, endorsed the notion that the more than seven hundred thousand Arabs who left Palestine as refugees in the years between 1947 and 1950 did so voluntarily or at the urging of their leaders. ...
In the late eighties, Israel encountered its first revisionist historians, a group of rigorous young scholars intent on seeing clearly the founding and development of the state, come what may. At the head of that small and diverse movement was Benny Morris, a Sabra and a Cambridge-educated leftist, who, like Israel itself, was born in 1948. His latest book on that pivotal year of war and transformation, "1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War" (Yale; $32.50), is a commanding, superbly documented, and fair-minded study of the events that, in the wake of the Holocaust, gave a sovereign home to one people and dispossessed another.
Remarkably, the book makes every attempt at depth and balance, even though its author has professed a "cosmic pessimism" about the current situation in the Middle East and has denounced the Palestinian leadership in the harshest terms imaginable....
In 1988, Morris published "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949," which revolutionized Israeli historiography and, to a great extent, a nation’s understanding of its own birth. Relying less on testimony than on the newly available documents, Morris described how and why sixty per cent of the Palestinians were uprooted and their society destroyed. It was a far more complex picture than many Israelis were prepared to accept. The book features a map that shows three hundred and eighty-nine Arab villages, from upper Galilee to the Negev Desert. Morris revealed that in forty-nine of these villages the indigenous Arabs were expelled by the Haganah and other Jewish military forces; in sixty-two villages, the Arabs fled out of fear, having heard rumors of attacks and even massacres; in six, the villagers left at the instruction of Palestinian local leaders. ...
Morris’s aim was not simply to invert the standard Zionist narrative. He provided a stark picture of the anti-Semitism that infected the Arab leadership, including the influential mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, who refused any compromise with the Zionists and, in the forties, promoted anti-Jewish propaganda from Berlin and recruited Bosnian Muslims for the S.S. Morris quoted the many leaders among the Palestinians and the Arab countries who vowed to eliminate the nascent state of Israel and force the European Jewish arrivals back to where they came from. But he also wrote at length about acts of wartime cruelty committed by the Jewish victors against the Palestinians. ... He said that there were about two dozen acts of massacre, some involving four or five executions but others involving many more, at Saliha, Deir Yassin, Lydda, and Dawayima. ...
Between 1993 and 1998, amid the optimism of the Oslo Accords and the possibility that the century-long conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs might be coming to a negotiated end, Morris worked on a comprehensive survey of the confrontation. The title, "Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001," attests to the book’s historical and imaginative sympathy both for the Zionists, who acquired a homeland but never a sense of security, and for the Palestinians, whose demand for a homeland remained unsatisfied. Like all Morris’s work, ... its attempt at balance is obvious: where there is anti-Arab racism among the Zionist forefathers, it is quoted; where there is venality among the early Palestinian leadership, it, too, is pointed out. ...
Yasir Arafat’s rejection of the peace proposals proffered by Ehud Barak in 2000 at Camp David and at Taba, Egypt, coupled with the second intifada, which followed, disillusioned Benny Morris to the point of embitterment. Morris, who has always voted for parties on the left, said that Arafat had "defrauded" the Israelis, and he decided that the Palestinians had no intention of forging a compromise. Morris was not at all persuaded by explanations and press reports claiming that Clinton and Barak had offered Arafat an unfair, hastily prepared deal. Even if Israel returned to its pre-1967 borders, Morris concluded, the Palestinians would consider that only a step in a "phased plan" to eliminate a "crusader state" from sacred Arab lands. After 2000, he said in a 2004 interview with Ha’aretz, "I understood that they were unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all. Lod and Acre and Jaffa." Morris did criticize the Israeli government for continuing to build on occupied territory, but, especially in his role as pundit and polemicist, he was no longer giving equal weight to two "righteous victims."
In the Ha’aretz interview, Morris took a tone that was in scant evidence in his earlier journalism or scholarly work. He spoke of a "deep problem in Islam," of a world in which "life doesn’t have the same value it does in the West." The Arabs belonged to a "tribal culture" in which "revenge" played a "central part," a society so lacking in "moral inhibitions" that "if it obtains chemical or biological or atomic weapons, it will use them."
