Yehuda Bauer, a renowned Holocaust historian, professor emeritus at Hebrew University and a veteran of the socialist-Zionist Mapam and now a supporter of Meretz, recently wrote this op-ed in Haaretz. I recently read his book of essays, which was first published in 2001, Rethinking the Holocaust, and I was enormously impressed. He is one of our most incisive thinkers.
The blogger, “Failed Messish,” summarizes and reflects upon his words:
... There are ... two "states," so-to-speak, the first a Western democracy [Israel within the Green Line], the second a primarily religious state governed by extremism [the West Bank].
If a peace deal is ever reached that calls for evacuation of significant parts of the West Bank or of eastern Jerusalem, the second "state" will clash with the first. [There is a real risk of civil war.] ...
Bauer closes as follows:
…There is no truth to the well-known tradition that the Second Temple was destroyed due to baseless hatred or internecine rivalry. The Temple was destroyed because religious, messianic extremists forced the nation to rebel against a global empire that it had no chance of defeating. [A time may come] in which a radical religious minority thwarts peace because the fanatic political assassins of the Second Temple period have found worthy successors.
Failed Messiah seems worth a further look.
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Friday, August 31, 2007
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Arab and Jewish theme schools
Curiously, two public schools dedicated separately to Hebrew and Arab language and culture, in Florida and New York respectively, have simultaneously made news . Our journalist friend, Doug Chandler, co-authored this story on the Arab school controversy. The following quote from a NY Times article bothered me because the concern expressed is factually flawed:
Critics on the school board in South Florida disregard the extent to which public schools in much if not most of America are infused with Christian religious themes. The very idea of Christmas parties and overtly religious Christmas carols – something I remember very clearly from my school days, even when the schools I attended had mostly Jewish students – stamp the public schools with the sense of a majority Christian identity. I think that this is a more serious issue, because it's so prevalent, than are worries over a Jewish or an Arab curriculum here or there.
Opponents say that it is impossible to teach Hebrew — and aspects of Jewish culture — outside a religious context, and that Ben Gamla, billed as the nation's first Hebrew-English charter school, violates one of its paramount legal and political boundaries.One can indeed teach Hebrew, or any language, outside of a religious context. It's also true that because its emphasis is on language, this school cannot be replicated by Christian groups. But I wonder if public schools should be in the business of imparting ethnic culture – which is also why I question the Arab school in New York. But teaching the Hebrew and Arabic languages (as well as social studies classes that cover Middle Eastern cultures) are proper course offerings for youngsters in public schools.
Critics on the school board in South Florida disregard the extent to which public schools in much if not most of America are infused with Christian religious themes. The very idea of Christmas parties and overtly religious Christmas carols – something I remember very clearly from my school days, even when the schools I attended had mostly Jewish students – stamp the public schools with the sense of a majority Christian identity. I think that this is a more serious issue, because it's so prevalent, than are worries over a Jewish or an Arab curriculum here or there.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Mearsheimer & Walt: 'The Wrong Guys'
If Professors Mearsheimer and Walt had simply critiqued AIPAC in an accurate way, there would have been no big uproar. There also would have been no big attention paid them, nor big sales pumped up for their forthcoming book, to be released Sept. 4 by Farrar, Straus and Giroux. But they actually lump together AIPAC with virtually anyone who is pro-Israel, including peaceniks.
At last summer's conference of the World Union of Meretz, Yossi Beilin told Meretz supporters from around the world last year that he saw "hatred" in their work; I responded when given the podium that it wasn't exactly hatred but rather "animus" or hostility. Beilin went on to explain how AIPAC had actually worked against Israeli policy when he was a member of the Rabin and Barak governments — e.g., lobbying Congress against Israeli efforts to free up aid to the Palestinian Authority.
There is a disturbing parallel between Mearsheimer-Walt accusing the "Israel Lobby" of causing the war in Iraq (which is what they basically contend) with the Nazis' "The Jews stabbed us in the back" narrative about World War I. There's a hard-to-calibrate combination of obtuseness and perniciousness in M-W's entire approach, very much a departure from the high standard of scholarship that one would expect from them.
I'm especially disturbed that (according to The Forward) their book appears not to have corrected gross out-of-context misstatements and distortions in their work. While acknowledging that AIPAC and others close to it are eminently open to criticism, we should also be very forthright in finding fault with M & W. If you haven't already, you should look at this editorial in The Forward.
As The Forward indicates:
At last summer's conference of the World Union of Meretz, Yossi Beilin told Meretz supporters from around the world last year that he saw "hatred" in their work; I responded when given the podium that it wasn't exactly hatred but rather "animus" or hostility. Beilin went on to explain how AIPAC had actually worked against Israeli policy when he was a member of the Rabin and Barak governments — e.g., lobbying Congress against Israeli efforts to free up aid to the Palestinian Authority.
There is a disturbing parallel between Mearsheimer-Walt accusing the "Israel Lobby" of causing the war in Iraq (which is what they basically contend) with the Nazis' "The Jews stabbed us in the back" narrative about World War I. There's a hard-to-calibrate combination of obtuseness and perniciousness in M-W's entire approach, very much a departure from the high standard of scholarship that one would expect from them.
I'm especially disturbed that (according to The Forward) their book appears not to have corrected gross out-of-context misstatements and distortions in their work. While acknowledging that AIPAC and others close to it are eminently open to criticism, we should also be very forthright in finding fault with M & W. If you haven't already, you should look at this editorial in The Forward.
As The Forward indicates:
There are substantial numbers of true moderates in this country who believe deeply in the need for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. They struggle to make their voices heard in a hostile political and communal environment, and they naturally look for spokesmen who can capture the public’s attention and help unite and mobilize the peace camp — including, most recently, scholars Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer. We are sympathetic to this quest for leadership, but after firsthand experience of these scholars’ definition of “opening the debate,” we feel compelled to speak up: They’re the wrong guys.
Thursday, August 23, 2007
Meretz USA mourns Carolyn Goodman
Mother of slain civil rights worker, Andrew Goodman, Carolyn Goodman served on the board of Meretz USA in the late1990s. She was a lifelong activist for human rights and justice and our condolences go out to her surviving son, Jonathan, her extended family, and everyone whose passion for justice, like hers, is universal. Click here for AP obituary.
Stefi Kirschner, former director of the Givat Haviva Educational Foundation, wrote upon hearing of her passing:
Stefi Kirschner, former director of the Givat Haviva Educational Foundation, wrote upon hearing of her passing:
Carolyn Goodman was indeed a lady, an activist in her own right, before and after the loss of her son Andy. She was an amazing woman, intelligent, caring and a wonderful friend and mentor to many who came to know her.
She served on the board of the Givat Haviva Educational Foundation for many years, certainly during my entire tenure from 1981 to 1991, but I know from the time Dov Sheba began coming to the States in the '50s, he befriended Carolyn. Carolyn hosted every shaliach from the Kibbutz Artzi Federation, opening her home, her address book and of course she was a generous supporter as well.
She was a brilliant, caring, warm, wonderful lady, with a great sense of humor, a special touch, the ability to connect with all from different walks of life, different cultures, etc. She holds a special place in my heart; I will remember her always as I have continued to tell stories of Carolyn to my family.
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
Primo Levi’s so-called ‘Journey’
The New York Times was far kinder in its very brief review of “The Journey of Primo Levi” than I will be. Film director, Davide Ferrario, lives in Primo Levi’s hometown of Turin, but his documentary production is misnamed. It is only partially about Levi, the world-renowned Italian-Jewish writer and Auschwitz survivor who is thought to have taken his own life in 1987. And, although it tracks his circuitous route from Poland back home to Turin after being liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945, it is not really about Levi’s journey.
For no discernible reason, Levi and 800 of his fellow Italian ex-prisoners are transported by train hundreds of miles north and east, rather than directly repatriated west and south to Italy. Their return trip lasted eight months.
Mr. Ferrario has devised a conceit to retrace their path through much of Eastern Europe 60 years later, matching his film crew’s journey in 2005 with geographically appropriate selections of Levi’s words read from his 1963 memoir, “The Truce” (published in the US as “The Reawakening”), by the distinguished American actor, Chris Cooper. We occasionally view the author on stock film footage — this intense, physically slight individual, visiting his former place of imprisonment at Auschwitz or walking alone, pensive, often smoking in unidentified places.
We ache for more of these glimpses of Primo Levi and to hear his soulful words recited by Mr. Cooper. Instead, we are distracted – sometimes engagingly, sometimes tediously – by stories and images from contemporary Eastern Europe or even from 20-30 years before. In the process, the viewer learns more about the decade and a half since the end of Communist rule and the fall of the Soviet Union than about Primo Levi.
After leaving the grounds of Auschwitz, except for one passage read by Chris Cooper, not a single scene refers to Jews. The filmmaker is expropriating the symbolism of Levi’s journey to depict the desolation and dislocation of post-Soviet Eastern Europe as a parallel to the greater human and material detritus left in the wake of World War II.
Read more detailed version of this review at New Jersey Jewish News Web site.
For no discernible reason, Levi and 800 of his fellow Italian ex-prisoners are transported by train hundreds of miles north and east, rather than directly repatriated west and south to Italy. Their return trip lasted eight months.
