Flawed Electoral System
The need for an Israeli prime minister to be skilled at coalition building has only deepened with the degeneration of Israel’s electoral system increasingly into a free-for-all of multiple parties — with 12 electoral blocs and as many as 17 distinct parties in the current Knesset. Israel has an extreme form of proportional representation, with a threshold of votes for getting into parliament that is too low, at about two percent, for a stable majority to govern.
No single party or list has ever won a majority of the 120 seats in the Knesset, but the major parties have declined to a historical low. Labor and Meretz have fallen from 44 and 12 members elected respectively with Rabin in 1992, to 19 and five seats today — paying the political price for the failure of the peace process of the 1990s.
As for Kadima, it’s still reeling from last year’s dismal war with Hezbollah; Olmert is consistently shown in the polls as leading Kadima to defeat. But elections are not due until 2010 and sitting Members of Knesset who know they are vulnerable have little incentive to vote no-confidence in the government, precipitating an early election. (And Olmert’s stock has risen lately due to the popularity of the mysterious military move against a target in Syria the other week.)
Contrary to what is generally believed, a possible silver lining of Olmert’s weakness is that this might embolden him to seriously negotiate a two-state framework agreement with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, to be consecrated at an upcoming international conference scheduled for November. Such a dramatic development, if it is seen as bolstering prospects for peace, would boost Olmert electorally. (But, given a host of factors, its success must be regarded as a longshot.)
Barak is apparently basing his comeback strategy on a hardline stand. He is said to have discounted the possibility of any West Bank withdrawal in the near term. He has reportedly proclaimed the need for three to five years for Israel to develop a technological defense against such rocket and missile attacks from the West Bank as Israel has experienced from the other territories it evacuated — Gaza and southern Lebanon. Barak may undermine Olmert’s efforts to bolster Abbas with the dismantling of West Bank checkpoints or the further release of prisoners.
Barak could have delivered much yet failed miserably as prime minister. Today’s resurrected version has been hardened by that experience.
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Sunday, September 30, 2007
Friday, September 28, 2007
Barak's Second Coming, Part 1
The following is a modified version of my "Column Left" in the pending autumn 2007 issue of ISRAEL HORIZONS, and an article in the October issue of IN THESE TIMES:
Nearly 10 years to the day since Ehud Barak was first elected chair of Israel’s Labor party (June 3, 1997, defeating Yossi Beilin), he emerged victorious again this past June 12 — in a narrow primary win over his more dovish opponent, Ami Ayalon. On June 17, he replaced the hapless Amir Peretz as minister of defense.
In 1999, Barak had trounced the incumbent Likud prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu, with 57 percent in a direct vote. This was under the short-lived experiment that mandated a separate ballot for prime minister — a reform ended after the 2001 election with a return to Israel’s traditional means of electing prime ministers, via competing parliamentary lists.
Although prime minister for a mere 20 months, Barak was energetic:
negotiating within a few meters of a peace agreement with Syria, withdrawing Israeli forces unilaterally from Lebanon, attempting an agreement with the Palestinians at Camp David in the summer of 2000, presiding over the beginnings of the intifada that followed, making one last-ditch negotiating attempt at Taba and then succumbing in a nearly two-to-one electoral debacle to Ariel Sharon. Barak resigned from politics, loudly proclaiming that Yasir Arafat had proven himself incapable of making peace.
The reality is that both leaders can legitimately share blame: Barak for delaying and in other ways mishandling negotiations with the Palestinians and Arafat for disastrously attempting to use the violent uprising known as the Al-Aksa Intifada as leverage on the Israelis, rather than doing all he could to quickly end it.
Even so, Barak came close to concluding agreements with both Syria and the Palestinians. But he also fatally tried the patience of Palestinians by heading a coalition that included the pro-settler National Religious Party (allowing them to expand settlements) and rejecting the option of including supportive Arab parties in his coalition. He refused the further interim withdrawal agreement called for under Oslo and negotiated with Syria first – coming to a blind alley because he insisted on those extra few meters (as, of course, did the Syrians).
Barak had not made a successful transition from armed forces chief of staff, a general who leads by commanding subordinates, to being a political leader who must negotiate decisions as first among equals. An example was his falling out with the Meretz party, his more left-wing but also ideologically closest ally. (For a time, Barak wasn’t even on speaking terms with Yossi Sarid, then the leader of Meretz.) To be continued.
Nearly 10 years to the day since Ehud Barak was first elected chair of Israel’s Labor party (June 3, 1997, defeating Yossi Beilin), he emerged victorious again this past June 12 — in a narrow primary win over his more dovish opponent, Ami Ayalon. On June 17, he replaced the hapless Amir Peretz as minister of defense.
In 1999, Barak had trounced the incumbent Likud prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu, with 57 percent in a direct vote. This was under the short-lived experiment that mandated a separate ballot for prime minister — a reform ended after the 2001 election with a return to Israel’s traditional means of electing prime ministers, via competing parliamentary lists.
Although prime minister for a mere 20 months, Barak was energetic:
negotiating within a few meters of a peace agreement with Syria, withdrawing Israeli forces unilaterally from Lebanon, attempting an agreement with the Palestinians at Camp David in the summer of 2000, presiding over the beginnings of the intifada that followed, making one last-ditch negotiating attempt at Taba and then succumbing in a nearly two-to-one electoral debacle to Ariel Sharon. Barak resigned from politics, loudly proclaiming that Yasir Arafat had proven himself incapable of making peace.
The reality is that both leaders can legitimately share blame: Barak for delaying and in other ways mishandling negotiations with the Palestinians and Arafat for disastrously attempting to use the violent uprising known as the Al-Aksa Intifada as leverage on the Israelis, rather than doing all he could to quickly end it.
Even so, Barak came close to concluding agreements with both Syria and the Palestinians. But he also fatally tried the patience of Palestinians by heading a coalition that included the pro-settler National Religious Party (allowing them to expand settlements) and rejecting the option of including supportive Arab parties in his coalition. He refused the further interim withdrawal agreement called for under Oslo and negotiated with Syria first – coming to a blind alley because he insisted on those extra few meters (as, of course, did the Syrians).
Barak had not made a successful transition from armed forces chief of staff, a general who leads by commanding subordinates, to being a political leader who must negotiate decisions as first among equals. An example was his falling out with the Meretz party, his more left-wing but also ideologically closest ally. (For a time, Barak wasn’t even on speaking terms with Yossi Sarid, then the leader of Meretz.) To be continued.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Bollinger and Ahmadinejad
Columbia University’s president Lee Bollinger was most impressive when I saw him speak last spring at a meeting organized by the American Jewish Committee. He has been outspoken in his opposition to academic boycotts of Israel and on the "Israel = apartheid" argument.
He may have misstepped in inviting Ahmadinejad to Columbia the other day, but it was with the best of intentions: to challenge and expose the latter’s outrageous views on the Holocaust and Israel. Bollinger’s take-no-prisoners introductory remarks made this abundantly clear.
But while he and Columbia were in their rights to invite this guy– and I applaud Mayor Bloomberg’s dismissal of New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s threat to punish Columbia financially – this may not have been wise. It gave Ahmadinejad a high-profile forum to espouse his odious views. Although this revealed his bigotry on homosexuality and his unwillingness to forthrightly own up to his antisemitism, Ahmadinejad expertly used Columbia as a platform to advance his propaganda assault against Israel.
"Why should the Palestinians pay for an event they had nothing to do with?" he stated to a round of applause, in responding to a query on the Holocaust.
While I certainly understand why this answer resonates with some, I wish to counter it. I do so not to deny the sufferings and injustices endured by the Palestinian Arab people in the wake of the Holocaust, but to provide some important historical details and to add moral texture.
Palestinian-Arab nationalist forces were uncompromising in their demand that Jewish immigration to the British Mandate of Palestine be ended, despite the fact that the Jews of continental Europe desperately needed a place of refuge from the looming Nazi onslaught. The most powerful Palestinian wartime leader, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was an active ally of Hitler; he fought for the establishment of a pro-Nazi regime in Iraq and after fleeing to Germany following the defeat of the Iraqi rebellion in the spring of 1941, made propaganda broadcasts for the Axis and against the Jews and recruited Balkan Muslims to the SS.
When the Palestinians rejected the UN partition plan of 1947, they launched an all-out assault on the Yishuv, the Jewish presence in Palestine, attempting to destroy it a full six months before Israel’s declaration of independence and the invasion of Palestine by regular armies from neighboring Arab states. They did not attack to implement a binational state in Palestine, mind you, but to extinguish Jewish autonomy in that country and perhaps the physical existence of Jews there.
Again, this is not to excuse the harsh treatment meted out by Jewish militias and then by the nascent Israeli Defense Force in the fighting of November 1947 through January 1949. Nor to excuse Israel’s uncompromising stance toward the refugees over the decades or to condone the second-class status that Arab citizens of Israel have lived under. But Israel was reacting to a traumatic effort to destroy it at its birth, one that came close to succeeding during the darkest days of the independence war in the first half of 1948. Neither side was pristine in their actions;
innocents suffered on both sides in their thousands.
If not for Iran’s strident hostility, and its active assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel would pose no military threat to Iran — a non-Arab country that it has never fought and that does not even border on any of Israel’s immediate neighbors. It is raw antisemitism that fuels Iran’s hatred of Israel and Ahmadinejad’s infuriating Holocaust denial.
Iran’s Jewish community of 25,000 is not persecuted in a wholesale way, but there is no question that its status is precarious. Prominent Jews have been imprisoned as "Zionist agents" and the community has shrunk precipitously from its peak of about 80,000 at the time of the Islamic revolution, 28 years ago.