... He described the Arab world as "barbarian," and said that the Israeli massacres committed in 1947-48 were "peanuts" compared with those in Bosnia. Then, there was his call to build "something like a cage" for the Palestinians: "I know that sounds terrible. It is really cruel. But there is no other choice. There is a wild animal that has to be locked up in one way or another." Upon reflection, even Morris was appalled by those words and later apologized.
To some extent, Morris has been writing the same book throughout his scholarly life, and one theme that has been pronounced is that of "transfer." In all his work, he has explored the thorny question of whether or not Ben-Gurion and his colleagues explicitly endorsed a policy of "transferring"—exiling—the Arab population from Israel.
By the time of the 2004 Ha’aretz interview, Morris had adopted a harsher, more prescriptive tone that was sometimes chilling to the liberal audience that had first welcomed him. Fearing the loss of a Jewish majority and the rise of an Arab fifth column, some right-wing politicians have advocated transferring either the Palestinian Arabs or the Israeli Arabs, or both, to Jordan—a country they refer to as the true Palestinian state. (That was once a theme of Ariel Sharon’s.)
Although Morris does not endorse such a policy—"It is neither moral nor realistic"—he does say that, historically speaking, BenGurion "faltered" in 1948. "If he was already engaged in expulsion, maybe he should have done a complete job," he told Ha’aretz. "I know that this stuns the Arabs and the liberals and the politically correct types. But my feeling is that this place would be quieter and know less suffering if the matter had been resolved once and for all." Morris acknowledged that ethnic cleansing was "problematic" but later pointed out catastrophic situations in which it could be "beneficial for humanity." He cited the Turkish expulsion of the Greek minority, Greece’s expulsion of its Turkish minority after the First World War, and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. ...
Four years ago, Morris said that only "apocalyptic" circumstances would demand that Israel carry out a policy of transfer. By January, 2007, writing in the Jerusalem Post, he seemed convinced that apocalypse was around the corner. The United States has been driven to isolationism by its "debacle" in Iraq, Russia and China are "obsessed with Muslim markets," and Israel, led by a "party hack of a prime minister," who botched the war with Hezbollah in 2006, will now be "like a rabbit caught in the headlights" as Iran prepares to launch nuclear-tipped Shihab missiles at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Be’er Sheva. In this scenario, which Morris implied is nearly inevitable, the Israeli leadership knows that it cannot launch a unilateral attack on Iran, for fear of igniting a "world-embracing" terror campaign....
What is so striking about Morris’s work as a historian is that it does not flatter anyone’s prejudices, least of all his own.
The stridency and darkness of some of his public pronouncements is not a feature of "Righteous Victims," which is the most useful survey of the conflict, or of "1948," which is the best history of the first Arab-Israeli wars. In "1948," the assembled compendium of aspiration, folly, aggression, hypocrisy, deception, bigotry, violence, suffering, and achievement is so comprehensive and multilayered that no reader can emerge without a feeling of unease—which is to say, a sense of the moral and historical intricacy of the conflict.
One of the lingering mythologies that Morris set out to confront in "1948" is the iconography of strength and weakness, the competition between Jews and Palestinians for the role of underdog and chief victim.
There were two wars following the U.N. partition resolution: first, the immediate Palestinian uprising against the Yishuv, and then, after the Palestinian defeat, the coördinated invasion by the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. Morris concludes that the Arabs were demographically and geopolitically stronger—the Palestinians outnumbered the Jews of the Yishuv two to one, and the surrounding Arab states had a population, all told, of forty million.
But in the years leading to the war the Yishuv had organized political and military institutions that were suited to crisis. Troop call-ups, expert foreign military personnel, and weapons-procurement systems were in place. By contrast, very few Palestinians came from the Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus areas to aid their fellow Palestinian Arabs in Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, and the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys. "The Yishuv had fought not a ‘people,’ " Morris concludes, "but an assortment of regions, towns, and villages." When the four Arab armies invaded, on May 15, 1948, they, too, were disorganized and—compared with the Jews, who were fighting for their survival—far less motivated.
About six thousand Jews and twelve thousand Palestinians died in the conflict; the Egyptians lost fourteen hundred men; the Iraqis, Jordanians, and Syrians lost several hundred each. Not long afterward, ... the Jewish minorities in the Islamic world—in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Libya—experienced anti-Semitic demonstrations, pogroms, threats, internments, bomb attacks, synagogue fires. This, too, was a product of the war, and half a million Jews, the Sephardim, eventually left Islamic countries for Israel and, largely because of the circumstances of their exile, formed the Likud rank and file. ...