Mr. Ferrario has devised a conceit to retrace their path through much of Eastern Europe 60 years later, matching his film crew’s journey in 2005 with geographically appropriate selections of Levi’s words read from his 1963 memoir, “The Truce” (published in the US as “The Reawakening”), by the distinguished American actor, Chris Cooper. We occasionally view the author on stock film footage — this intense, physically slight individual, visiting his former place of imprisonment at Auschwitz or walking alone, pensive, often smoking in unidentified places.
We ache for more of these glimpses of Primo Levi and to hear his soulful words recited by Mr. Cooper. Instead, we are distracted – sometimes engagingly, sometimes tediously – by stories and images from contemporary Eastern Europe or even from 20-30 years before. In the process, the viewer learns more about the decade and a half since the end of Communist rule and the fall of the Soviet Union than about Primo Levi.
After leaving the grounds of Auschwitz, except for one passage read by Chris Cooper, not a single scene refers to Jews. The filmmaker is expropriating the symbolism of Levi’s journey to depict the desolation and dislocation of post-Soviet Eastern Europe as a parallel to the greater human and material detritus left in the wake of World War II.
Read more detailed version of this review at New Jersey Jewish News Web site.
Sunday, August 19, 2007
Meretz USA News Analysis - Aug. 17, 2007
Return of the Peace Process?
Once upon a time, in a decade not long ago (the 1990s, to be exact), the exchanges that took place between Israelis and Palestinians were known 'round the world as the "peace process," not "the conflict." Sadly, over the last seven years, since Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary compound and the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian arena has seemed to generate only one depressing headline after another - with just the rarest bits of hopeful news scattered here and there.
Lately, however, a scent of change has been wafting in the air. The good vibes emanating from Israel-Palestine have been multiplying. The buds of progress seem to be sprouting. The bad news hasn't disappeared, mind you, but it's no longer the only news in town.
Note, if you will, the following developments (both symbolic and substantive) that have been reported in the press over the last several weeks:
* Israeli Prime Minister Olmert went to the West Bank to meet with the Palestinian President (Abbas) for the first time since the beginning of the Second Intifada.
* Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, announced that Olmert had promised Abbas to release a list of major roadblocks in the West Bank slated for removal.
* Israel has allowed the Palestinian police to resume their activity in the sections of the West Bank known as "Area B" - where, under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority has been given control over law enforcement.
* The IDF halted its incendiary practice of staging training exercises within West Bank Palestinian villages.
* The "grand old man" of Israeli politics, President Shimon Peres, has reportedly submitted a peace plan under which "Israel will propose transferring to the Palestinian state areas equivalent to 100 percent of the territories conquered in 1967."
* Indeed, various Israeli politicians have begun competing, not over who can sound most pugnacious vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but over whose framework for diplomatic progress is most viable.
* Finally, and most notably, the weekend papers in Israel are filled with items suggesting that Olmert and Abbas have been doing much more serious negotiating over the last few weeks than was commonly believed. Indeed, the Yediot newspaper reports Olmert's optimism that the two sides can reach agreement on the principles of a permanent settlement ahead of this fall's projected peace conference in Washington.
Several Israeli commentators have ascribed the growing signs of flexibility emanating from Ehud Olmert's office to the Prime Minister's need to retool his political reputation following last year's Lebanon War and amid the multiple criminal investigations he is facing. However, Steve Erlanger of the New York Times today offers a less simplistic interpretation, suggesting that an "alliance of fear" (fear of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas) is pushing the US, Israel, Egypt, Palestinian moderates, Saudi Arabia and others towards this renewed diplomatic push. As an unnamed US official told the paper, the Bush administration has finally come to realize that the current status quo is unsustainable.
But not everyone is optimistic. Haaretz's Aluf Benn argues that, although all the signs seem good, Abbas and his Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, are simply too weak to enforce security in the West Bank and thereby allow a meaningful Israeli withdrawal. Hence, Benn concludes, what we are witnessing is a make-believe negotiation over a "Play Station Palestine."
Labor Party Chairman/Defense Minister Ehud Barak is not joining the diplomatic revelry either. In a series of private pronouncements over the last several weeks, Barak has intoned that those who talk about a peace agreement with the Palestinians are indulging in "a fantasy." Staking out a position which many see as further to the right than the centrist Ehud Olmert, Barak has suggested that he would not support a deal with the Palestinians until Israel had a proper rocket and missile defense system in place - a process that could take up to five years. Indeed, Haaretz reported today that funding for this system, known as "Iron Dome," has been inconsistent and that, as a result, its development has been slow.
The hard line that Barak has been pushing has not enamored him to Secretary of State Rice. According to Akiva Eldar of Haaretz, "Rice is of the opinion that in the war against terrorism, technological advantage holds no special significance," and that, "when security considerations alone dictate policy, those people not involved in violence join in the cycle of violence." Rice is especially concerned that Barak's negative remarks about the peace process will undermine Palestinian confidence in the Israeli side and become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Haaretz, too, has roundly criticized Barak's approach, as well as the Defense Ministry's continued leniency toward the illegal outposts. The paper has called on the Prime Minister to, "Restrain the defense minister."
Martin Indyk, the ex-Clinton Administration official and former ambassador to Israel, appears to strike a middle ground between exaggerated optimism and "Barakish" skepticism. "If Rice goes for final status she'll drive it into the ground," Indyk told the New York Times. He argues that Israel lacks sufficient confidence in the Palestinians to withdraw from large sections of the West Bank, since it fears this would lead to rocket fire on Ben-Gurion Airport and elsewhere in central Israel.
Instead, Indyk suggests a two-pronged approach: Tony Blair will work with the Palestinians to help them build properly functioning state institutions; in parallel, Condoleezza Rice will push the Israelis and Palestinians to reach agreement on the principles of a final settlement - "not the final settlement itself, which will be carried out over many years", according to Indyk.
Last, but not least: Haggai Alon, who was a senior adviser to former Defense Minister Amir Peretz, importantly reminds readers that it will certainly be hard to generate any movement towards peace when the pressures of occupation continue to weigh so heavily on average Palestinians. In order to strengthen President Abbas in the eyes of his own people, Alon argues that Israel must allow the Palestinians, "a modicum of civil dignity and human rights, as expressed through law, order and freedom of movement." Alon implores the Israeli government to remove many of the roadblocks, dismantle unauthorized outposts, and cease the IDF's incessant raids into Palestinian towns and cities.
Once upon a time, in a decade not long ago (the 1990s, to be exact), the exchanges that took place between Israelis and Palestinians were known 'round the world as the "peace process," not "the conflict." Sadly, over the last seven years, since Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary compound and the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian arena has seemed to generate only one depressing headline after another - with just the rarest bits of hopeful news scattered here and there.
Lately, however, a scent of change has been wafting in the air. The good vibes emanating from Israel-Palestine have been multiplying. The buds of progress seem to be sprouting. The bad news hasn't disappeared, mind you, but it's no longer the only news in town.
Note, if you will, the following developments (both symbolic and substantive) that have been reported in the press over the last several weeks:
* Israeli Prime Minister Olmert went to the West Bank to meet with the Palestinian President (Abbas) for the first time since the beginning of the Second Intifada.
* Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, announced that Olmert had promised Abbas to release a list of major roadblocks in the West Bank slated for removal.
* Israel has allowed the Palestinian police to resume their activity in the sections of the West Bank known as "Area B" - where, under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority has been given control over law enforcement.
* The IDF halted its incendiary practice of staging training exercises within West Bank Palestinian villages.
* The "grand old man" of Israeli politics, President Shimon Peres, has reportedly submitted a peace plan under which "Israel will propose transferring to the Palestinian state areas equivalent to 100 percent of the territories conquered in 1967."
* Indeed, various Israeli politicians have begun competing, not over who can sound most pugnacious vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but over whose framework for diplomatic progress is most viable.
* Finally, and most notably, the weekend papers in Israel are filled with items suggesting that Olmert and Abbas have been doing much more serious negotiating over the last few weeks than was commonly believed. Indeed, the Yediot newspaper reports Olmert's optimism that the two sides can reach agreement on the principles of a permanent settlement ahead of this fall's projected peace conference in Washington.
Several Israeli commentators have ascribed the growing signs of flexibility emanating from Ehud Olmert's office to the Prime Minister's need to retool his political reputation following last year's Lebanon War and amid the multiple criminal investigations he is facing. However, Steve Erlanger of the New York Times today offers a less simplistic interpretation, suggesting that an "alliance of fear" (fear of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas) is pushing the US, Israel, Egypt, Palestinian moderates, Saudi Arabia and others towards this renewed diplomatic push. As an unnamed US official told the paper, the Bush administration has finally come to realize that the current status quo is unsustainable.
But not everyone is optimistic. Haaretz's Aluf Benn argues that, although all the signs seem good, Abbas and his Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, are simply too weak to enforce security in the West Bank and thereby allow a meaningful Israeli withdrawal. Hence, Benn concludes, what we are witnessing is a make-believe negotiation over a "Play Station Palestine."