He may have misstepped in inviting Ahmadinejad to Columbia the other day, but it was with the best of intentions: to challenge and expose the latter’s outrageous views on the Holocaust and Israel. Bollinger’s take-no-prisoners introductory remarks made this abundantly clear.
But while he and Columbia were in their rights to invite this guy– and I applaud Mayor Bloomberg’s dismissal of New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s threat to punish Columbia financially – this may not have been wise. It gave Ahmadinejad a high-profile forum to espouse his odious views. Although this revealed his bigotry on homosexuality and his unwillingness to forthrightly own up to his antisemitism, Ahmadinejad expertly used Columbia as a platform to advance his propaganda assault against Israel.
"Why should the Palestinians pay for an event they had nothing to do with?" he stated to a round of applause, in responding to a query on the Holocaust.
While I certainly understand why this answer resonates with some, I wish to counter it. I do so not to deny the sufferings and injustices endured by the Palestinian Arab people in the wake of the Holocaust, but to provide some important historical details and to add moral texture.
Palestinian-Arab nationalist forces were uncompromising in their demand that Jewish immigration to the British Mandate of Palestine be ended, despite the fact that the Jews of continental Europe desperately needed a place of refuge from the looming Nazi onslaught. The most powerful Palestinian wartime leader, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was an active ally of Hitler; he fought for the establishment of a pro-Nazi regime in Iraq and after fleeing to Germany following the defeat of the Iraqi rebellion in the spring of 1941, made propaganda broadcasts for the Axis and against the Jews and recruited Balkan Muslims to the SS.
When the Palestinians rejected the UN partition plan of 1947, they launched an all-out assault on the Yishuv, the Jewish presence in Palestine, attempting to destroy it a full six months before Israel’s declaration of independence and the invasion of Palestine by regular armies from neighboring Arab states. They did not attack to implement a binational state in Palestine, mind you, but to extinguish Jewish autonomy in that country and perhaps the physical existence of Jews there.
Again, this is not to excuse the harsh treatment meted out by Jewish militias and then by the nascent Israeli Defense Force in the fighting of November 1947 through January 1949. Nor to excuse Israel’s uncompromising stance toward the refugees over the decades or to condone the second-class status that Arab citizens of Israel have lived under. But Israel was reacting to a traumatic effort to destroy it at its birth, one that came close to succeeding during the darkest days of the independence war in the first half of 1948. Neither side was pristine in their actions;
innocents suffered on both sides in their thousands.
If not for Iran’s strident hostility, and its active assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel would pose no military threat to Iran — a non-Arab country that it has never fought and that does not even border on any of Israel’s immediate neighbors. It is raw antisemitism that fuels Iran’s hatred of Israel and Ahmadinejad’s infuriating Holocaust denial.
Iran’s Jewish community of 25,000 is not persecuted in a wholesale way, but there is no question that its status is precarious. Prominent Jews have been imprisoned as "Zionist agents" and the community has shrunk precipitously from its peak of about 80,000 at the time of the Islamic revolution, 28 years ago.
Monday, September 24, 2007
Michael Green’s ‘Jerusalem Postcard’
Even amid the prospect of new punitive measures by Israel against the Gaza Strip as a response to ongoing rocket attacks, the dovish deputy prime minister, Haim Ramon, speaks of the necessity for Israel to cede Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Progressive-Zionist blogger, Michael Green, writes from Israel of right-wing demonstrators against possible territorial concessions contemplated by Prime Minister Olmert’s government in ongoing discussions with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen):
I’ve never felt entirely comfortable with slogan-chanting or banner- waving and this was no exception. But in truth, it was satisfying to publicly take a stand against the people who litter the city with their garish orange ribbons. It reminded me of experiences in England campaigning against anti-Zionists. In common with the far-right in Israel, British anti-Zionists also resort to crude Holocaust comparisons, as well as branding me and my brethren ‘Nazis’. One thing both have in common is the ability to privilege the rights of one people at the expense of another. Both of their ideologies are black and white: excluding the narrative and sufferings of the ‘other’ whilst rejecting any role they have to play in the current state of affairs. They are simply ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’. Whilst the effectiveness of banner-waving may be limited (2 million people took to the streets of London to protest against the Iraq war), it’s surely better to do so than let extremism and racism go unchecked – whether Israeli or Anti-Zionist.Click here for entire posting.
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Zel Lurie on mysterious incident in Syria
What follows is a lightly edited version of the column submitted by our khaver, J. Zel Lurie, for publication in the Jewish Journal of South Florida, 9/23/07. You can also check out a JTA piece of a few days ago -- plus this just published in the NY Times -- on this subject. G’mar Khatima Tova! [May you finish with a good decree!]
“Israel bombs Syria, but please don’t mention it” By J. Zel Lurie
On September 3, a small North Korean 1700-ton cargo ship docked at the Syrian port of Tartus. It unloaded its cargo into waiting trucks. The cargo was listed as cement.
Syria has never purchased cement from North Korea, nor was this cargo added to Syria’s inventory of cement. The trucks went across Syria, northeast, to storage bunkers near the Euphrates River, at the Iraqi border.
The Mossad had been tracking this ship and its cargo for some time. They believed the cargo was nuclear material including warheads. Israel did not wait long to strike: In the pre-dawn light of September 6, the bunkers were obliterated by Israeli precision bombs.
Syria complained to the UN about the invasion of its air space. They said nothing about the bombing. Why not?
Turkey was also involved. A Turkish minister complained that empty Israeli fuel tanks were dropped in Turkey. The Turkish Army, which cooperates closely with Israel despite being a Moslem country, did not interfere with the Israeli F-15s.
Not a single country, with one exception, commented on the invasion of Syria’s air space. The exception was North Korea, which slammed Israel for its action without mentioning the bombing.
North Korea had agreed, in exchange for ample payment, to dismantle its nuclear bomb facilities. Dismantle means dismantle. It does not mean exporting its nuclear capabilities to the Middle East.
The diplomats knew what was going on. Despite its preoccupation with the 2008 Olympics, China decided to act. China abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting of diplomats in Beijing.
Christopher R. Hill, the top American negotiator with North Korea, had his bag packed to leave for Beijing when he was informed of the cancellation. Reporters for the Washington Post put two and two together. On September 15 the Post broke the story of the bombing in Syria nine days earlier that nobody has admitted ever happened. I believe this is the first time in world history that a country was bombed by its neighbor and neither the bomber nor the bombed admitted it.
The Israel press has been muzzled by the Army censor. They are not allowed to discuss what happened in the skies over Syria, but many commentators seem to think that Bashir Assad would like to forget it and talk about peace with Israel and getting the Golan back.
Bashir has hinted about peace often in the recent past and has sent unofficial emissaries to Jerusalem. Many in Israel believe that Ehud Olmert has been prevented from responding to the Syrian initiative by Washington. Which prompted Ma’ariv columnist Jacky Hugy to write in an open letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates:
So there we have it. Syria tries to import nuclear material from North Korea. Within three days of its arrival, Israel bombs it to smithereens. But forget it. Don’t mention it. Bashir Assad still wants peace.
In the ever-changing [and bizarre] Middle East, this could be right.
“Israel bombs Syria, but please don’t mention it” By J. Zel Lurie
On September 3, a small North Korean 1700-ton cargo ship docked at the Syrian port of Tartus. It unloaded its cargo into waiting trucks. The cargo was listed as cement.
Syria has never purchased cement from North Korea, nor was this cargo added to Syria’s inventory of cement. The trucks went across Syria, northeast, to storage bunkers near the Euphrates River, at the Iraqi border.
The Mossad had been tracking this ship and its cargo for some time. They believed the cargo was nuclear material including warheads. Israel did not wait long to strike: In the pre-dawn light of September 6, the bunkers were obliterated by Israeli precision bombs.
Syria complained to the UN about the invasion of its air space. They said nothing about the bombing. Why not?
Turkey was also involved. A Turkish minister complained that empty Israeli fuel tanks were dropped in Turkey. The Turkish Army, which cooperates closely with Israel despite being a Moslem country, did not interfere with the Israeli F-15s.
Not a single country, with one exception, commented on the invasion of Syria’s air space. The exception was North Korea, which slammed Israel for its action without mentioning the bombing.
North Korea had agreed, in exchange for ample payment, to dismantle its nuclear bomb facilities. Dismantle means dismantle. It does not mean exporting its nuclear capabilities to the Middle East.
The diplomats knew what was going on. Despite its preoccupation with the 2008 Olympics, China decided to act. China abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting of diplomats in Beijing.
Christopher R. Hill, the top American negotiator with North Korea, had his bag packed to leave for Beijing when he was informed of the cancellation. Reporters for the Washington Post put two and two together. On September 15 the Post broke the story of the bombing in Syria nine days earlier that nobody has admitted ever happened. I believe this is the first time in world history that a country was bombed by its neighbor and neither the bomber nor the bombed admitted it.
The Israel press has been muzzled by the Army censor. They are not allowed to discuss what happened in the skies over Syria, but many commentators seem to think that Bashir Assad would like to forget it and talk about peace with Israel and getting the Golan back.
Bashir has hinted about peace often in the recent past and has sent unofficial emissaries to Jerusalem. Many in Israel believe that Ehud Olmert has been prevented from responding to the Syrian initiative by Washington. Which prompted Ma’ariv columnist Jacky Hugy to write in an open letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates:
The level of trust between Israel and Syria is just about level with the ground. Each country believes that the other is plotting war against it.. But despite everything Bashir is till on Olmert’s side, He is also interested in turning down the flame, calming down the region and getting back to business as usual. But your people are not letting him. They are eager to embarrass him in front of the whole world. And over here, we are afraid that if Assad is embarrassed too much he will be forced to respond, That is our problem. Mr. Gates.And the Americans for Peace Now’s report for September 17 points out that despite the Israeli strike in Syria on September 6th, Israel’s top military leaders are calling for a return to Israeli-Syrian peace talks.