If you have the patience, I suggest you go back and read Remnick’s entire article online, which includes the origins of the belief that Palestine was "a land without a people for a people without a land."
Wednesday, May 07, 2008
Soccer and the Jewish Question
It’s a season for solemn ceremony in the Jewish world. Late last week was Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Memorial Day. Today is Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day, remembering the approximately 23,000 soldiers and civilians who have fallen in Israel’s wars and many skirmishes, culminating tonight in the beginning of Yom Ha’atzmaut, Israel’s Independence Day, a time for celebration. This year, because of the cycles of the Hebrew calendar that determines these dates, Yom Hazikaron falls on my birthday, and after nightfall, I will still be observing my 59th year as Israel commemorates its 60th.
Our khaver, Hillel Schenker, posted on the London Guardian’s blog regarding his mix of feelings about watching an important soccer match on a German television network on Yom HaShoah. Israel blacks out broadcasts on Hebrew language networks that day. To learn about the political and cultural resonances of soccer in Israel, read the following explanation from Hillel, after reading his May 2nd posting, "To watch or not to watch?":
"Hapoel Tel Aviv was once owned by the Histadrut [trade union confederation], but it's still considered the ultimate left-wing team in Israel, definitely by its fans. As for Maccabi Tel Aviv, they are associated with the capitalist bourgeoisie, not the Likud. Particularly in basketball, where they rule the roost, they have assumed the role of the nation's team, milking the government and TV powers for money along the way. It's considered "unpatriotic" not to support them, something like the role the NY Yankees had/have in New York, a team that assumes it was born to win. However, they are not associated with the Likud, and actually have left-wing supporters as well.
"The Likud team is Beitar Jerusalem, the only Israeli soccer team which has never had an Arab or a Moslem player. Today, virtually every other team has at least one, and frequently a few Arab and Druze players. Hapoel Tel Aviv's captain is an Arab, Walid Badir, and the captain of the under 21 national team is another Hapoel Tel Aviv minority player, Bibrus Natko, who is a Circassian. As you may know, there is also an Arab team in the top league - Bnai Sachnin, Arab-owned with a Jewish coach. There is a wonderful film made about them: 'We too don't have any other country.' About half the players are Arabs from Sachnin and other Galilean towns, and the other half are Jews and internationals. This year they are one of the top four teams in the league.
"Beitar's fans, who are extreme right-wing, frequently Kahanists, would rebel if the current owner, Russian oligarch Arkady Gaidamak would bring in an Arab player, something he has said he is ready to do. Olmert has been one of the teams patrons, particularly when he was a Likud member and the Jerusalem mayor. Today, his status vis-a-vis the teams fan base is much more problematic. It will be interesting to see how the fans will react if Gaidamak, who will be running a Social Justice party in the next elections, will dare to include an Arab on the list. Beitar are the current champions, because Gaidamak has outspent all of the other teams by far, buying the best Israeli and foreign players. To make things even more complicated, one of the top Israeli players he bought is Michael Zandberg, who's mother Esther is a well-known progressive architectural and urban planning columnist in Ha'aretz.
"That's a brief Israeli soccer l0l course."
Our khaver, Hillel Schenker, posted on the London Guardian’s blog regarding his mix of feelings about watching an important soccer match on a German television network on Yom HaShoah. Israel blacks out broadcasts on Hebrew language networks that day. To learn about the political and cultural resonances of soccer in Israel, read the following explanation from Hillel, after reading his May 2nd posting, "To watch or not to watch?":
"Hapoel Tel Aviv was once owned by the Histadrut [trade union confederation], but it's still considered the ultimate left-wing team in Israel, definitely by its fans. As for Maccabi Tel Aviv, they are associated with the capitalist bourgeoisie, not the Likud. Particularly in basketball, where they rule the roost, they have assumed the role of the nation's team, milking the government and TV powers for money along the way. It's considered "unpatriotic" not to support them, something like the role the NY Yankees had/have in New York, a team that assumes it was born to win. However, they are not associated with the Likud, and actually have left-wing supporters as well.