Labor Party Chairman/Defense Minister Ehud Barak is not joining the diplomatic revelry either. In a series of private pronouncements over the last several weeks, Barak has intoned that those who talk about a peace agreement with the Palestinians are indulging in "a fantasy." Staking out a position which many see as further to the right than the centrist Ehud Olmert, Barak has suggested that he would not support a deal with the Palestinians until Israel had a proper rocket and missile defense system in place - a process that could take up to five years. Indeed, Haaretz reported today that funding for this system, known as "Iron Dome," has been inconsistent and that, as a result, its development has been slow.
The hard line that Barak has been pushing has not enamored him to Secretary of State Rice. According to Akiva Eldar of Haaretz, "Rice is of the opinion that in the war against terrorism, technological advantage holds no special significance," and that, "when security considerations alone dictate policy, those people not involved in violence join in the cycle of violence." Rice is especially concerned that Barak's negative remarks about the peace process will undermine Palestinian confidence in the Israeli side and become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Haaretz, too, has roundly criticized Barak's approach, as well as the Defense Ministry's continued leniency toward the illegal outposts. The paper has called on the Prime Minister to, "Restrain the defense minister."
Martin Indyk, the ex-Clinton Administration official and former ambassador to Israel, appears to strike a middle ground between exaggerated optimism and "Barakish" skepticism. "If Rice goes for final status she'll drive it into the ground," Indyk told the New York Times. He argues that Israel lacks sufficient confidence in the Palestinians to withdraw from large sections of the West Bank, since it fears this would lead to rocket fire on Ben-Gurion Airport and elsewhere in central Israel.
Instead, Indyk suggests a two-pronged approach: Tony Blair will work with the Palestinians to help them build properly functioning state institutions; in parallel, Condoleezza Rice will push the Israelis and Palestinians to reach agreement on the principles of a final settlement - "not the final settlement itself, which will be carried out over many years", according to Indyk.
Last, but not least: Haggai Alon, who was a senior adviser to former Defense Minister Amir Peretz, importantly reminds readers that it will certainly be hard to generate any movement towards peace when the pressures of occupation continue to weigh so heavily on average Palestinians. In order to strengthen President Abbas in the eyes of his own people, Alon argues that Israel must allow the Palestinians, "a modicum of civil dignity and human rights, as expressed through law, order and freedom of movement." Alon implores the Israeli government to remove many of the roadblocks, dismantle unauthorized outposts, and cease the IDF's incessant raids into Palestinian towns and cities.
Thursday, August 16, 2007
Why be Jewish? Part 2
The recent death of Cardinal Lustiger, the “Jewish” French cleric, provides a postscript to my earlier posting about Jewishness, “Why be Jewish? If you have to ask. ...” A convert to Catholicism who was born Jewish and all his life continued to proclaim his Jewishness, Lustiger reminds us of the complexity of Jewish identity. He was a child Holocaust survivor, a native Yiddish speaker and insisted on regarding himself as a Jew, even as a leading prince of the Roman Catholic Church. Until tapped for promotion to archbishop and then cardinal by Pope John Paul II (a personal friend), Lustiger considered retiring and making Aliya.
But if Israel and its supreme court stuck to precedent, Lustiger would not have been granted immediate citizenship under the Law of Return. The precedent was the famous case of a Catholic monk, Jewish by blood like Lustiger, who sued for rights under the Law of Return that were denied by virtue of his obvious Catholic faith. (If I remember correctly, the monk was eventually granted citizenship under the naturalization process that is available to non-Jewish immigrants.)
As a left Zionist with a humanistic religious bent, I would be gratified with the success of Zionism in radically transforming Jewish identity into an ethnic or cultural classification, rather than the mainly religious association that it continues to project to most Jews and non-Jews alike. Pioneering Zionism was primarily a non-religious, largely even an anti-religious movement; alas, the religious right has ascended to a powerful influence in Zionist institutions and ideology. And, in this light, my notion of Jewish identity divorced from religious attachment seems very radical. If someone like Lustiger, with unmistakable Jewish roots but of non-Jewish faith, continues to regard himself as a Jew, I am loath to deny his self definition.
The Jewish people is one of the oldest on earth, with origins going back as much as 3500 years. In the current era, similarly ancient peoples – such as Chinese, Indians and Greeks – (with the exception of extremists) do not cast out people who have embraced a non-native individual creed. Even though the lack of strong religious conviction among most of world Jewry is a well-known fact, we alone among the world’s peoples continue to maintain an unnaturally rigid linkage between our aboriginal religious faith and our identity as a people.
But if Israel and its supreme court stuck to precedent, Lustiger would not have been granted immediate citizenship under the Law of Return. The precedent was the famous case of a Catholic monk, Jewish by blood like Lustiger, who sued for rights under the Law of Return that were denied by virtue of his obvious Catholic faith. (If I remember correctly, the monk was eventually granted citizenship under the naturalization process that is available to non-Jewish immigrants.)
As a left Zionist with a humanistic religious bent, I would be gratified with the success of Zionism in radically transforming Jewish identity into an ethnic or cultural classification, rather than the mainly religious association that it continues to project to most Jews and non-Jews alike. Pioneering Zionism was primarily a non-religious, largely even an anti-religious movement; alas, the religious right has ascended to a powerful influence in Zionist institutions and ideology. And, in this light, my notion of Jewish identity divorced from religious attachment seems very radical. If someone like Lustiger, with unmistakable Jewish roots but of non-Jewish faith, continues to regard himself as a Jew, I am loath to deny his self definition.
The Jewish people is one of the oldest on earth, with origins going back as much as 3500 years. In the current era, similarly ancient peoples – such as Chinese, Indians and Greeks – (with the exception of extremists) do not cast out people who have embraced a non-native individual creed. Even though the lack of strong religious conviction among most of world Jewry is a well-known fact, we alone among the world’s peoples continue to maintain an unnaturally rigid linkage between our aboriginal religious faith and our identity as a people.
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Vacationing in Israel, Part 2
Dalyat al Carmel is one of two Druse villages near Haifa. Cousins who hosted us for a few days, took us there (as is their custom whenever I visit) to buy gifts, eat and shmooze with their friends of the Halabi clan. Traffic was heavy in Dalyat, as in the neighboring Druse village.
Interestingly, I learned from these cousins that some Israeli Jews also live there. (When Prof. Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland addressed a Meretz USA board meeting a couple of years ago, he informed me that he was an Israeli Arab who had lived in Dalyat.) So much for a system of enforced segregation resembling apartheid.
The Druse (also transliterated as “Druze”) are an Arabic-speaking people who have a unique religion and a separate identity from other Arabs. Their largest communities are in Israel, Lebanon and Syria; each makes a point of fitting in politically with the majority. In Lebanon, where there is no single majority, they constitute a distinct ethnic faction safeguarding their interests in the rough and tumble of its often chaotic and violent reality. In Syria and the Golan Heights, they are loyal to the Assad regime. Across the border, they are loyal to Israel, with their 100,000-strong community willingly subject to military conscription on the same basis as Jews. The much smaller Circassian community is similarly subject to military conscription on an equal basis as Jews; the Circassians are Muslims but not Arabs.
During our stay at his home, our cousin Uzi took us to his favorite eatery (twice in four days, in my case): a falafel and shwarma place at a crossroads called Checkpost, a name left over from the British Mandate when soldiers manned a checkpoint there. I was surprised when he told me that the owner and his sons working there are Arabs; almost all of the customers were Jews.
I am informed by Daniela Cohen – a member of Kibbutz Ein Gedi who works at the resort and hosts a lovely early-morning tour of its botanical gardens – that the Arabic speakers we saw as fellow guests were Druse and not generic Israeli Arabs as I had thought. But Arabs were very much in evidence in Akko – the mixed Galilee city that was once the Crusader stronghold known as Acre. And we chatted with a family from the Arab city of Nazareth who shared the cable car ride with us at Rosh HaNikra. They asked if we had visited their town; I explained that one set of cousins had invited us to go to lunch in Nazareth but that we had already made other plans near Haifa. We have a “rain check” for that lunch in Nazareth.
We were driven to Rosh HaNikra by still another cousin who hosted us for a day and two nights at Kibbutz Kabri (or Cabri) near Naharia. Earlier, we took a swim at the kibbutz pool, where we saw many Arab families enjoying their Saturday leisure time. My cousin Gila explained that these were the families of employees at kibbutz enterprises – of which there are quite a few, including two industrial factories, a high-end gourmet restaurant (owned in part by an Arab family), guest houses and agricultural fields. There was a controversy last year in which the kibbutz was accused of racism for excluding Arabs and Druse from pool membership; the decision was then made to restrict pool use to the kibbutz community and to workers’ families.
Gila told us that outside membership had to be restricted because the facilities were not adequate to be available to all. She was satisfied that including the families of workers now allayed the charge of racism. Some of the workers we met when we toured the factories were families of Lebanese militiamen allied with Israel, who had fled when Israel withdrew from the security zone in 2000. Kibbutz Kabri housed many of these refugees and hosted the ulpan course that taught them Hebrew.
As explained previously, Israeli Arabs have reason to complain of discrimination. But under any reasonable definition of the word, they are not truly oppressed — at least not in ways that Israel’s severest critics imagine.