So there we have it. Syria tries to import nuclear material from North Korea. Within three days of its arrival, Israel bombs it to smithereens. But forget it. Don’t mention it. Bashir Assad still wants peace.
In the ever-changing [and bizarre] Middle East, this could be right.
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Against shrillness re Mearsheimer and Walt
The book on the “Israel Lobby” by Professors Mearsheimer and Walt has risen to the NY Times non-fiction bestsellers’ list. Surely, attacks on them as out and out antisemites or kooks are inappropriate. But their complaint that they are subject to a latter-day variety of McCarthyism is overblown and their success proves this.
I recommend recent blog postings by Dan Fleshler (click here and there) for a more tempered view that both criticizes and commends M & W’s book in a thoughtful way. Dan still sees their work as deeply flawed but argues that their book is an improvement over their earlier, shorter version.
Rabbi Michael Lerner of Tikkun is to a large degree siding with M & W and he denounces the mainstream media for belittling M & W's thesis that THE “Lobby” was THE primary factor in influencing the US to go to war in Iraq. Lerner also defends Congressman Jim Moran from attacks by the Jewish Democrats’ organization (whatever that's called) and by Congressmen Hoyer and Cantor (the former, the House majority leader, and the latter, a Republican) . Yet both Hoyer and Cantor, especially Hoyer, seemed quite reasonable in their criticism of Moran. They point out that his primary contention, that the Jewish community had the power to prevent the war, is both wrong and dangerous in its implications.
Any criticism of M & W and their supporters is being viewed as "McCarthyism." This in itself resembles McCarthyism, or at least manifests a degree of shrillness that precludes the debate that M & W claim to want. I am in favor of such a debate.
I recommend recent blog postings by Dan Fleshler (click here and there) for a more tempered view that both criticizes and commends M & W’s book in a thoughtful way. Dan still sees their work as deeply flawed but argues that their book is an improvement over their earlier, shorter version.
Rabbi Michael Lerner of Tikkun is to a large degree siding with M & W and he denounces the mainstream media for belittling M & W's thesis that THE “Lobby” was THE primary factor in influencing the US to go to war in Iraq. Lerner also defends Congressman Jim Moran from attacks by the Jewish Democrats’ organization (whatever that's called) and by Congressmen Hoyer and Cantor (the former, the House majority leader, and the latter, a Republican) . Yet both Hoyer and Cantor, especially Hoyer, seemed quite reasonable in their criticism of Moran. They point out that his primary contention, that the Jewish community had the power to prevent the war, is both wrong and dangerous in its implications.
Any criticism of M & W and their supporters is being viewed as "McCarthyism." This in itself resembles McCarthyism, or at least manifests a degree of shrillness that precludes the debate that M & W claim to want. I am in favor of such a debate.
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
Another dent in the Wall
A lead headline in this week's Maariv newspaper reads "Residents of Bil'in Defeated the IDF".
The headline refers to the fact that a forum of three supreme court justices, headed by Israeli supreme court president Dorit Beinish, ruled that the government must change the route of the wall that is being built on the land of the Palestinian village of Bil'in, because the current route "disproportionately damages the lives and rights of the residents of Bil'in". The judges go on to note that the route is meant to protect a neighbourhood in the West Bank settlement of Upper Modi'in, which is being built without appropriate permits, and that they were not convinced that there are sufficient security reasons to maintain the current route.
This was a clear victory for the joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle against the route of the separation wall/barrier on the lands of Bil'in. For the past three years, members of the Israeli peace movement have been following, and participating, in the weekly protests in Bil'in against the wall. The struggle was led by the local Palestinian residents of Bil'in, together with the Israeli group Anarchists Against the Wall. Every Friday, they gathered in Bil'in to carry out a joint, non-violent protest against the wall. And now that struggle has been crowned by victory.
Rona Even, a young Israeli MA student at the Hebrew University who was a regular activist in the protests, told me she is of course happy and relieved at the verdict, but is still concerned about where the alternative route will be built. And she adds, "the struggle will continue, since the wall violates Palestinian rights in many other areas as well."
Just two days earlier, I had the opportunity to witness another victory of non-violent protest against the route of the wall. The Palestine-Israel Journal had the privilege of hosting Professor Johan Galtung, the father of peace research and peace journalism, at an event held at Al-Quds University in the Palestinian town of Abu Dis on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Before he met with the faculty to talk about future options to resolve the conflict, we were taken on a tour of the campus by the deputy president of the university, Professor Hasan Dweik.
He took us up a hill overlooking the campus, and proudly described how the students had saved one third of the campus space from the wall which runs through the city of Abu Dis, one side of which is in the West Bank, and the other in the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem municipal district. "Our students gathered, played music, studied, and carried out all sorts of activities in the area meant for the wall. Day after day, in a totally non-violent manner. And we won, the route of the wall was moved, and the campus saved." Galtung, who runs workshops on non-violent conflict resolution techniques throughout the world, was very impressed, and justifiably so.
There are many subtexts to this story: the clash between violent and non-violent strategies within Palestinian society over how to end the occupation, the joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle, the fact that the Jewish settlement of Upper Modi'in is a bribe by rightwing Israeli elements to provide cheap housing for ultra-orthodox Haredi Jews who are one of the poorest segments in Israeli society, and even the struggle over the role of the supreme court within Israeli society.
In Maariv, opinion page editor Ben-Dror Yamini praised the supreme court's decision, and he wrote: "The State of Israel must decide what type of Zionism it wants: A Zionism which provides a national home and the right to self-determination for the Jewish nation in its own state, or a real estate Zionism which steals from the Palestinians." He praised the supreme court decision as reflecting a "humanistic Zionism, which recognizes the Jewish right to self-determination, while not denying that same right to the Palestinians".
The struggle and victory in Bil'in should be studied by all who believe in the importance and potential efficacy of non-violent protest against human rights violations and oppression. An excellent film called Bil'in Habibti (Bil'in my Beloved), made by director Shai Carmeli-Pollak, the brother of protest leader Yonatan Pollak, should get as broad a distribution as possible.
It took 28 years for the Berlin Wall to come down. This wall will come down too, in the context of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace.
This entry originally appeared in the UK Guardian's "Comment is free" Weblog.
The headline refers to the fact that a forum of three supreme court justices, headed by Israeli supreme court president Dorit Beinish, ruled that the government must change the route of the wall that is being built on the land of the Palestinian village of Bil'in, because the current route "disproportionately damages the lives and rights of the residents of Bil'in". The judges go on to note that the route is meant to protect a neighbourhood in the West Bank settlement of Upper Modi'in, which is being built without appropriate permits, and that they were not convinced that there are sufficient security reasons to maintain the current route.
This was a clear victory for the joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle against the route of the separation wall/barrier on the lands of Bil'in. For the past three years, members of the Israeli peace movement have been following, and participating, in the weekly protests in Bil'in against the wall. The struggle was led by the local Palestinian residents of Bil'in, together with the Israeli group Anarchists Against the Wall. Every Friday, they gathered in Bil'in to carry out a joint, non-violent protest against the wall. And now that struggle has been crowned by victory.
Rona Even, a young Israeli MA student at the Hebrew University who was a regular activist in the protests, told me she is of course happy and relieved at the verdict, but is still concerned about where the alternative route will be built. And she adds, "the struggle will continue, since the wall violates Palestinian rights in many other areas as well."
Just two days earlier, I had the opportunity to witness another victory of non-violent protest against the route of the wall. The Palestine-Israel Journal had the privilege of hosting Professor Johan Galtung, the father of peace research and peace journalism, at an event held at Al-Quds University in the Palestinian town of Abu Dis on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Before he met with the faculty to talk about future options to resolve the conflict, we were taken on a tour of the campus by the deputy president of the university, Professor Hasan Dweik.
He took us up a hill overlooking the campus, and proudly described how the students had saved one third of the campus space from the wall which runs through the city of Abu Dis, one side of which is in the West Bank, and the other in the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem municipal district. "Our students gathered, played music, studied, and carried out all sorts of activities in the area meant for the wall. Day after day, in a totally non-violent manner. And we won, the route of the wall was moved, and the campus saved." Galtung, who runs workshops on non-violent conflict resolution techniques throughout the world, was very impressed, and justifiably so.
There are many subtexts to this story: the clash between violent and non-violent strategies within Palestinian society over how to end the occupation, the joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle, the fact that the Jewish settlement of Upper Modi'in is a bribe by rightwing Israeli elements to provide cheap housing for ultra-orthodox Haredi Jews who are one of the poorest segments in Israeli society, and even the struggle over the role of the supreme court within Israeli society.
In Maariv, opinion page editor Ben-Dror Yamini praised the supreme court's decision, and he wrote: "The State of Israel must decide what type of Zionism it wants: A Zionism which provides a national home and the right to self-determination for the Jewish nation in its own state, or a real estate Zionism which steals from the Palestinians." He praised the supreme court decision as reflecting a "humanistic Zionism, which recognizes the Jewish right to self-determination, while not denying that same right to the Palestinians".
The struggle and victory in Bil'in should be studied by all who believe in the importance and potential efficacy of non-violent protest against human rights violations and oppression. An excellent film called Bil'in Habibti (Bil'in my Beloved), made by director Shai Carmeli-Pollak, the brother of protest leader Yonatan Pollak, should get as broad a distribution as possible.
It took 28 years for the Berlin Wall to come down. This wall will come down too, in the context of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace.