"The Likud team is Beitar Jerusalem, the only Israeli soccer team which has never had an Arab or a Moslem player. Today, virtually every other team has at least one, and frequently a few Arab and Druze players. Hapoel Tel Aviv's captain is an Arab, Walid Badir, and the captain of the under 21 national team is another Hapoel Tel Aviv minority player, Bibrus Natko, who is a Circassian. As you may know, there is also an Arab team in the top league - Bnai Sachnin, Arab-owned with a Jewish coach. There is a wonderful film made about them: 'We too don't have any other country.' About half the players are Arabs from Sachnin and other Galilean towns, and the other half are Jews and internationals. This year they are one of the top four teams in the league.
"Beitar's fans, who are extreme right-wing, frequently Kahanists, would rebel if the current owner, Russian oligarch Arkady Gaidamak would bring in an Arab player, something he has said he is ready to do. Olmert has been one of the teams patrons, particularly when he was a Likud member and the Jerusalem mayor. Today, his status vis-a-vis the teams fan base is much more problematic. It will be interesting to see how the fans will react if Gaidamak, who will be running a Social Justice party in the next elections, will dare to include an Arab on the list. Beitar are the current champions, because Gaidamak has outspent all of the other teams by far, buying the best Israeli and foreign players. To make things even more complicated, one of the top Israeli players he bought is Michael Zandberg, who's mother Esther is a well-known progressive architectural and urban planning columnist in Ha'aretz.
"That's a brief Israeli soccer l0l course."
Monday, May 05, 2008
Israel at 120
Racism. Blatant discrimination against women. The legitimization of ethnic cleansing. Undue influence over public policy wielded by a wealthy oligarchy. A Declaration of Independence that spoke of equality, amid a stark reality of inequality. A democracy at 60.
No, this is not a profile of Israel, as we approach her 60th birthday next week, but a snapshot of the situation in the United States of America circa 1836. The US at 60 was a nation in which human slavery was legal and practiced widely; in which women were denied the right to vote and, in many cases, to hold property. A nation in which Native Americans were being ethnically cleansed by the new Americans - settlers and homesteaders rapidly pushing westward. A country in which - as its own President, Andrew Jackson, complained - "the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes".
This is certainly not to say that, over the last 172 years, America has healed all its ills. Nor am I suggesting in any way that Israel of 2008 should be excused its failings and excesses, since they pale in comparison to those of Jacksonian America. But a look at America at 60 is instructive, since it reminds us that young nations are works in progress, subject to change, growth - and, hopefully, even repair and improvement. Through hard-fought struggles waged by abolitionists, women's rights leaders and others, slavery was made illegal in the US; women secured their right to vote.
There are still wrongs to right in the US, as there are in 60 year-old Israel. Luckily, there are people in both nations doing the hard, unheralded, sometimes thankless work of social change, of tikkun olam.
Israel at 60 - despite the shortcomings that still need to be addressed - is a cause for celebration. But I foresee with optimism an Israel at 120 that will be an even more profound source of pride. My Israel in 2068 will have reached an accommodation with all its neighbors, no longer vilified, no longer ruling over another people, and no longer confusing the short-term security benefits provided by roadblocks and territory with the long-term benefits of regional integration.
Israel at 120 will be a nation that lives up to the promises made in its Declaration of Independence: "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; [...] freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture". The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel will be living the "full and equal citizenship" promised them in May 1948, while Israel's Jews will be free to practice, interpret and develop their Judaism as they see fit - Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative and secular Jews no longer assigned second-class status (at best) by Israel's dominant orthodox rabbinical clique.
In Israel at 2068, women will no longer be subject to rabbinic court authority when it comes to questions of their marital status, and only half of the Knesset's 120 seats will be filled by men. Same-sex partnerships will have been legally recognized. The High Court of Justice, having fought off attempts to erode its authority, will remain the staunch defender of civil liberties and human rights.
One-hundred and twenty year-old Israel will have reversed the trend of socio-economic polarization it has witnessed since free-market liberalism became bon ton around its 30th birthday. Israel at 120 will have a dignified pension system for its seniors, and certainly would never tolerate a third of its children living under the poverty line.
Israel at 120 won't be perfect, but it will be headed in the right direction.