Interestingly, I learned from these cousins that some Israeli Jews also live there. (When Prof. Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland addressed a Meretz USA board meeting a couple of years ago, he informed me that he was an Israeli Arab who had lived in Dalyat.) So much for a system of enforced segregation resembling apartheid.
The Druse (also transliterated as “Druze”) are an Arabic-speaking people who have a unique religion and a separate identity from other Arabs. Their largest communities are in Israel, Lebanon and Syria; each makes a point of fitting in politically with the majority. In Lebanon, where there is no single majority, they constitute a distinct ethnic faction safeguarding their interests in the rough and tumble of its often chaotic and violent reality. In Syria and the Golan Heights, they are loyal to the Assad regime. Across the border, they are loyal to Israel, with their 100,000-strong community willingly subject to military conscription on the same basis as Jews. The much smaller Circassian community is similarly subject to military conscription on an equal basis as Jews; the Circassians are Muslims but not Arabs.
During our stay at his home, our cousin Uzi took us to his favorite eatery (twice in four days, in my case): a falafel and shwarma place at a crossroads called Checkpost, a name left over from the British Mandate when soldiers manned a checkpoint there. I was surprised when he told me that the owner and his sons working there are Arabs; almost all of the customers were Jews.
I am informed by Daniela Cohen – a member of Kibbutz Ein Gedi who works at the resort and hosts a lovely early-morning tour of its botanical gardens – that the Arabic speakers we saw as fellow guests were Druse and not generic Israeli Arabs as I had thought. But Arabs were very much in evidence in Akko – the mixed Galilee city that was once the Crusader stronghold known as Acre. And we chatted with a family from the Arab city of Nazareth who shared the cable car ride with us at Rosh HaNikra. They asked if we had visited their town; I explained that one set of cousins had invited us to go to lunch in Nazareth but that we had already made other plans near Haifa. We have a “rain check” for that lunch in Nazareth.
We were driven to Rosh HaNikra by still another cousin who hosted us for a day and two nights at Kibbutz Kabri (or Cabri) near Naharia. Earlier, we took a swim at the kibbutz pool, where we saw many Arab families enjoying their Saturday leisure time. My cousin Gila explained that these were the families of employees at kibbutz enterprises – of which there are quite a few, including two industrial factories, a high-end gourmet restaurant (owned in part by an Arab family), guest houses and agricultural fields. There was a controversy last year in which the kibbutz was accused of racism for excluding Arabs and Druse from pool membership; the decision was then made to restrict pool use to the kibbutz community and to workers’ families.
Gila told us that outside membership had to be restricted because the facilities were not adequate to be available to all. She was satisfied that including the families of workers now allayed the charge of racism. Some of the workers we met when we toured the factories were families of Lebanese militiamen allied with Israel, who had fled when Israel withdrew from the security zone in 2000. Kibbutz Kabri housed many of these refugees and hosted the ulpan course that taught them Hebrew.
As explained previously, Israeli Arabs have reason to complain of discrimination. But under any reasonable definition of the word, they are not truly oppressed — at least not in ways that Israel’s severest critics imagine.
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Vacationing in Israel
It was my tenth trip to Israel, but for the first time in over 30 years, I visited last month on a purely personal basis, scheduling no political events or meetings. I had the pleasure of traveling with one of my nephews (Larry), introducing him to the country and to his many Israeli relatives.
Israel appears to have recovered nicely from the physical damage of last year’s war with Hezbollah. We saw but one unrepaired building from a missile strike in Haifa. And Naharia, a major coastal town in the Western Galilee, that was virtually evacuated last summer, bustled with night life and the exuberance of youth. My cousin from a nearby kibbutz noted that Naharia is booming, having suddenly grown to over 50,000.
Larry expressed surprise that so many we encountered in Israel were not Jews. He wondered if the population is divided about 50-50 between Jews and non-Jews. Wherever we toured, we encountered Israeli-Arab families also enjoying the scenic summer landscape, from Rosh HaNikra in the north to Ein-Gedi and the Dead Sea in the southeast. And after my massage at the Ein-Gedi spa, I realized that my masseuse wore a cross around her neck; Eva, a blue-eyed blonde, is apparently a Russian immigrant.
I explained to Larry that officially Israel is about 80 percent Jewish, counting most of the remaining 20 percent as Arabs and Druse, but that many recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union are either non-Jewish spouses of Jews or people of Jewish ancestry who are Christian by religious identification. The proportion is not 50-50 but, because of this peculiarity of the nearly million immigrants from the former Soviet Union, may be closer to 75-25 than 80-20.
It surprised me to see so many Arabic-speaking guests at the Ein-Gedi resort where we stayed for two days. At first, I had thought that the women — identically garbed in black with distinctive white head coverings — were nuns or members of a reclusive Christian community like the Amish. I have been informed since that these were Israeli Druse.
By the way, Kibbutz Ein-Gedi (where the resort is located) is a rare example of an Israeli community that literally made "the desert bloom." Contrary to this mythic image, most Israeli agricultural land was never desert, but this patch of lush green fields was carefully nurtured from starkly barren, rocky terrain. Authorities did not believe that anything could grow in what had once been under the Dead Sea, but they were proven wrong by the pioneering generation that began its work in 1956. Since this is the lowest point on earth, the vegetation benefits from an extra dose of oxygen (just as oxygen becomes scarce on high mountains, it grows denser at low altitudes).
Arab citizens of Israel have legitimate complaints about not being treated equally in terms of government policy — mainly in budgetary allocations and in matters relating to employment and housing, where there is discrimination. For example, Meretz USA opposes the bill currently circulating through the Knesset to enshrine housing discrimination on lands owned by the Jewish National Fund in Israel and we deplore the unrecognized status of Bedouin communities in the Negev and the hardships that result.
But what we found on our visit brought home a truth that may appear subtle to some but is very significant: although Arab citizens of Israel do indeed experience discrimination, they are NOT oppressed! They are not suffering from a systematic and total system of enforced separation and degradation — nothing like an “apartheid” policy as alleged by Israel’s enemies. (Alas, the situation of Palestinian Arabs who are not Israeli citizens and live under occupation is far worse.)
Postscript: Less than three weeks following our visit to some sites in the Old City of Jerusalem, we learn of a fatal gunfight, with nine bystanders wounded, nearby.
Israel appears to have recovered nicely from the physical damage of last year’s war with Hezbollah. We saw but one unrepaired building from a missile strike in Haifa. And Naharia, a major coastal town in the Western Galilee, that was virtually evacuated last summer, bustled with night life and the exuberance of youth. My cousin from a nearby kibbutz noted that Naharia is booming, having suddenly grown to over 50,000.
Larry expressed surprise that so many we encountered in Israel were not Jews. He wondered if the population is divided about 50-50 between Jews and non-Jews. Wherever we toured, we encountered Israeli-Arab families also enjoying the scenic summer landscape, from Rosh HaNikra in the north to Ein-Gedi and the Dead Sea in the southeast. And after my massage at the Ein-Gedi spa, I realized that my masseuse wore a cross around her neck; Eva, a blue-eyed blonde, is apparently a Russian immigrant.
I explained to Larry that officially Israel is about 80 percent Jewish, counting most of the remaining 20 percent as Arabs and Druse, but that many recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union are either non-Jewish spouses of Jews or people of Jewish ancestry who are Christian by religious identification. The proportion is not 50-50 but, because of this peculiarity of the nearly million immigrants from the former Soviet Union, may be closer to 75-25 than 80-20.
It surprised me to see so many Arabic-speaking guests at the Ein-Gedi resort where we stayed for two days. At first, I had thought that the women — identically garbed in black with distinctive white head coverings — were nuns or members of a reclusive Christian community like the Amish. I have been informed since that these were Israeli Druse.
By the way, Kibbutz Ein-Gedi (where the resort is located) is a rare example of an Israeli community that literally made "the desert bloom." Contrary to this mythic image, most Israeli agricultural land was never desert, but this patch of lush green fields was carefully nurtured from starkly barren, rocky terrain. Authorities did not believe that anything could grow in what had once been under the Dead Sea, but they were proven wrong by the pioneering generation that began its work in 1956. Since this is the lowest point on earth, the vegetation benefits from an extra dose of oxygen (just as oxygen becomes scarce on high mountains, it grows denser at low altitudes).
Arab citizens of Israel have legitimate complaints about not being treated equally in terms of government policy — mainly in budgetary allocations and in matters relating to employment and housing, where there is discrimination. For example, Meretz USA opposes the bill currently circulating through the Knesset to enshrine housing discrimination on lands owned by the Jewish National Fund in Israel and we deplore the unrecognized status of Bedouin communities in the Negev and the hardships that result.
But what we found on our visit brought home a truth that may appear subtle to some but is very significant: although Arab citizens of Israel do indeed experience discrimination, they are NOT oppressed! They are not suffering from a systematic and total system of enforced separation and degradation — nothing like an “apartheid” policy as alleged by Israel’s enemies. (Alas, the situation of Palestinian Arabs who are not Israeli citizens and live under occupation is far worse.)
Postscript: Less than three weeks following our visit to some sites in the Old City of Jerusalem, we learn of a fatal gunfight, with nine bystanders wounded, nearby.
Friday, August 10, 2007
A situation ripe for peace?