This entry originally appeared in the UK Guardian's "Comment is free" Weblog.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
Reflections on end of Jewish Year 5767
All of us at Meretz USA - Officers, Board, and Staff - send you heartfelt greetings for this New Year. May the New Year bring you health and happiness and may it bring us all - our brothers and sisters in Israel and throughout the world, and our cousins in Palestine and everywhere - peace, shalom, salaam.
With the Jewish Year 5767 having ended, this News Review directs its focus to the twelve months gone by so that we can remember (and perhaps learn from) the events of the year past.
Israel and Palestine: Can Palestinian disunity help the peace process? Perhaps the most important factor this year in Israeli-Palestinian relations has been the rivalry and conflict between Fatah and Hamas.
When 5767 began, Israel was helping maintain the international boycott of the Hamas government, leaving only the most meager room for contacts with the Palestinian Presidency of Mahmoud Abbas. Internal Palestinian tensions ran high, as Hamas and Fatah used their respective power bases to jockey for control of the Palestinian Authority. The peace process was at a standstill.
Prodded and pushed by Saudi Arabia, the two warring parties seemed to end their power struggle in February when they signed the Mecca Accord and entered into a power-sharing unity government. Though some viewed the Accord as a way to restart Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy (the unity government ambiguously agreed to respect the agreements signed by the PLO), both Israel and the US maintained their refusal to deal with a government in which Hamas was the senior member.
Unable to break the continued international boycott, the Palestinian unity government began to implode, as the worst of the Hamas-Fatah fighting erupted in Gaza in May and June. When Fatah's forces in Gaza were routed in June by a surprise Hamas offensive, President Abbas used the opportunity to disband the government and set up an interim emergency Cabinet led by moderate Salam Fayyad, and devoid of Hamas members.
The Hamas victory in Gaza, and heightened concerned that Hamas could soon take control on the West Bank as well, have recently propelled the US, Israel and Abbas' Fatah towards more concerted action. President Bush has called a peace conference, scheduled to take place in mid-November, and US diplomats are trying to enlist public Saudi support.
After ignoring Abbas at the beginning of his Presidency (before Hamas' election victory in legislative elections in January 2006), Israel began exploring the possibility of dialogue, and Olmert and Abbas are now trying to work up an agreed "declaration of principles" that would form the backbone for a future peace agreement.
On the West Bank, the Fatah party has gone on the offensive against Hamas, rounding up its operatives there and shutting down many of its affiliated charities. In Gaza, meanwhile, Fatah supporters have begun waging a battle for public opinion, holding a series of Friday protest prayers demonstratively outside the walls of the Hamas-controlled mosques.
Israel and Syria - Moves for Peace, Rumbles of War: The year 5767 once again taught us to take the opinions of the pundits - even when a near-consensus reigns among them - with more than a grain of salt. All through the year, commentators in Israel predicted a Syrian-Israeli war over this past summer as if were almost an inevitability. Fortunately, however, both the Israeli and Syrian governments showed a bit more sense and moderation than what the prognosticators gave them credit for.
This is not to say, of course, that the leaders in Damascus and Jerusalem have fully embraced the peace option. As always, the political reality is neither black nor white. The months gone by have seen a curious, almost surreal combination, of sabers being rattled and olive branches being extended - at one and same time. The speeches of Syrian and Israeli officials have seemed well-nigh identical at times: We sincerely seek peace, each country tells us, but we stand ready to repulse the other side should it commit an act of aggression.
Nor has the US Administration lived up to its commitment to advance the peace process. As Prime Minister Olmert himself has indicated, the United States had made it clear to Israel that America is adamantly opposed to Israeli-Syrian peace talks - lest Damascus find a way to wriggle out of the diplomatic isolation to which Washington has committed it.
But 5767 also delivered some positive signs: It was revealed in January that between September 2004 and July 2006, Israel and Syria had been unofficially negotiating a peace deal, employing unofficial negotiators Alon Liel and Abe Suleiman to draft an unofficial, non-binding "non-paper". Although the talks broke down amid last year's war and Israel's reported refusal to move these talks to an official level, the non-paper helped lay the foundations for peace talks at a future time.
Arab Minority Pushes for Autonomy; Right-Wing Pushes Segregation: The most profound development in 5767 from the standpoint of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel was the series of documents produced by Israeli Arab think-tanks and NGOs that tried to energize the debate over the unequal status of Israel's Arab community. Foremost among these papers was "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," produced by The National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel.
The "Vision document" issued an important call for a restructured Israeli polity in which all citizens were accorded full legal, political and socioeconomic equality - in practice as well as in theory. Unfortunately, however, the document also contained a provocative introduction that drew all public attention away from this core message: Referring to the Palestinian Arabs as the only indigenous people in the area, the document treated Zionism as an alien, colonialist project and hinted at the illegitimacy of Israel's creation.
In the short term at least, the Vision document seems to have boomeranged - creating increased suspicion of and hostility for Israeli Arabs, even among centrist and left-of-center Israelis. It is perhaps this changed atmosphere that gave right-wing Knesset Members (with support from some Labor and Kadima MKs) the courage to push the "JNF bill", which endorses state-sponsored discrimination in the sphere of land-leasing.
The bill is making its way through the legislative process and is shaping up to be a major issue when the Knesset returns from its summer recess. The question of Jewish-Arab equality in Israel will certainly remain a central challenge for Israel, as it seeks to maintain the balance between its Jewish and democratic characteristics.
Women in Israel - Sex Offenses in High Places: The year 5767 was a year of shame in Israel in terms of the treatment of women in the workplace. Remarkably, two of Israel's most senior politicians, outgoing President Moshe Katzav and Minister Haim Ramon, were both found guilty of sexual offenses committed against their female employees. And, much to the chagrin of women's organizations throughout the country, both politicians seem to have escaped with less than maximal punishment.
Ramon was convicted in January of forcibly kissing a female employee. However, an appeals court later ruled that, due to his record of public service, Ramon would serve no jail time, and his crime would not be considered one of "moral turpitude". The "absence of moral turpitude" decree enabled Ramon to resume his work in government. In fact, Ramon even won a promotion, returning to the Cabinet in the new role of Vice (no pun intended) Prime Minister.
Although Moshe Katzav was escorted out of public life, suspending himself from the Presidency in midyear until his term ended in July, he, too, managed to emerge relatively unscathed. Although the initial indictment sheet against Katzav included counts of rape, blackmail and obstruction of justice, the now ex-President managed to strike a plea bargain with the Attorney-General. Katzav agreed to plead guilty to lesser counts of sexual harassment and acts of indecency, and to receive a suspended jail sentence. Tens of thousands of Israelis turned out to a rally in Rabin Square to protest the deal.
Israeli Politics: To paraphrase Mark Twain, "the reports of Ehud Olmert's political death are greatly exaggerated."
When 5767 began, Olmert was a failed Prime Minister, who had mismanaged the war in Lebanon, and whose public-opinion ratings were in the single digits. As 5767 ends, the situation is not entirely different. However, much to the surprise of the pundits (once again), Olmert is still standing. And, to a certain extent, he's even managed to bounce back.
The interim report of the Winograd Committee (late April), which looked into the handling of the Lebanon War II, managed to rock Olmert's boat, but not sink it. The Committee accused Olmert of a "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence"; newspapers called for Olmert's immediate resignation. But Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni's brief attempted rebellion from within Kadima never got off the ground. And the promises issued back in May/June by the two rivals in the Labor Party primaries, Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon, to lead the party out of the Olmert government turned out to be empty election slogans. Months later, both are members of the same government - Barak as Defense Minister, and Ayalon as Minister without Portfolio. Olmert's position seems solid for now.
Labor's lack of enthusiasm to leave the government should come as no surprise, though: Back in October, Olmert's addition of the far-right Avigdor Lieberman to his government drew no more than the feeblest protests from his Labor colleagues.
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As 5768 begins, we once again hold out the hope that the Israeli and Palestinian people will choose the path of co-existence, not the path of mutual enmity, rejection and destruction offered by extremists on both sides. And we look forward to seeing an American administration that realizes the importance of active US engagement for the sake of Middle East peace. We wish for all of Israel a year of peace with its neighbors, and a year of civil rights, without the scourges of sexism, racism, homophobia and religious intolerance. Y'hi Ratzon!
Shana Tova!
With the Jewish Year 5767 having ended, this News Review directs its focus to the twelve months gone by so that we can remember (and perhaps learn from) the events of the year past.
Israel and Palestine: Can Palestinian disunity help the peace process? Perhaps the most important factor this year in Israeli-Palestinian relations has been the rivalry and conflict between Fatah and Hamas.
When 5767 began, Israel was helping maintain the international boycott of the Hamas government, leaving only the most meager room for contacts with the Palestinian Presidency of Mahmoud Abbas. Internal Palestinian tensions ran high, as Hamas and Fatah used their respective power bases to jockey for control of the Palestinian Authority. The peace process was at a standstill.
Prodded and pushed by Saudi Arabia, the two warring parties seemed to end their power struggle in February when they signed the Mecca Accord and entered into a power-sharing unity government. Though some viewed the Accord as a way to restart Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy (the unity government ambiguously agreed to respect the agreements signed by the PLO), both Israel and the US maintained their refusal to deal with a government in which Hamas was the senior member.
Unable to break the continued international boycott, the Palestinian unity government began to implode, as the worst of the Hamas-Fatah fighting erupted in Gaza in May and June. When Fatah's forces in Gaza were routed in June by a surprise Hamas offensive, President Abbas used the opportunity to disband the government and set up an interim emergency Cabinet led by moderate Salam Fayyad, and devoid of Hamas members.