I sometimes encounter politically progressive young Jews who, observing the many blemishes on Israel's complexion, suggest that Israel is somehow irredeemable, that Zionism is an inherently "dirty" political program. In a way, they are not very different from the tens of thousands of American Jews who speak of Israel's independence in "miraculous" terms. Ironically, both sides seem to agree that Israel is something other than the collective opus of the people who live there.
But Israel is neither divine creation nor satanic scheme. It is a society, a polity, a home that can become a better place if its citizens help make that happen. And while too many of Israel's citizens subscribe to ideologies that put them at variance with the picture imagined above, just as many, if not more, still believe the country can, and must, find a better way.
So as we celebrate Israel's accomplishments at 60, and there are more than a few, let's also make a pledge to continue sharing their belief, and continue supporting an even brighter vision of Israel at 120. Lu Y'hi.
No, this is not a profile of Israel, as we approach her 60th birthday next week, but a snapshot of the situation in the United States of America circa 1836. The US at 60 was a nation in which human slavery was legal and practiced widely; in which women were denied the right to vote and, in many cases, to hold property. A nation in which Native Americans were being ethnically cleansed by the new Americans - settlers and homesteaders rapidly pushing westward. A country in which - as its own President, Andrew Jackson, complained - "the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes".
This is certainly not to say that, over the last 172 years, America has healed all its ills. Nor am I suggesting in any way that Israel of 2008 should be excused its failings and excesses, since they pale in comparison to those of Jacksonian America. But a look at America at 60 is instructive, since it reminds us that young nations are works in progress, subject to change, growth - and, hopefully, even repair and improvement. Through hard-fought struggles waged by abolitionists, women's rights leaders and others, slavery was made illegal in the US; women secured their right to vote.
There are still wrongs to right in the US, as there are in 60 year-old Israel. Luckily, there are people in both nations doing the hard, unheralded, sometimes thankless work of social change, of tikkun olam.
Israel at 60 - despite the shortcomings that still need to be addressed - is a cause for celebration. But I foresee with optimism an Israel at 120 that will be an even more profound source of pride. My Israel in 2068 will have reached an accommodation with all its neighbors, no longer vilified, no longer ruling over another people, and no longer confusing the short-term security benefits provided by roadblocks and territory with the long-term benefits of regional integration.
Israel at 120 will be a nation that lives up to the promises made in its Declaration of Independence: "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; [...] freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture". The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel will be living the "full and equal citizenship" promised them in May 1948, while Israel's Jews will be free to practice, interpret and develop their Judaism as they see fit - Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative and secular Jews no longer assigned second-class status (at best) by Israel's dominant orthodox rabbinical clique.
In Israel at 2068, women will no longer be subject to rabbinic court authority when it comes to questions of their marital status, and only half of the Knesset's 120 seats will be filled by men. Same-sex partnerships will have been legally recognized. The High Court of Justice, having fought off attempts to erode its authority, will remain the staunch defender of civil liberties and human rights.
One-hundred and twenty year-old Israel will have reversed the trend of socio-economic polarization it has witnessed since free-market liberalism became bon ton around its 30th birthday. Israel at 120 will have a dignified pension system for its seniors, and certainly would never tolerate a third of its children living under the poverty line.
Israel at 120 won't be perfect, but it will be headed in the right direction.
I sometimes encounter politically progressive young Jews who, observing the many blemishes on Israel's complexion, suggest that Israel is somehow irredeemable, that Zionism is an inherently "dirty" political program. In a way, they are not very different from the tens of thousands of American Jews who speak of Israel's independence in "miraculous" terms. Ironically, both sides seem to agree that Israel is something other than the collective opus of the people who live there.
But Israel is neither divine creation nor satanic scheme. It is a society, a polity, a home that can become a better place if its citizens help make that happen. And while too many of Israel's citizens subscribe to ideologies that put them at variance with the picture imagined above, just as many, if not more, still believe the country can, and must, find a better way.
So as we celebrate Israel's accomplishments at 60, and there are more than a few, let's also make a pledge to continue sharing their belief, and continue supporting an even brighter vision of Israel at 120. Lu Y'hi.
Friday, May 02, 2008
Daniel Pipes’ war on 'soft Jihadism'
Implied in last Monday’s lengthy article in the NY Times on the controversy surrounding Debbie Almontaser, the Yemini-born and US-raised educator who lost her job as the founding principal of the Khalil Gibran International Academy (a New York City public high school dedicated to the study of Arab language and culture), is that she has been hounded and unfairly targeted by extremists organized or encouraged by Daniel Pipes. Dr. Pipes is a right-wing ideologue whose activities profit from his status as a Harvard-credentialed scholar of the Middle East.