The following contrary opinion to how most of us see these things is by Thomas Mitchell, Ph.D., whose writings on the prospects for Israeli-Arab peace are based on a comparative analysis with other historic peace processes. See, for example, his piece on the applicability of Northern Ireland as a model for Israelis and Palestinians.
Meretz members and supporters in both Israel and the US are urging that in the wake of the Hamas takeover of Gaza, that Israel make dramatic gestures to save Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and negotiate peace with him. I think that such a strategy would be unwise.
For Israel and the Palestinians to make peace three minimal conditions are necessary: First, the existence of a Palestinian government that could offer terms acceptable to a likely Israeli governing coalition. Second, the existence of an Israeli government that could offer terms acceptable to a likely PA government. Collectively these two conditions are known as “ripeness” but political scientists and negotiations theorists. Third, the presence of an American president or similar international mediator who is willing to devote the time and energy necessary into turning this “ripeness” into a peace settlement. This is known as “readiness,” to distinguish it from “ripeness.”
Throughout his career, Abu Mazen has been a vigorous advocate of the Palestinian right of return. Now facing competition from Hamas, he is unlikely to make concessions on this basic piece of Palestinian identity and offer a policy on refugees that even Meretz, let alone any Israeli government, could accept and survive politically. Likewise, Olmert is unlikely to be able to offer concessions on Jerusalem that any Palestinian government would accept. Olmert supported Likud positions on the indivisibility of Jerusalem throughout his career and is too weak politically to change now.
Although US Secretary of State Condileezza Rice is interested in negotiating an end to the conflict, at best she can expect no more support from George W. Bush that Bush’s father gave to James Baker in 1989 and 1991 or that Presidents Nixon and Ford gave to Henry Kissinger in 1974-75 during Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. Such a level of support would be sufficient for laying the groundwork for a future president, or for negotiating an interim agreement between Israel and one of its neighbors, but not for concluding peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Historically, in conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that have a colonial dimension, if the stronger dominant “settler” side embraces too strongly a native leader, it can be bad for the latter’s political health. Such was the case with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia when he was embraced by the Smith regime in 1978-79. His successor, Robert Mugabe, is still in power, to the sorrow of most Zimbabweans. Such was the case with Chief Minister Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in South Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s. Buthelezi, a leader of the Zulu “homeland” of KwaZulu, was never able to successfully challenge the ANC leadership for the allegiance of black voters and was lucky to end up as a minister in Mandela’s first government.
And it can be argued that this was the case with the nonviolent Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland. It negotiated a peace agreement with the Ulster Unionists in 1998 only to see itself replaced as the main nationalist (Irish Catholic) party as the IRA refused to give up its guns. New nationalist voters found the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, with its whiff of gunpowder to be much sexier than the principled SDLP.
Israel’s overt support for Abu Mazen and Fatah could likewise prove to be the kiss of death for them. Hamas has an aura of piety, national steadfastness and incorruptibility that contrasts with Fatah’s cynical record of corruption, violence, and ineptitude during a decade in power.
The failed Oslo peace process has cost the peace camp of Labor and Meretz half of their combined Knesset representation since 1992. Meretz is now at five seats, less than 40 percent of its strength in 1992. Labor’s 19 seats is less than half of its strength in 1992. This is due to their support for the Oslo process that led to Arafat starting the Al-Aksa Intifada under favorable conditions. A second failed peace initiative would once more bring Labor’s judgement into question and would likely result in an even more thorough rejection of the peace camp by the Israeli public. Meretz may already be at its base level of support. But Labor could drop as the floating vote moved to the Likud and smaller centrist parties.
Kadima looks likely to go the way of previous centrist parties: the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1980, the Center Party in 2001 and Tommy Lapid’s Shinui in 2003 [Shinui – an initial component of the Meretz list in 1992 – originated as a vestige of the DMC - ed.] As with the DMC, this may not occur within one election cycle. Kadima could drop from its present strength of 29 seats to somewhere in the range of 10-12 seats. This would make it smaller than the DMC was in 1977 and prone to implosion as occurred with that party during Begin’s first term. Kadima has lost both its founding leader (Sharon) and its raison d’etre. One moderate possible successor, Shimon Peres, has been “kicked upstairs” [as the mostly ceremonial president of Israel] into the twilight of his career. This means that Kadima could amount to a second Likud.
Israeli history has shown that only Labor-led coalitions can make peace with the Palestinians. Even Begin relied on the votes of the Labor opposition to pass his peace treaty with Egypt through the Knesset. When Labor is the junior or co-equal partner in a coalition, the result is diplomatic paralysis.
So what should Olmert do? Israel should make some conciliatory moves towards the West Bank such as gradually removing unnecessary checkpoints, releasing Palestinian customs duties and other taxes collected on behalf of the PA by Israel, and releasing some security prisoners who do not have “blood on their hands” and have served at least half of their sentences. But if the dismantling of checkpoints increases violence, this initiative should be discontinued.
Israel should concentrate on testing the intentions of Syria. If Bashir Assad is sincere about negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, then this is something that the present Israeli government may have the political support to accomplish. Israel by now should know what the Assad regime’s asking price is for peace: A return to the June 4, 1967 line, even though this contradicts the Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 about the non-acquisition of territory by force — i.e., during the 1948 war, Syria took over tiny bits of the Galilee by force.
Both Jerusalem and Washington have been more interested in a peace deal with Syria than with the Palestinians as the Assads, pere et fils, have a better reputation as negotiating partners than did Arafat and Abu Mazen (the latter widely regarded as too weak to deliver). Assad has also secured the stability of his regime, which is not the case with Abu Mazen. If Israel is willing to pay Damascus’s asking price, the situation is ripe for peace with Syria. This is not the case with Palestine.
Meretz members and supporters in both Israel and the US are urging that in the wake of the Hamas takeover of Gaza, that Israel make dramatic gestures to save Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and negotiate peace with him. I think that such a strategy would be unwise.
For Israel and the Palestinians to make peace three minimal conditions are necessary: First, the existence of a Palestinian government that could offer terms acceptable to a likely Israeli governing coalition. Second, the existence of an Israeli government that could offer terms acceptable to a likely PA government. Collectively these two conditions are known as “ripeness” but political scientists and negotiations theorists. Third, the presence of an American president or similar international mediator who is willing to devote the time and energy necessary into turning this “ripeness” into a peace settlement. This is known as “readiness,” to distinguish it from “ripeness.”
Throughout his career, Abu Mazen has been a vigorous advocate of the Palestinian right of return. Now facing competition from Hamas, he is unlikely to make concessions on this basic piece of Palestinian identity and offer a policy on refugees that even Meretz, let alone any Israeli government, could accept and survive politically. Likewise, Olmert is unlikely to be able to offer concessions on Jerusalem that any Palestinian government would accept. Olmert supported Likud positions on the indivisibility of Jerusalem throughout his career and is too weak politically to change now.
Although US Secretary of State Condileezza Rice is interested in negotiating an end to the conflict, at best she can expect no more support from George W. Bush that Bush’s father gave to James Baker in 1989 and 1991 or that Presidents Nixon and Ford gave to Henry Kissinger in 1974-75 during Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. Such a level of support would be sufficient for laying the groundwork for a future president, or for negotiating an interim agreement between Israel and one of its neighbors, but not for concluding peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Historically, in conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that have a colonial dimension, if the stronger dominant “settler” side embraces too strongly a native leader, it can be bad for the latter’s political health. Such was the case with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia when he was embraced by the Smith regime in 1978-79. His successor, Robert Mugabe, is still in power, to the sorrow of most Zimbabweans. Such was the case with Chief Minister Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in South Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s. Buthelezi, a leader of the Zulu “homeland” of KwaZulu, was never able to successfully challenge the ANC leadership for the allegiance of black voters and was lucky to end up as a minister in Mandela’s first government.
And it can be argued that this was the case with the nonviolent Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland. It negotiated a peace agreement with the Ulster Unionists in 1998 only to see itself replaced as the main nationalist (Irish Catholic) party as the IRA refused to give up its guns. New nationalist voters found the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, with its whiff of gunpowder to be much sexier than the principled SDLP.
Israel’s overt support for Abu Mazen and Fatah could likewise prove to be the kiss of death for them. Hamas has an aura of piety, national steadfastness and incorruptibility that contrasts with Fatah’s cynical record of corruption, violence, and ineptitude during a decade in power.
The failed Oslo peace process has cost the peace camp of Labor and Meretz half of their combined Knesset representation since 1992. Meretz is now at five seats, less than 40 percent of its strength in 1992. Labor’s 19 seats is less than half of its strength in 1992. This is due to their support for the Oslo process that led to Arafat starting the Al-Aksa Intifada under favorable conditions. A second failed peace initiative would once more bring Labor’s judgement into question and would likely result in an even more thorough rejection of the peace camp by the Israeli public. Meretz may already be at its base level of support. But Labor could drop as the floating vote moved to the Likud and smaller centrist parties.