The Hamas victory in Gaza, and heightened concerned that Hamas could soon take control on the West Bank as well, have recently propelled the US, Israel and Abbas' Fatah towards more concerted action. President Bush has called a peace conference, scheduled to take place in mid-November, and US diplomats are trying to enlist public Saudi support.
After ignoring Abbas at the beginning of his Presidency (before Hamas' election victory in legislative elections in January 2006), Israel began exploring the possibility of dialogue, and Olmert and Abbas are now trying to work up an agreed "declaration of principles" that would form the backbone for a future peace agreement.
On the West Bank, the Fatah party has gone on the offensive against Hamas, rounding up its operatives there and shutting down many of its affiliated charities. In Gaza, meanwhile, Fatah supporters have begun waging a battle for public opinion, holding a series of Friday protest prayers demonstratively outside the walls of the Hamas-controlled mosques.
Israel and Syria - Moves for Peace, Rumbles of War: The year 5767 once again taught us to take the opinions of the pundits - even when a near-consensus reigns among them - with more than a grain of salt. All through the year, commentators in Israel predicted a Syrian-Israeli war over this past summer as if were almost an inevitability. Fortunately, however, both the Israeli and Syrian governments showed a bit more sense and moderation than what the prognosticators gave them credit for.
This is not to say, of course, that the leaders in Damascus and Jerusalem have fully embraced the peace option. As always, the political reality is neither black nor white. The months gone by have seen a curious, almost surreal combination, of sabers being rattled and olive branches being extended - at one and same time. The speeches of Syrian and Israeli officials have seemed well-nigh identical at times: We sincerely seek peace, each country tells us, but we stand ready to repulse the other side should it commit an act of aggression.
Nor has the US Administration lived up to its commitment to advance the peace process. As Prime Minister Olmert himself has indicated, the United States had made it clear to Israel that America is adamantly opposed to Israeli-Syrian peace talks - lest Damascus find a way to wriggle out of the diplomatic isolation to which Washington has committed it.
But 5767 also delivered some positive signs: It was revealed in January that between September 2004 and July 2006, Israel and Syria had been unofficially negotiating a peace deal, employing unofficial negotiators Alon Liel and Abe Suleiman to draft an unofficial, non-binding "non-paper". Although the talks broke down amid last year's war and Israel's reported refusal to move these talks to an official level, the non-paper helped lay the foundations for peace talks at a future time.
Arab Minority Pushes for Autonomy; Right-Wing Pushes Segregation: The most profound development in 5767 from the standpoint of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel was the series of documents produced by Israeli Arab think-tanks and NGOs that tried to energize the debate over the unequal status of Israel's Arab community. Foremost among these papers was "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," produced by The National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel.
The "Vision document" issued an important call for a restructured Israeli polity in which all citizens were accorded full legal, political and socioeconomic equality - in practice as well as in theory. Unfortunately, however, the document also contained a provocative introduction that drew all public attention away from this core message: Referring to the Palestinian Arabs as the only indigenous people in the area, the document treated Zionism as an alien, colonialist project and hinted at the illegitimacy of Israel's creation.
In the short term at least, the Vision document seems to have boomeranged - creating increased suspicion of and hostility for Israeli Arabs, even among centrist and left-of-center Israelis. It is perhaps this changed atmosphere that gave right-wing Knesset Members (with support from some Labor and Kadima MKs) the courage to push the "JNF bill", which endorses state-sponsored discrimination in the sphere of land-leasing.
The bill is making its way through the legislative process and is shaping up to be a major issue when the Knesset returns from its summer recess. The question of Jewish-Arab equality in Israel will certainly remain a central challenge for Israel, as it seeks to maintain the balance between its Jewish and democratic characteristics.
Women in Israel - Sex Offenses in High Places: The year 5767 was a year of shame in Israel in terms of the treatment of women in the workplace. Remarkably, two of Israel's most senior politicians, outgoing President Moshe Katzav and Minister Haim Ramon, were both found guilty of sexual offenses committed against their female employees. And, much to the chagrin of women's organizations throughout the country, both politicians seem to have escaped with less than maximal punishment.
Ramon was convicted in January of forcibly kissing a female employee. However, an appeals court later ruled that, due to his record of public service, Ramon would serve no jail time, and his crime would not be considered one of "moral turpitude". The "absence of moral turpitude" decree enabled Ramon to resume his work in government. In fact, Ramon even won a promotion, returning to the Cabinet in the new role of Vice (no pun intended) Prime Minister.
Although Moshe Katzav was escorted out of public life, suspending himself from the Presidency in midyear until his term ended in July, he, too, managed to emerge relatively unscathed. Although the initial indictment sheet against Katzav included counts of rape, blackmail and obstruction of justice, the now ex-President managed to strike a plea bargain with the Attorney-General. Katzav agreed to plead guilty to lesser counts of sexual harassment and acts of indecency, and to receive a suspended jail sentence. Tens of thousands of Israelis turned out to a rally in Rabin Square to protest the deal.
Israeli Politics: To paraphrase Mark Twain, "the reports of Ehud Olmert's political death are greatly exaggerated."
When 5767 began, Olmert was a failed Prime Minister, who had mismanaged the war in Lebanon, and whose public-opinion ratings were in the single digits. As 5767 ends, the situation is not entirely different. However, much to the surprise of the pundits (once again), Olmert is still standing. And, to a certain extent, he's even managed to bounce back.
The interim report of the Winograd Committee (late April), which looked into the handling of the Lebanon War II, managed to rock Olmert's boat, but not sink it. The Committee accused Olmert of a "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence"; newspapers called for Olmert's immediate resignation. But Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni's brief attempted rebellion from within Kadima never got off the ground. And the promises issued back in May/June by the two rivals in the Labor Party primaries, Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon, to lead the party out of the Olmert government turned out to be empty election slogans. Months later, both are members of the same government - Barak as Defense Minister, and Ayalon as Minister without Portfolio. Olmert's position seems solid for now.
Labor's lack of enthusiasm to leave the government should come as no surprise, though: Back in October, Olmert's addition of the far-right Avigdor Lieberman to his government drew no more than the feeblest protests from his Labor colleagues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As 5768 begins, we once again hold out the hope that the Israeli and Palestinian people will choose the path of co-existence, not the path of mutual enmity, rejection and destruction offered by extremists on both sides. And we look forward to seeing an American administration that realizes the importance of active US engagement for the sake of Middle East peace. We wish for all of Israel a year of peace with its neighbors, and a year of civil rights, without the scourges of sexism, racism, homophobia and religious intolerance. Y'hi Ratzon!
Shana Tova!
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
My Rosh Hashana Memory
Click here to link to what I wrote last year about this day, which marks a sad anniversary for my family. Shana Tova to all our readers and friends! We’ll be back next week, after Rosh Hashana.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
September 11, once again
Click to link to last year’s entry with my memories of, and associations with, that fateful day, six years ago.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Zel Lurie Reacts to Mearsheimer-Walt
From “The truth about the Israel lobby,” the latest column by J. Zel Lurie in the Jewish Journal of South Florida:
... On September 4, Farrar, Straus and Giroux published “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” by two distinguished political scientists, John J. Mersheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen J. Walt of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, a book-length version of their treatise first published in the London Review of Books that the Israel lobby controls U.S. foreign policy and is responsible for the war in Iraq.
On the same date, Palgrave/Macmillan published a refutation of the Mersheimer/Walt thesis by Abraham H. Foxman, head of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Under the sensational title “The Deadliest Lies” and the ambiguous subtitle, “The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control,” Abe Foxman effectively demolishes most of their arguments. ...
On the key issue of Israel and the war in Iraq, Foxman says that the two professors contradict themselves. They quote Israel’s [former] minister of defense. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who remarked a month before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, “Iraq is a problem…but today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.”
Foxman writes: “Given the fact that Israel regarded Iran as the primary threat, how does the U.S. decision to invade Iraq instead square with the notion of Israeli ‘control’ of U.S. foreign policy?”
Lawrence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, wrote last week in the Hong Kong Asia Times that Israeli officials warned the Bush administration that an invasion of Iraq would be destabilizing to the region and urged the U.S, instead to target Iran, the primary enemy. This message was conveyed from Jerusalem as early as 2002 by a wide range of Israelis, including political and intelligence figures and private citizens. The main point, wrote Wilkerson, was not that the U.S. should attack Iran but that it should not be distracted by Iraq and Saddam Hussein from a focus on the threat from Iran.
The Neo-Cons in Washington, many of whom are Jewish -- Elliot Abrams, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and others -- paid no attention to Israeli objections. Together with Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and others they continued to plan the Iraq invasion. The perpetrators are mostly gone now, but their disastrous planning has resulted in a swamp in which the next Democratic president may well sink in 2009.
We didn’t need a couple of wily professors, trying successfully to make a buck, to tell us that the Israel lobby is strong and effective. It has induced no less than 34 vetoes of Security Council resolutions critical of Israel since 1982.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s security adviser, in commenting on Mearsheimer-Walt rated the Israel lobby among the top lobbies. He wrote in Foreign Policy magazine: “I have dealt with many of them. I would rank the Israeli-American, Cuban-American and Armenian-American lobbies as the most effective.”
{A couple of weeks ago, Abe Foxman faced the Armenian lobby, which is run by the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the Armenian refugees who escaped the massacre by Turks during World War I. Abe refused to call it genocide because Moslem Turkey is friendly to Israel. Abe capitulated. He issued a statement calling the massacre genocide.}
The Israel lobby consists of 40 or 50 Jewish organizations loosely connected in the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations. I was a spoke in its wheel as the editor of the Hadassah Magazine. AIPAC is its Washington operator, assisted by those organizations which have representation in Washington. Abe Foxman is its self-appointed spokesman.