I don't know if a public school of this nature was such a good idea, but Pipes' efforts against "soft Jihadism" seem dangerously intolerant and paranoid. Almontaser appears to represent exactly the kind of Islamic voice we should be encouraging rather than pushing away.
One egregious example of Pipes’ MO disclosed in this Times article was his distortion of a quotation of Ms. Almontaser regarding the terror attacks of 9/11: He just quotes the first part of her statement that she didn't see Arabs or Muslims as carrying out the 9/11 attacks while omitting her concluding point that she saw these attackers as betraying their Arab identities and Muslim faith. He is a McCarthyite; he's out to destroy people's reputations because he has this malicious notion that moderate Muslims are really "soft jihadis."
I don't know if a public school of this nature was such a good idea, but Pipes' efforts against "soft Jihadism" seem dangerously intolerant and paranoid. Almontaser appears to represent exactly the kind of Islamic voice we should be encouraging rather than pushing away.
One egregious example of Pipes’ MO disclosed in this Times article was his distortion of a quotation of Ms. Almontaser regarding the terror attacks of 9/11: He just quotes the first part of her statement that she didn't see Arabs or Muslims as carrying out the 9/11 attacks while omitting her concluding point that she saw these attackers as betraying their Arab identities and Muslim faith. He is a McCarthyite; he's out to destroy people's reputations because he has this malicious notion that moderate Muslims are really "soft jihadis."
Thursday, May 01, 2008
Holocaust Memorial Day
My local synagogue’s commemoration featured a talk by Peter Duffy, the author of "The Bielski Brothers: The True Story of Three Men Who Defied the Nazis, Built a Village in the Forest, and Saved 1200 Jews." (The book’s subtitle encapsulates the story.)
This event was planned by the shul’s vice president, whose mother was one of those saved by the Bielskis. A son of one of the Bielski bothers also spoke and a young person in the audience identified herself as one of the "28,000" people — survivors and their descendants — who Peter Duffy indicated are living today because of the Bielskis.
The story is described in a little more detail in this description from the Web:
For a completely different kind of reflection on the Holocaust, one might call it anti-heroic, check out Larry Bush’s thoughtful blog posting, "Never Say Never Again." This Bush (absolutely no relation) is the editor of Jewish Currents magazine, which was "wedded" to the Workmen’s Circle about two years ago (they called it a wedding and actually staged a ceremony).
This event was planned by the shul’s vice president, whose mother was one of those saved by the Bielskis. A son of one of the Bielski bothers also spoke and a young person in the audience identified herself as one of the "28,000" people — survivors and their descendants — who Peter Duffy indicated are living today because of the Bielskis.
The story is described in a little more detail in this description from the Web:
In 1941, three brothers witnessed their parents and two other siblings being led away to their eventual murders. It was a grim scene that would, of course, be repeated endlessly throughout the war. Instead of running or giving in to despair, these brothers – Tuvia, Zus, and Asael Bielski – fought back, waging a guerrilla war of wits against the Nazis. By using their intimate knowledge of the dense forests surrounding the Belarusan towns of Novogrudek and Lida, the Bielskis evaded the Nazis and established a hidden base camp, then set about convincing other Jews to join their ranks. As more and more Jews arrived each day, a robust community began to emerge, a "Jerusalem in the woods." After two and a half years in the woods, in July 1944, the Bielskis learned that the Germans, overrun by the Red Army, were retreating back toward Berlin. More than one thousand Bielski Jews emerged – alive – on that final, triumphant exit from the woods.We were informed that the story will be told in a motion picture, "Defiance," to be released in December. It is directed by Edward Zwick and stars Daniel Craig (the latest incarnation of James Bond) and Liev Schreiber. There’s a preview available online. I hope it will do this story justice.
For a completely different kind of reflection on the Holocaust, one might call it anti-heroic, check out Larry Bush’s thoughtful blog posting, "Never Say Never Again." This Bush (absolutely no relation) is the editor of Jewish Currents magazine, which was "wedded" to the Workmen’s Circle about two years ago (they called it a wedding and actually staged a ceremony).
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