Kadima looks likely to go the way of previous centrist parties: the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1980, the Center Party in 2001 and Tommy Lapid’s Shinui in 2003 [Shinui – an initial component of the Meretz list in 1992 – originated as a vestige of the DMC - ed.] As with the DMC, this may not occur within one election cycle. Kadima could drop from its present strength of 29 seats to somewhere in the range of 10-12 seats. This would make it smaller than the DMC was in 1977 and prone to implosion as occurred with that party during Begin’s first term. Kadima has lost both its founding leader (Sharon) and its raison d’etre. One moderate possible successor, Shimon Peres, has been “kicked upstairs” [as the mostly ceremonial president of Israel] into the twilight of his career. This means that Kadima could amount to a second Likud.
Israeli history has shown that only Labor-led coalitions can make peace with the Palestinians. Even Begin relied on the votes of the Labor opposition to pass his peace treaty with Egypt through the Knesset. When Labor is the junior or co-equal partner in a coalition, the result is diplomatic paralysis.
So what should Olmert do? Israel should make some conciliatory moves towards the West Bank such as gradually removing unnecessary checkpoints, releasing Palestinian customs duties and other taxes collected on behalf of the PA by Israel, and releasing some security prisoners who do not have “blood on their hands” and have served at least half of their sentences. But if the dismantling of checkpoints increases violence, this initiative should be discontinued.
Israel should concentrate on testing the intentions of Syria. If Bashir Assad is sincere about negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, then this is something that the present Israeli government may have the political support to accomplish. Israel by now should know what the Assad regime’s asking price is for peace: A return to the June 4, 1967 line, even though this contradicts the Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 about the non-acquisition of territory by force — i.e., during the 1948 war, Syria took over tiny bits of the Galilee by force.
Both Jerusalem and Washington have been more interested in a peace deal with Syria than with the Palestinians as the Assads, pere et fils, have a better reputation as negotiating partners than did Arafat and Abu Mazen (the latter widely regarded as too weak to deliver). Assad has also secured the stability of his regime, which is not the case with Abu Mazen. If Israel is willing to pay Damascus’s asking price, the situation is ripe for peace with Syria. This is not the case with Palestine.
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
Meeting with Meretz MK Vilan, Aug. 2
MK Avshalom (Abu) Vilan has been a frequent guest of Meretz USA in recent months, as he stops in New York on his way to Washington, DC to engage in a political project, now nearing its end. On August 2nd, he began his talk by explaining Israeli and international efforts to begin a peace process with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas while isolating Hamas. The international community will allow investors to put money into the West Bank economy, raising the standard of living, meanwhile doing just enough to keep the Gazan economy just above humanitarian disaster. Gazans will be isolated and see the huge gap between itself and the West Bank, and understand that they were mistaken to support Hamas.
MK Vilan explained that, in his view, this approach is naïve: Gazans will only throw their support more firmly behind the extremists. He also spoke against Israeli military action in Gaza. It would only cause casualties on both sides, without altering the political situation.
Discussing the struggle between Hamas and Fatah, MK Vilan described the horrific violence being perpetrated. He explained that this conflict will not be resolved without taking into account regional dynamics — including, the money going from Iran to Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.
Turning to internal Israeli politics, MK Vilan explained that although Prime Minister Olmert's government is stable, it currently has little purpose. If Olmert does not push forward with the peace process, there will be no reason for him to be reelected. It is better that he turns the spotlight away from his struggle for survival and towards his efforts to get something done.
But he sees Olmert as capable of staying on for at least another year. Olmert reassured him personally that he knows "all the tricks and shticks" required to stay on. Even if Labor bolted from the coalition, he sees Olmert as able to bribe Agudat Yisrael (an ultra-Orthodox party with six seats) to keep his majority. As you probably know, because of Netanyahu's electoral strength indicated in the polls, Abu does not want early elections.
Progress on the peace front is in Olmert's interest. Paradoxically, Abu sees such progress as not in Barak's personal political interest (in his quest to regain the office of prime minister) and he fears that Barak will be an obstacle to making necessary concessions to Abbas.
Surprisingly, Abu has heard from Fayyad, the new reform Palestinian prime minister, that the PA has plenty of money to pay salaried employees – including up to "100,000" in Gaza.
Abu mentioned that he's become a champion for many West Bank settlers and the rights of ex-Gaza settlers. He'd like the government to offer monetary packages to 40,000 or more non-ideological settlers who live beyond the projected path of the wall/fence and therefore live on real estate with zero resale value. He believes that a good 40,000 can be enticed, therefore, to abandon their homes.
Abu advocates an international force to maintain a cease-fire in Gaza and stabilize the situation so that Gaza's economic isolation can end. He sees no realistic chance that Israel's own military efforts can maintain quiet there.
Currently, support in the polls for Kadima has risen from seven to 11 seats (no indication if this changes with Livni as leader; so far, Abu is unimpressed with the leadership ability of Livni). Meretz fluctuates from five to eight, Labor scores with 23 or 24 seats and Netanyahu scores with 30 or more seats for Likud. Currently, the Knesset has a comfortable majority for a two-state solution and a negotiated peace. After new elections, under current conditions, this majority would disappear.
Abu is embarrassed by the bill moving through the Knesset to undermine the Supreme Court and allow Jewish National Fund lands not to be leased to Israeli Arabs, characterizing it as “racist.” He noted with dismay that it even has the support of some liberals, like Ami Ayalon. He sees Ayalon as having bad political instincts and that his inexperience shows. He feels that Barak's success in regaining the leadership of the Labor party (defeating Ayalon in a run-off election) had to do with people's unwillingness to go to a relatively unknown and inexperienced commodity for the third straight time after the failed leadership stints of Mitzna and Peretz.
MK Vilan explained that, in his view, this approach is naïve: Gazans will only throw their support more firmly behind the extremists. He also spoke against Israeli military action in Gaza. It would only cause casualties on both sides, without altering the political situation.
Discussing the struggle between Hamas and Fatah, MK Vilan described the horrific violence being perpetrated. He explained that this conflict will not be resolved without taking into account regional dynamics — including, the money going from Iran to Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.
Turning to internal Israeli politics, MK Vilan explained that although Prime Minister Olmert's government is stable, it currently has little purpose. If Olmert does not push forward with the peace process, there will be no reason for him to be reelected. It is better that he turns the spotlight away from his struggle for survival and towards his efforts to get something done.
But he sees Olmert as capable of staying on for at least another year. Olmert reassured him personally that he knows "all the tricks and shticks" required to stay on. Even if Labor bolted from the coalition, he sees Olmert as able to bribe Agudat Yisrael (an ultra-Orthodox party with six seats) to keep his majority. As you probably know, because of Netanyahu's electoral strength indicated in the polls, Abu does not want early elections.
Progress on the peace front is in Olmert's interest. Paradoxically, Abu sees such progress as not in Barak's personal political interest (in his quest to regain the office of prime minister) and he fears that Barak will be an obstacle to making necessary concessions to Abbas.
Surprisingly, Abu has heard from Fayyad, the new reform Palestinian prime minister, that the PA has plenty of money to pay salaried employees – including up to "100,000" in Gaza.
Abu mentioned that he's become a champion for many West Bank settlers and the rights of ex-Gaza settlers. He'd like the government to offer monetary packages to 40,000 or more non-ideological settlers who live beyond the projected path of the wall/fence and therefore live on real estate with zero resale value. He believes that a good 40,000 can be enticed, therefore, to abandon their homes.
Abu advocates an international force to maintain a cease-fire in Gaza and stabilize the situation so that Gaza's economic isolation can end. He sees no realistic chance that Israel's own military efforts can maintain quiet there.
Currently, support in the polls for Kadima has risen from seven to 11 seats (no indication if this changes with Livni as leader; so far, Abu is unimpressed with the leadership ability of Livni). Meretz fluctuates from five to eight, Labor scores with 23 or 24 seats and Netanyahu scores with 30 or more seats for Likud. Currently, the Knesset has a comfortable majority for a two-state solution and a negotiated peace. After new elections, under current conditions, this majority would disappear.
Abu is embarrassed by the bill moving through the Knesset to undermine the Supreme Court and allow Jewish National Fund lands not to be leased to Israeli Arabs, characterizing it as “racist.” He noted with dismay that it even has the support of some liberals, like Ami Ayalon. He sees Ayalon as having bad political instincts and that his inexperience shows. He feels that Barak's success in regaining the leadership of the Labor party (defeating Ayalon in a run-off election) had to do with people's unwillingness to go to a relatively unknown and inexperienced commodity for the third straight time after the failed leadership stints of Mitzna and Peretz.
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Postscript to Friedlander review
As a follow-up to Werner Cohn's review of Saul Friedlander's new book on the Holocaust, you might want to check out the interview with Prof. Friedlander in the current issue of Dissent magazine.
Monday, August 06, 2007
Why be Jewish? If you have to ask...
... we’ve got a problem
Check out this JTA article, “Bronfman salon asks: Why be Jewish?”
To an extent, it’s a matter of envy that I’m never asked to these kind of events. But pushing this personal dissatisfaction aside, it’s sad to read of these things. Why should we have to justify being Jewish to ourselves or others? Shouldn’t this be as ludicrous a question as asking someone who is French or Danish or maybe African American or Latino?