It is not a Jewish lobby. The Evangelical Christians are a significant force in the lobby. The way these fundamentalist Christians raise money for and visit the Jewish settlements in the West Bank is dramatically portrayed in Christiane Amanpour's recent program on CNN.
The program neglects the American Jewish peace organizations: Americans for Peace Now, Israel Policy Forum and Brit Tzedek V’Shalom, all of which I support, and which are gaining influence in Washington in opposition to AIPAC.
Morris Amitay, former head of AIPAC who now runs its Washington PAC, tells Amanpour that they are successful because they approach the administration and Congress on the basis of American self-interest. He neglects to add that when their message contravenes the administration, they lose.
That’s what happened in 1981 when President Ronald Reagan proposed the sale to Saudi Arabia of five planes equipped with our most sophisticated radar system. It was called AWACS, which stood for Airborn Warning and Control System.
The Israel Air Force didn’t want Saudi Arabia watching its planes. If the Saudis had had these planes in 1967, the surprise attack on Egypt’s planes and airfields would have been imperiled. The Israel government, AIPAC, and every Jewish organization including Hadassah and its magazine, mounted a massive campaign against the sale. Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin came to Washington to lobby President Reagan.
The campaign reached its peak when the Senate’s Foreign Affairs committee voted 10 to 5 to ban the sale. Then President Reagan personally lobbied 18 senators. The whole Senate voted in favor of the sale.
In a forward to Foxman’s book. George P. Shultz wrote: “Jewish groups are influential…But the notion…that U.S. policy on Israel and the Middle East is a result of their influence is simply wrong.”
George Shultz should know. He was President Reagan’s Secretary of State. He was a key player in the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.
AIPAC has been more successful in its campaign for the Jewish settlements in the West Bank against the stated opposition of every U.S. president. Amanpour gives us quotes from each of them. But the only president who took any action was the first George Bush who refused Israel’s request for loan guarantees unless settlement expansion was halted. Amanpour shows how Bush capitulated during his campaign for re-election, which he lost anyway.
Therefore, the Israel lobby is responsible for the establishment and growth of over 200 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, contrary to the wishes of every American administration. More important, the majority of Israeli and American Jews consider them to be obstacles to peace designed to prevent the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel.
... On September 4, Farrar, Straus and Giroux published “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” by two distinguished political scientists, John J. Mersheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen J. Walt of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, a book-length version of their treatise first published in the London Review of Books that the Israel lobby controls U.S. foreign policy and is responsible for the war in Iraq.
On the same date, Palgrave/Macmillan published a refutation of the Mersheimer/Walt thesis by Abraham H. Foxman, head of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Under the sensational title “The Deadliest Lies” and the ambiguous subtitle, “The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control,” Abe Foxman effectively demolishes most of their arguments. ...
On the key issue of Israel and the war in Iraq, Foxman says that the two professors contradict themselves. They quote Israel’s [former] minister of defense. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who remarked a month before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, “Iraq is a problem…but today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.”
Foxman writes: “Given the fact that Israel regarded Iran as the primary threat, how does the U.S. decision to invade Iraq instead square with the notion of Israeli ‘control’ of U.S. foreign policy?”
Lawrence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, wrote last week in the Hong Kong Asia Times that Israeli officials warned the Bush administration that an invasion of Iraq would be destabilizing to the region and urged the U.S, instead to target Iran, the primary enemy. This message was conveyed from Jerusalem as early as 2002 by a wide range of Israelis, including political and intelligence figures and private citizens. The main point, wrote Wilkerson, was not that the U.S. should attack Iran but that it should not be distracted by Iraq and Saddam Hussein from a focus on the threat from Iran.
The Neo-Cons in Washington, many of whom are Jewish -- Elliot Abrams, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and others -- paid no attention to Israeli objections. Together with Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and others they continued to plan the Iraq invasion. The perpetrators are mostly gone now, but their disastrous planning has resulted in a swamp in which the next Democratic president may well sink in 2009.
We didn’t need a couple of wily professors, trying successfully to make a buck, to tell us that the Israel lobby is strong and effective. It has induced no less than 34 vetoes of Security Council resolutions critical of Israel since 1982.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s security adviser, in commenting on Mearsheimer-Walt rated the Israel lobby among the top lobbies. He wrote in Foreign Policy magazine: “I have dealt with many of them. I would rank the Israeli-American, Cuban-American and Armenian-American lobbies as the most effective.”
{A couple of weeks ago, Abe Foxman faced the Armenian lobby, which is run by the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the Armenian refugees who escaped the massacre by Turks during World War I. Abe refused to call it genocide because Moslem Turkey is friendly to Israel. Abe capitulated. He issued a statement calling the massacre genocide.}
The Israel lobby consists of 40 or 50 Jewish organizations loosely connected in the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations. I was a spoke in its wheel as the editor of the Hadassah Magazine. AIPAC is its Washington operator, assisted by those organizations which have representation in Washington. Abe Foxman is its self-appointed spokesman.
It is not a Jewish lobby. The Evangelical Christians are a significant force in the lobby. The way these fundamentalist Christians raise money for and visit the Jewish settlements in the West Bank is dramatically portrayed in Christiane Amanpour's recent program on CNN.
The program neglects the American Jewish peace organizations: Americans for Peace Now, Israel Policy Forum and Brit Tzedek V’Shalom, all of which I support, and which are gaining influence in Washington in opposition to AIPAC.
Morris Amitay, former head of AIPAC who now runs its Washington PAC, tells Amanpour that they are successful because they approach the administration and Congress on the basis of American self-interest. He neglects to add that when their message contravenes the administration, they lose.
That’s what happened in 1981 when President Ronald Reagan proposed the sale to Saudi Arabia of five planes equipped with our most sophisticated radar system. It was called AWACS, which stood for Airborn Warning and Control System.
The Israel Air Force didn’t want Saudi Arabia watching its planes. If the Saudis had had these planes in 1967, the surprise attack on Egypt’s planes and airfields would have been imperiled. The Israel government, AIPAC, and every Jewish organization including Hadassah and its magazine, mounted a massive campaign against the sale. Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin came to Washington to lobby President Reagan.
The campaign reached its peak when the Senate’s Foreign Affairs committee voted 10 to 5 to ban the sale. Then President Reagan personally lobbied 18 senators. The whole Senate voted in favor of the sale.
In a forward to Foxman’s book. George P. Shultz wrote: “Jewish groups are influential…But the notion…that U.S. policy on Israel and the Middle East is a result of their influence is simply wrong.”
George Shultz should know. He was President Reagan’s Secretary of State. He was a key player in the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.
AIPAC has been more successful in its campaign for the Jewish settlements in the West Bank against the stated opposition of every U.S. president. Amanpour gives us quotes from each of them. But the only president who took any action was the first George Bush who refused Israel’s request for loan guarantees unless settlement expansion was halted. Amanpour shows how Bush capitulated during his campaign for re-election, which he lost anyway.
Therefore, the Israel lobby is responsible for the establishment and growth of over 200 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, contrary to the wishes of every American administration. More important, the majority of Israeli and American Jews consider them to be obstacles to peace designed to prevent the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel.
Friday, September 07, 2007
Reactions to Mearsheimer-Walt, Con’t.
The New Yorker’s editor, David Remnick, criticizes without savaging Professors Mearsheimer and Walt:
Mearsheimer and Walt are not anti-Semites or racists. They are serious scholars, and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. They are right to describe the moral violation in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands. (In this, most Israelis and most American Jews agree with them.) They were also right about Iraq.I don’t believe that Mr. Remnick means here, given his essay’s conclusion, that he agrees with their thesis that the invasion of Iraq was largely a product of the Israel Lobby’s influence and power. He continues:
The strategic questions they raise now, particularly about Israel’s privileged relationship with the United States, are worth debating— just as it is worth debating whether it is a good idea to be selling arms to Saudi Arabia. But their announced objectives have been badly undermined by the contours of their argument— a prosecutor’s brief that depicts Israel as a singularly pernicious force in world affairs.He concludes:
“The Israel Lobby” is a phenomenon of its moment. The duplicitous and manipulative arguments for invading Iraq put forward by the Bush Administration, the general inability of the press to upend those duplicities, the triumphalist illusions, the miserable performance of the military strategists, the arrogance of the Pentagon, the stifling of dissent within the military and the government, the moral disaster of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, the rise of an intractable civil war, and now an incapacity to deal with the singular winner of the war, Iran—all of this has left Americans furious and demanding explanations. Mearsheimer and Walt provide one: the Israel lobby. In this respect, their account is not so much a diagnosis of our polarized era as a symptom of it.
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Thomas Mitchell: Rebuilding Labor
In a previous article, I wrote about lessons from the Northern Ireland peace process for the Middle East. I wrote that Israel’s parliamentary peace camp will need rebuilding in order to implement those lessons and make peace with the Palestinians. Since the formation of the second Rabin government in June 1992, Israel’s parliamentary peace camp—Labor and Meretz—has lost half of its representation.
The rebuilding of Labor—or a new center-left party—is more critical than the fate of Meretz, because the latter is the junior partner. Meretz is the missionary party that has already succeeded in selling the concept of the two-state solution to Labor. But unless Labor rebuilds to the point that it can head a coalition government without Likud or other right-wing elements, there will not be peace in the Middle East.
Labor is a middle-aged party suffering from several problems. First, it is overly dependent on former generals to fill the upper slots on its Knesset list. This has been the situation since Labor was formed in 1968 and the problem has only gotten worse over time. Second, it allowed itself to become too dependent on a few key leaders and did not replace them as they retired and left the party. Third, it has served in too many national-unity governments and so has not sufficiently differentiated itself from the center-right parties, Kadima and Likud. Fourth, it is suffering from the fallout of both a failed peace process and a failed war.
A major characteristic of Labor is its dependence on former generals. There are two key dates in the militarization of the Labor movement, June 1967 and June 1974. Before June 1967 Israel’s prime ministers, namely David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol, served as their own defense ministers. Ben-Gurion also served temporarily as a defense minister under Moshe Sharret after another civilian defense minister, Pinhas Lavon, was forced to resign due to a scandal. This was during Ben-Gurion’s temporary retirement from politics in1954 and 1955. On the eve of the Six Day War, Eshkol bowed to popular pressure and appointed former chief of staff General Moshe Dayan as his defense minister. Ever since then, only defense technocrats, one for each of the two main parties, and former generals have served as defense ministers with two minor exceptions. Menahem Begin served temporarily as his own defense minister in 1980-81, after ex-general Ezer Weizman. During his second term, he quickly made room for first Arik Sharon and then (defense industry engineer) Moshe Arens as defense ministers. The latest failed Labor head, Amir Peretz, was a civilian defense minister in 2006 and 2007; everyone has judged him a failure due to his and the IDF’s poor performance in the Second Lebanon War.
In June 1974, after Golda Meir and Dayan were forced to resign, former chief of staff General Yitzhak Rabin replaced Meir as prime minister. Since then Shimon Peres has been Labor’s only “civilian” prime minister. Peres served three times as prime minister: after Rabin suddenly resigned in February 1977 for two months, after Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 for seven months, and from 1984 to 1986 after being elected in a close election with the Likud. Peres was forced to change positions with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir halfway through his term by previous agreement. Since Rabin’s death, Peres has rotated with three former generals, Ehud Barak, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and Amram Mitzna, as leader of the Labor Party.
Labor has gone from a record high of 56 seats the year after its creation (1969), to between 35 and 45 seats from 1981 to 1996, to 26 seats under Barak in1999, to 21 seats in 2003 and 19 seats today. This is less than the 44 seats it held under Rabin in 1992. I believe that this shrinkage is due to three factors. First, the rise of smaller parties as the result of direct elections for prime minister from 1996 to 2001. Second, a backlash against the peace camp as a result of the failure of the Oslo Process. Third, the substitution of generals for a program and ideology has left the party without a real identity.
The Labor Party has probably had two dozen or more generals on its lists in the last forty years. Since 1974, Labor has had only one civilian, Shimon Peres, elected as prime minister. From 1974 to 1996 two individuals monopolized the Labor Party leadership. One is now dead and the other left the party after losing the leadership to another civilian. Labor is in definite danger of echoing right-wing parties, permanently losing the Mizrahi and Russian populations and relying on an aging Sabra Ashkenazi population. Unless it attracts a significant number of new voters it will continue to see its share of the electorate shrink and its caucus in the Knesset as well. An over-reliance on former generals as leaders lead to a substitution of imagined military charisma for real popular policies and leadership. Israel is suffering from the same problem.
There is precedent from Labor’s own history for a political penalty for a failed war. The Likud first came to power in 1977 in a delayed reaction to Israel being caught by surprise in the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The next elections took place in December, too soon for Israelis to take stock of the responsibility for the failure and exact a price at the polls. A price will be exacted for Israel’s poor showing in the Second Lebanon War in the next election. The Likud will probably return to power in a coalition with Israel Beitenu and religious parties.
Labor needs to go into opposition, develop new policies including a social agenda, and develop a close working relationship if not a Ma’arakh-style joint list with Meretz. Because of Israel’s PR franchise system a full merger might not be necessary and could even be counterproductive. But the two parties could found a joint think tank to develop a new peace initiative, new social policies, and new military policies. This will be difficult to implement as the two parties are competitors for some of the same electorate.
But such a new relationship will probably take an outside stimulus to create. It will probably take balanced outside pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians through a dual mediation peace process to achieve this.
I do not go into detailed demographic election marketing strategy. I’m an historian, not a professional campaign manager or pollster. Labor has plenty of these that it can hire in Israel or from America. But that is short term and tactical. Labor needs major strategic changes. So far its biggest innovation has been to have an “aluf” competing for the leadership whose title translates into admiral in English rather than general. In Israel’s situation it is natural that generals play a role in politics, they just should not dominate it and the party should not hold its electoral fortunes hostage to them. In this respect. Labor should be more like the Likud. Making Amir Peretz its leader was a step in the right direction. His mistake was to accept the defense ministry rather than the finance ministry or another economic post. Given more time, Peretz might well have become a skilled war leader, but Peretz could not count on that time in Israel’s strategic environment.
Labor must also conduct a detailed demographic analysis of its electorate since December 1973. It should examine which sectors have left and why. It should then determine which demographic sectors are recoverable and build an integrated package of policies that will attract them. This combined with a principled peace strategy of peace with reliable Arab leaders will help it regain and sustain power. Labor has substituted tactical election policies at the expense of strategic thinking and its dramatic shrinkage has been the result. It is not too late to reverse this trend.
The rebuilding of Labor—or a new center-left party—is more critical than the fate of Meretz, because the latter is the junior partner. Meretz is the missionary party that has already succeeded in selling the concept of the two-state solution to Labor. But unless Labor rebuilds to the point that it can head a coalition government without Likud or other right-wing elements, there will not be peace in the Middle East.
Labor is a middle-aged party suffering from several problems. First, it is overly dependent on former generals to fill the upper slots on its Knesset list. This has been the situation since Labor was formed in 1968 and the problem has only gotten worse over time. Second, it allowed itself to become too dependent on a few key leaders and did not replace them as they retired and left the party. Third, it has served in too many national-unity governments and so has not sufficiently differentiated itself from the center-right parties, Kadima and Likud. Fourth, it is suffering from the fallout of both a failed peace process and a failed war.
A major characteristic of Labor is its dependence on former generals. There are two key dates in the militarization of the Labor movement, June 1967 and June 1974. Before June 1967 Israel’s prime ministers, namely David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol, served as their own defense ministers. Ben-Gurion also served temporarily as a defense minister under Moshe Sharret after another civilian defense minister, Pinhas Lavon, was forced to resign due to a scandal. This was during Ben-Gurion’s temporary retirement from politics in1954 and 1955. On the eve of the Six Day War, Eshkol bowed to popular pressure and appointed former chief of staff General Moshe Dayan as his defense minister. Ever since then, only defense technocrats, one for each of the two main parties, and former generals have served as defense ministers with two minor exceptions. Menahem Begin served temporarily as his own defense minister in 1980-81, after ex-general Ezer Weizman. During his second term, he quickly made room for first Arik Sharon and then (defense industry engineer) Moshe Arens as defense ministers. The latest failed Labor head, Amir Peretz, was a civilian defense minister in 2006 and 2007; everyone has judged him a failure due to his and the IDF’s poor performance in the Second Lebanon War.
In June 1974, after Golda Meir and Dayan were forced to resign, former chief of staff General Yitzhak Rabin replaced Meir as prime minister. Since then Shimon Peres has been Labor’s only “civilian” prime minister. Peres served three times as prime minister: after Rabin suddenly resigned in February 1977 for two months, after Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 for seven months, and from 1984 to 1986 after being elected in a close election with the Likud. Peres was forced to change positions with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir halfway through his term by previous agreement. Since Rabin’s death, Peres has rotated with three former generals, Ehud Barak, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and Amram Mitzna, as leader of the Labor Party.
Labor has gone from a record high of 56 seats the year after its creation (1969), to between 35 and 45 seats from 1981 to 1996, to 26 seats under Barak in1999, to 21 seats in 2003 and 19 seats today. This is less than the 44 seats it held under Rabin in 1992. I believe that this shrinkage is due to three factors. First, the rise of smaller parties as the result of direct elections for prime minister from 1996 to 2001. Second, a backlash against the peace camp as a result of the failure of the Oslo Process. Third, the substitution of generals for a program and ideology has left the party without a real identity.
The Labor Party has probably had two dozen or more generals on its lists in the last forty years. Since 1974, Labor has had only one civilian, Shimon Peres, elected as prime minister. From 1974 to 1996 two individuals monopolized the Labor Party leadership. One is now dead and the other left the party after losing the leadership to another civilian. Labor is in definite danger of echoing right-wing parties, permanently losing the Mizrahi and Russian populations and relying on an aging Sabra Ashkenazi population. Unless it attracts a significant number of new voters it will continue to see its share of the electorate shrink and its caucus in the Knesset as well. An over-reliance on former generals as leaders lead to a substitution of imagined military charisma for real popular policies and leadership. Israel is suffering from the same problem.
There is precedent from Labor’s own history for a political penalty for a failed war. The Likud first came to power in 1977 in a delayed reaction to Israel being caught by surprise in the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The next elections took place in December, too soon for Israelis to take stock of the responsibility for the failure and exact a price at the polls. A price will be exacted for Israel’s poor showing in the Second Lebanon War in the next election. The Likud will probably return to power in a coalition with Israel Beitenu and religious parties.
Labor needs to go into opposition, develop new policies including a social agenda, and develop a close working relationship if not a Ma’arakh-style joint list with Meretz. Because of Israel’s PR franchise system a full merger might not be necessary and could even be counterproductive. But the two parties could found a joint think tank to develop a new peace initiative, new social policies, and new military policies. This will be difficult to implement as the two parties are competitors for some of the same electorate.
But such a new relationship will probably take an outside stimulus to create. It will probably take balanced outside pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians through a dual mediation peace process to achieve this.