First of all, we should be able to simply acknowledge who we are and not feel the need to justify or propagandize about it, depending upon our brand of Jewish belief or lack of same. But we in the United States in particular see our Jewish identity as primarily (or exclusively) religious — among American Jews who largely don’t have strong identification with Judaism as a religion. Yet this article on the conference is frustrating in reporting that:
Jewishness is a rich cultural and historical heritage even when devoid of religious elements. My father, for example, was Jewish to his core even as a totally non-religious individual. As a fluent speaker of Yiddish and Hebrew, it was easier for him to be Jewish (that is to imbue his life with Jewish content) even as he rejected almost all forms of religious observance.
He sent me to Hebrew school partly in the mistaken belief that I’d learn Hebrew there; he did not object to my learning to daven [pray] but I would have caused problems at home if I had insisted on eating kosher. They drew the shades down when eating on Yom Kippur but also sought out a place to say Yizkor (the memorial prayer) on some years.
My parents were happy to invite guests for a Passover seder, but their version was shockingly superficial and ill-informed from the point of view of even Reform religious practice. Maybe my aging mother was losing it when she did the following one year when in her 80s: She shocked me by laying out sliced bread beside the matzah. “People should have a choice,” she declared when challenged.
But still, after all this, they were very Jewish. I’ve always identified with our fate and destiny as Jews — as a small people proudly struggling to survive and maintain ourselves as Jews. In fact, they did not believe that one had a choice in this matter; their experience of the world was that one cannot simply renounce being Jewish, that anti-Semites will find a way to remind you of your Jewishness.
My answer to the question, “why be Jewish?”: It’s up to each of us individually to find what is meaningful and real within the very wide array of what it is to be Jewish. It might be religious practice; traditional Judaism is genuinely a way of life. Judaism can enrich our lives by providing a calendar, a schedule, a behavioral framework that helps order what might otherwise be chaotic. Or it might be Judaism that engages one intellectually, morally or spiritually with its demands and its questions as well as its answers — whether one is religiously observant or not. Or it might be learning and continually drinking of the depth of Jewish cultural and historical experience — an orientation that engages Jews who are secularist (secularism involves beliefs and practices, as opposed to the absence of such, which is commonly meant by the term “secular” rather than “secularist”).
Notwithstanding Rabbi Stern, as a Zionist activist, I am also an advocate of Jewish peoplehood. But it’s up to us as individuals to discover our Jewish path, of which there are quite a few choices. If we don’t insist that being Jewish is essentially “this” or “that” particular thing, it would help.
Check out this JTA article, “Bronfman salon asks: Why be Jewish?”
To an extent, it’s a matter of envy that I’m never asked to these kind of events. But pushing this personal dissatisfaction aside, it’s sad to read of these things. Why should we have to justify being Jewish to ourselves or others? Shouldn’t this be as ludicrous a question as asking someone who is French or Danish or maybe African American or Latino?
First of all, we should be able to simply acknowledge who we are and not feel the need to justify or propagandize about it, depending upon our brand of Jewish belief or lack of same. But we in the United States in particular see our Jewish identity as primarily (or exclusively) religious — among American Jews who largely don’t have strong identification with Judaism as a religion. Yet this article on the conference is frustrating in reporting that:
“Absent from these conversations were anti-Semitism, Israel and the Holocaust, the holy trinity of American Jewish identity for the past 60 years. That, too, was intentional.This “holy trinity” of anti-Semitism, Israel and the Holocaust is of prime importance to me as a child of Holocaust refugees who lost more close family members than I exactly know and with half of my known relatives being Israeli. I don’t think that these are the only considerations for being Jewish; Judaism has its positive rewards as a rich cultural, philosophical and religious legacy — which one practices or ignores as a citizen of a (still) free country as one chooses.
"The big question this generation is asking is: Why should I be Jewish? How does Judaism influence my life? The old 'peoplehood' argument doesn't resonate with them," [conference organizer Rabbi Eliyahu] Stern said.
Jewishness is a rich cultural and historical heritage even when devoid of religious elements. My father, for example, was Jewish to his core even as a totally non-religious individual. As a fluent speaker of Yiddish and Hebrew, it was easier for him to be Jewish (that is to imbue his life with Jewish content) even as he rejected almost all forms of religious observance.
He sent me to Hebrew school partly in the mistaken belief that I’d learn Hebrew there; he did not object to my learning to daven [pray] but I would have caused problems at home if I had insisted on eating kosher. They drew the shades down when eating on Yom Kippur but also sought out a place to say Yizkor (the memorial prayer) on some years.
My parents were happy to invite guests for a Passover seder, but their version was shockingly superficial and ill-informed from the point of view of even Reform religious practice. Maybe my aging mother was losing it when she did the following one year when in her 80s: She shocked me by laying out sliced bread beside the matzah. “People should have a choice,” she declared when challenged.
But still, after all this, they were very Jewish. I’ve always identified with our fate and destiny as Jews — as a small people proudly struggling to survive and maintain ourselves as Jews. In fact, they did not believe that one had a choice in this matter; their experience of the world was that one cannot simply renounce being Jewish, that anti-Semites will find a way to remind you of your Jewishness.
My answer to the question, “why be Jewish?”: It’s up to each of us individually to find what is meaningful and real within the very wide array of what it is to be Jewish. It might be religious practice; traditional Judaism is genuinely a way of life. Judaism can enrich our lives by providing a calendar, a schedule, a behavioral framework that helps order what might otherwise be chaotic. Or it might be Judaism that engages one intellectually, morally or spiritually with its demands and its questions as well as its answers — whether one is religiously observant or not. Or it might be learning and continually drinking of the depth of Jewish cultural and historical experience — an orientation that engages Jews who are secularist (secularism involves beliefs and practices, as opposed to the absence of such, which is commonly meant by the term “secular” rather than “secularist”).
Notwithstanding Rabbi Stern, as a Zionist activist, I am also an advocate of Jewish peoplehood. But it’s up to us as individuals to discover our Jewish path, of which there are quite a few choices. If we don’t insist that being Jewish is essentially “this” or “that” particular thing, it would help.
Friday, August 03, 2007
W. Cohn: Critique of Saul Friedlander's new book
What follows is excerpted from a lengthy review of Saul Friedländer's "The Years of Extermination," (New York, HarperCollins, 2007) by emeritus professor of sociology Werner Cohn and posted at Prof. Cohn’s Web site. It is the part that most interests us as a Zionist blog – ed.
Nowhere in Friedländer's book is there a mention of the activities of Hitler's one major Arab supporter during the "years of extermination": the Mufti of Jerusalem at the time, Haj Amin al-Husseini.
As I have already suggested, Friedländer is extraordinarily comprehensive in his list of social forces and individuals whom he considers as partially responsible for the Holocaust. He never loses sight, of course, of the major culprits, viz. Hitler and his immediate followers. But he also finds room, lots of it, for dishonorable mentions of many others: the German public, Christian religious institutions throughout the world, the governments of the West and of neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden, the anti-Semitic man-in-the-street in just about every European country, and many others. (But Friedländer fails to mention, in a minor but curious omission from his index of villains, that the French Communist Party in the era of the Stalin-Hitler Pact did not hesitate to engage in a spot of Jew-baiting.)
Perhaps more than other writers on the Holocaust, Friedländer is insistent and repetitive in his criticism and condemnation of Jewish shortcomings during these dark years. The Jews of Palestine, with Ben- Gurion as their leader, were selfish, narrow-minded, and lacked an adequate spirit of self-sacrifice (pp. 153, 305, 596, etc.). The Jews of Europe generally? A " sauve qui peut " mentality (pp. 192, 355, etc.). The Jewish leaders of Amsterdam? "A wealthy Jewish haute bourgeoisie" , oblivious of its human responsibilities (p. 181). American Jewish leaders? The less said the better (pp. 85, etc.) These critical comments border on the moralistic and ahistorical. In hindsight, yes, these men and women were blind, shortsighted, and less than fully courageous. But – need I say this to a historian? – there were constraints of the times in which they lived, constraints that are just a bit too often forgotten by Friedländer.
But while these Jews, including the Jews of Palestine, cannot escape the criticisms of Friedländer, another Palestinian at the time, Haj Amin al-Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem, enjoys the writer's strange indulgence. Friedländer mentions the Mufti but once, on page 277, where we are told that Hitler informs him, the Mufti, that he, Hitler, would be "uncompromising" about the Jews, including the Jews of Palestine. But neither here, nor anywhere in his book, nor in the first volume of this book, does Friedländer give a hint about the Mufti's words or the Mufti's activities.
These activities, in brief, were pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. There were anti-Semitic messages to Arabs who were enlisted in Allied armies, asking them to desert to avoid fighting for "the Jews" (2). The Mufti also interceded with the Germans to prevent the exchange of prisoners that could have saved thousands of Jewish children from the Holocaust. The Mufti spent the last years of the war in Berlin. While Arab writers have often tried to ignore the Mufti's work for Hitler (3), at least one Arab scholar has written an influential study that presents the essential facts. (4)
In short, the Mufti of Jerusalem was a far more important player in the Holocaust than many of the minor figures that make up Friedländer's index of villains. They are all given dishonorable mention – usually for good cause. But the Mufti, well known to Friedländer as we have seen, has escaped his censure. ...