I do not go into detailed demographic election marketing strategy. I’m an historian, not a professional campaign manager or pollster. Labor has plenty of these that it can hire in Israel or from America. But that is short term and tactical. Labor needs major strategic changes. So far its biggest innovation has been to have an “aluf” competing for the leadership whose title translates into admiral in English rather than general. In Israel’s situation it is natural that generals play a role in politics, they just should not dominate it and the party should not hold its electoral fortunes hostage to them. In this respect. Labor should be more like the Likud. Making Amir Peretz its leader was a step in the right direction. His mistake was to accept the defense ministry rather than the finance ministry or another economic post. Given more time, Peretz might well have become a skilled war leader, but Peretz could not count on that time in Israel’s strategic environment.
Labor must also conduct a detailed demographic analysis of its electorate since December 1973. It should examine which sectors have left and why. It should then determine which demographic sectors are recoverable and build an integrated package of policies that will attract them. This combined with a principled peace strategy of peace with reliable Arab leaders will help it regain and sustain power. Labor has substituted tactical election policies at the expense of strategic thinking and its dramatic shrinkage has been the result. It is not too late to reverse this trend.
Monday, September 03, 2007
Meretz USA News Analysis, Aug. 31
Making November Conference a Success
The past month or so has been filled with a mixture of hope and skepticism: hope because of the upcoming peace conference that the United States has proposed for November, but skepticism because of fears that the three leaders (President Bush, Prime Minister Olmert, and President Abbas) are too weak to achieve anything.
Meanwhile, these months leading up to the conference are seeing periodic meetings between the two Middle Eastern leaders. Their goal is to hammer out a final status agreement in time for the conference. The issues on which they are focusing include determining the borders for a Palestinian state, the future of Jerusalem, and the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees.
As these discussions continue, Israeli diplomats are working to come up with a strategy for the peace process. They are recommending:
1) bilateral talks with the Palestinians and the achievement of a boycott on Hamas;
2) gradual rapprochement with the Arab League;
3) additional financial support for Abbas and his followers.
But many analysts also have their own ideas about what must occur in order for the November conference and the peace process as a whole to succeed where the last failed. Below are a number of these suggestions:
* Focusing on the statement of principles itself, Akiva Eldar writes that "the key [to its acceptance by both sides] is constructive ambiguity." In other words, to word it in a way that will allow both sides their own interpretation.
* Kenneth W. Stein offers more general requirements for the conference to be a success. Looking back at history, he writes that the three most successful ones - Geneva in 1973, Camp David in 1978 and Madrid in 1991 - were not themselves the end, but rather means to an end. He continues by emphasizing the importance of detailed pre-negotiations and concludes telling both Israel and Palestine to "keep your eyes on the prize" since there are sure to be stumbling blocks.
* Ghassan Katib has advice for the Palestinians. Taking into account internal divisions on both the Israeli and Palestinian side, he advises writes that the conference will not be successful without the reform of Fatah and dialogue between Fatah and Hamas.
* Writing about the format of the conference, Elie Podeh advocates "multi-bilateral negotiations." He explains that the parties should not focus on one track at the exclusion of the others. More specifically, there should be Israel-Palestine, Israel-Syria, and Israel-Lebanon talks all at the same time.
* Gershon Baskin focuses on the peace process in general. Like Stein, he recommends learning from history's failures. In a series of several articles, he offers explanations of why the Oslo process failed and how not to repeat its mistakes in the current peace process. In the most recent, Baskin has a series of suggestions: 1) the nurturing of the Palestinian economy; 2) the centrality of an unbiased, third-party mediator; 3) demilitarization; 4) the cultivation of personal relationships; 5) ongoing contact between the leaders; 6) peace education; and 7) a bottom-up strategy - necessary in order to reach the grassroots on both sides.
* Danny Rubinstein [Yes, that Danny Rubinstein, who recently entered the "apartheid" controversy - ed.] concurs in particular with Baskin's final point. In a Haaretz, opinion piece, he writes that Palestinian public opinion has become more extreme in recent years. Israel must, thus, "persuade the [Palestinian] people" that an agreement is necessary.
Although some are skeptical, none of these analysts believe the November conference's failure a given. And some commentators are even arguing that the weakness of Bush, Olmert, and Abbas will have a positive effect. For instance, Akiva Eldar, writes that this perceived weakness is one reason the Israeli media is paying little attention to the talks between Olmert and Abbas - something that could actually bode well! It will be easier to make process when the right wing and the settlers are distracted.
Similarly, Roger Cohen writes for the New York Times that "low expectations are a diplomat's ally." There is an exhaustion of fighting in the region that may pave the way for peace. And, with so much already gone bad, the weakened leaders have little left to lose.
Gadi Baltiansky (director general of the Geneva Initiative) observed last Friday, that history has happened in November every thirty years, since 1917: November 1917 saw the publication of the Balfour Declaration, November 1947, the UN partition plan, and November 1977, Sadat's break-through visit to Israel. Hopefully he's right, and November 2007 will be an auspicious time for the conference.
In other news:
* Israel has come under fire for turning away Sudanese refugees trying to get into the country. An article in the JTA explores the moral and practical dilemmas Israel faces. (Also read Meretz USA's recent statement on the issue.)
* An Israeli officer's rescue by Palestinian security forces after he accidentally drove into Jenin this week has made big news. Many are touting the incident as a positive sign of cooperation between Israel and Fatah.
* Clashes between Fatah and Hamas are continuing. Today, three were injured in the Gaza Strip.
* And the closed Gaza border is becoming of great concern for many. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development released a report on the issue on Thursday.
The past month or so has been filled with a mixture of hope and skepticism: hope because of the upcoming peace conference that the United States has proposed for November, but skepticism because of fears that the three leaders (President Bush, Prime Minister Olmert, and President Abbas) are too weak to achieve anything.
Meanwhile, these months leading up to the conference are seeing periodic meetings between the two Middle Eastern leaders. Their goal is to hammer out a final status agreement in time for the conference. The issues on which they are focusing include determining the borders for a Palestinian state, the future of Jerusalem, and the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees.
As these discussions continue, Israeli diplomats are working to come up with a strategy for the peace process. They are recommending:
1) bilateral talks with the Palestinians and the achievement of a boycott on Hamas;
2) gradual rapprochement with the Arab League;
3) additional financial support for Abbas and his followers.
But many analysts also have their own ideas about what must occur in order for the November conference and the peace process as a whole to succeed where the last failed. Below are a number of these suggestions:
* Focusing on the statement of principles itself, Akiva Eldar writes that "the key [to its acceptance by both sides] is constructive ambiguity." In other words, to word it in a way that will allow both sides their own interpretation.
* Kenneth W. Stein offers more general requirements for the conference to be a success. Looking back at history, he writes that the three most successful ones - Geneva in 1973, Camp David in 1978 and Madrid in 1991 - were not themselves the end, but rather means to an end. He continues by emphasizing the importance of detailed pre-negotiations and concludes telling both Israel and Palestine to "keep your eyes on the prize" since there are sure to be stumbling blocks.
* Ghassan Katib has advice for the Palestinians. Taking into account internal divisions on both the Israeli and Palestinian side, he advises writes that the conference will not be successful without the reform of Fatah and dialogue between Fatah and Hamas.
* Writing about the format of the conference, Elie Podeh advocates "multi-bilateral negotiations." He explains that the parties should not focus on one track at the exclusion of the others. More specifically, there should be Israel-Palestine, Israel-Syria, and Israel-Lebanon talks all at the same time.
* Gershon Baskin focuses on the peace process in general. Like Stein, he recommends learning from history's failures. In a series of several articles, he offers explanations of why the Oslo process failed and how not to repeat its mistakes in the current peace process. In the most recent, Baskin has a series of suggestions: 1) the nurturing of the Palestinian economy; 2) the centrality of an unbiased, third-party mediator; 3) demilitarization; 4) the cultivation of personal relationships; 5) ongoing contact between the leaders; 6) peace education; and 7) a bottom-up strategy - necessary in order to reach the grassroots on both sides.
* Danny Rubinstein [Yes, that Danny Rubinstein, who recently entered the "apartheid" controversy - ed.] concurs in particular with Baskin's final point. In a Haaretz, opinion piece, he writes that Palestinian public opinion has become more extreme in recent years. Israel must, thus, "persuade the [Palestinian] people" that an agreement is necessary.
Although some are skeptical, none of these analysts believe the November conference's failure a given. And some commentators are even arguing that the weakness of Bush, Olmert, and Abbas will have a positive effect. For instance, Akiva Eldar, writes that this perceived weakness is one reason the Israeli media is paying little attention to the talks between Olmert and Abbas - something that could actually bode well! It will be easier to make process when the right wing and the settlers are distracted.
Similarly, Roger Cohen writes for the New York Times that "low expectations are a diplomat's ally." There is an exhaustion of fighting in the region that may pave the way for peace. And, with so much already gone bad, the weakened leaders have little left to lose.
Gadi Baltiansky (director general of the Geneva Initiative) observed last Friday, that history has happened in November every thirty years, since 1917: November 1917 saw the publication of the Balfour Declaration, November 1947, the UN partition plan, and November 1977, Sadat's break-through visit to Israel. Hopefully he's right, and November 2007 will be an auspicious time for the conference.
In other news:
* Israel has come under fire for turning away Sudanese refugees trying to get into the country. An article in the JTA explores the moral and practical dilemmas Israel faces. (Also read Meretz USA's recent statement on the issue.)
* An Israeli officer's rescue by Palestinian security forces after he accidentally drove into Jenin this week has made big news. Many are touting the incident as a positive sign of cooperation between Israel and Fatah.
* Clashes between Fatah and Hamas are continuing. Today, three were injured in the Gaza Strip.
* And the closed Gaza border is becoming of great concern for many. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development released a report on the issue on Thursday.
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