The Mufti’s collaboration with, and efforts for, the Nazi cause are even more damning than indicated by Prof. Cohn. During his years of exile from Palestine as a guest of Hitler during World War II, the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini made Arabic radio broadcasts advocating genocide against the Jews and victory for Nazi Germany, personally recruited Balkan Muslims to the SS and was a leader of an Iraqi rebellion in 1941 (directly supported by German and Italian air units) to attempt to push the British out of Iraq — an effort, that if successful, would have outflanked the British in North Africa and doomed the Jews of Palestine – Ralph Seliger.
Click here for the entire review.
Nowhere in Friedländer's book is there a mention of the activities of Hitler's one major Arab supporter during the "years of extermination": the Mufti of Jerusalem at the time, Haj Amin al-Husseini.
As I have already suggested, Friedländer is extraordinarily comprehensive in his list of social forces and individuals whom he considers as partially responsible for the Holocaust. He never loses sight, of course, of the major culprits, viz. Hitler and his immediate followers. But he also finds room, lots of it, for dishonorable mentions of many others: the German public, Christian religious institutions throughout the world, the governments of the West and of neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden, the anti-Semitic man-in-the-street in just about every European country, and many others. (But Friedländer fails to mention, in a minor but curious omission from his index of villains, that the French Communist Party in the era of the Stalin-Hitler Pact did not hesitate to engage in a spot of Jew-baiting.)
Perhaps more than other writers on the Holocaust, Friedländer is insistent and repetitive in his criticism and condemnation of Jewish shortcomings during these dark years. The Jews of Palestine, with Ben- Gurion as their leader, were selfish, narrow-minded, and lacked an adequate spirit of self-sacrifice (pp. 153, 305, 596, etc.). The Jews of Europe generally? A " sauve qui peut " mentality (pp. 192, 355, etc.). The Jewish leaders of Amsterdam? "A wealthy Jewish haute bourgeoisie" , oblivious of its human responsibilities (p. 181). American Jewish leaders? The less said the better (pp. 85, etc.) These critical comments border on the moralistic and ahistorical. In hindsight, yes, these men and women were blind, shortsighted, and less than fully courageous. But – need I say this to a historian? – there were constraints of the times in which they lived, constraints that are just a bit too often forgotten by Friedländer.
But while these Jews, including the Jews of Palestine, cannot escape the criticisms of Friedländer, another Palestinian at the time, Haj Amin al-Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem, enjoys the writer's strange indulgence. Friedländer mentions the Mufti but once, on page 277, where we are told that Hitler informs him, the Mufti, that he, Hitler, would be "uncompromising" about the Jews, including the Jews of Palestine. But neither here, nor anywhere in his book, nor in the first volume of this book, does Friedländer give a hint about the Mufti's words or the Mufti's activities.
These activities, in brief, were pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. There were anti-Semitic messages to Arabs who were enlisted in Allied armies, asking them to desert to avoid fighting for "the Jews" (2). The Mufti also interceded with the Germans to prevent the exchange of prisoners that could have saved thousands of Jewish children from the Holocaust. The Mufti spent the last years of the war in Berlin. While Arab writers have often tried to ignore the Mufti's work for Hitler (3), at least one Arab scholar has written an influential study that presents the essential facts. (4)
In short, the Mufti of Jerusalem was a far more important player in the Holocaust than many of the minor figures that make up Friedländer's index of villains. They are all given dishonorable mention – usually for good cause. But the Mufti, well known to Friedländer as we have seen, has escaped his censure. ...
The Mufti’s collaboration with, and efforts for, the Nazi cause are even more damning than indicated by Prof. Cohn. During his years of exile from Palestine as a guest of Hitler during World War II, the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini made Arabic radio broadcasts advocating genocide against the Jews and victory for Nazi Germany, personally recruited Balkan Muslims to the SS and was a leader of an Iraqi rebellion in 1941 (directly supported by German and Italian air units) to attempt to push the British out of Iraq — an effort, that if successful, would have outflanked the British in North Africa and doomed the Jews of Palestine – Ralph Seliger.
Click here for the entire review.
Thursday, August 02, 2007
Meretz USA mourns Board member, Michael Ben-Levi, Ph.D.
A memorial will be held on Sunday, August 12, at 5 p.m. at The Workmen's Circle, 1525 South Robertson Boulevard, Los Angeles. Those who wish to attend are requested to R.S.V.P. to his e-mail address, benlevim@aol.com, or by telephone to 323-384-3645.
Michael Ben-Levi, né Martin Lewinson, passed away on July 27, 2007, at 80. He is survived by his wife Beatrice, son Jack and daughter Rachel, brother Saul Lewinson, sister Anne Warren and brother Arthur Lewinson.
Dr. Ben-Levi received his doctoral degree in sociology from the University of Southern California. His dissertation focused on white-collar crime and criminal law. He was Chairman of the Sociology Department of Loyola University in the 1970s. From the 1980s to retirement, he taught at the Fashion Institute of Design and Merchandising.
In the 1950s he emigrated from Los Angeles to Israel with Hashomer Hatzair, residing at Kibbutz Barkai; but returned to help his ailing mother. For her, he designed a device to avoid bedsores for which he received a patent in 2006. He remained a vigorous leader in the Zionist movement in Los Angeles. A past president of the Southern California chapter of Meretz USA, he was active in The Workmen's Circle and in the leadership of Ameinu. Michael was beloved not only by his family and close friends but also by numerous neighbors, and others in need, whom he helped in so many ways. He was and will be irreplaceable.
Donations may be made in his name to Meretz USA, 114 West 26th Street, Suite 1002, New York, NY 10001-6812; The Workmen's Circle, 1525 South Robertson Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90035-4231; or Hadassah Medical Organization, Kiryat Hadassah, Post Office Box 12000, 91120 Jerusalem, Israel.
Michael Ben-Levi, né Martin Lewinson, passed away on July 27, 2007, at 80. He is survived by his wife Beatrice, son Jack and daughter Rachel, brother Saul Lewinson, sister Anne Warren and brother Arthur Lewinson.
Dr. Ben-Levi received his doctoral degree in sociology from the University of Southern California. His dissertation focused on white-collar crime and criminal law. He was Chairman of the Sociology Department of Loyola University in the 1970s. From the 1980s to retirement, he taught at the Fashion Institute of Design and Merchandising.
In the 1950s he emigrated from Los Angeles to Israel with Hashomer Hatzair, residing at Kibbutz Barkai; but returned to help his ailing mother. For her, he designed a device to avoid bedsores for which he received a patent in 2006. He remained a vigorous leader in the Zionist movement in Los Angeles. A past president of the Southern California chapter of Meretz USA, he was active in The Workmen's Circle and in the leadership of Ameinu. Michael was beloved not only by his family and close friends but also by numerous neighbors, and others in need, whom he helped in so many ways. He was and will be irreplaceable.
Donations may be made in his name to Meretz USA, 114 West 26th Street, Suite 1002, New York, NY 10001-6812; The Workmen's Circle, 1525 South Robertson Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90035-4231; or Hadassah Medical Organization, Kiryat Hadassah, Post Office Box 12000, 91120 Jerusalem, Israel.
Wednesday, August 01, 2007
Hillel Schenker: Window of opportunity
The following was published July 28, 2007 by our long-time khaver and co-editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal at the UK Guardian Weblog with a slightly different version in Haaretz:
This was a bad week for pessimists who believe that there is no chance to revive an Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the foreseeable future. The UK's former prime minister, Tony Blair, made his first study visit to the region as he begins his new role as envoy of the Quartet (composed of the US, the EU, the UN and Russia). He was followed by an unprecedented visit by Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Jordanian foreign minister Abdelelah al-Khatib, who met with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to promote the Arab peace initiative. And finally, in preparation for her visit to the region next week, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a briefing that President George W Bush "was the first to call for a two-state solution ... stating very clearly that Israel's future will rest in Israel, in places like Galilee and in the Negev, and that the occupation of the West Bank will have to end and a Palestinian state will need to be established".
Thus, despite the tragic events in the Gaza Strip, the weaknesses of both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, the mess in Iraq and the problems with Iran, several factors in the current configuration suggest a possible window of opportunity for forward movement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.
• In Israel, Ehud Barak's election as leader of a revived Labor party and appointment as defence minister, the dovish, politically experienced Haim Ramon's appointment as vice premier and Shimon Peres' election as a peace-oriented activist president create an opportunity for Olmert to carry out a peace-oriented policy which could encompass significant steps forward, without which his political career is doomed.
• The internal Palestinian tragedy creates a possibility for Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to demand of Israel and the international community significant measures to improve the situation in the West Bank, to serve as a model for a future solution which would include the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, based on the 1967 borders with mutual land swaps.
• The Arab peace initiative, which offers Israel recognition by and normalization with the 22 Arab League states in exchange for withdrawal to the Green Line, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel and an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem, reflects the interest of Israel's Sunni neighbours in a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides a regional framework for progress.
• While Tony Blair may be compromised in the eyes of many because of his role in Iraq, he will want to leverage his position as a high-profile Quartet envoy to try to promote genuine progress, and not only remain within the limited mandate given to his predecessor James Wolfensohn.
• The recent speech by President Bush calling for an international conference this autumn creates a framework for progress, provided that Ms Rice can gain the upper hand against the neocons within the administration. Bush should be concerned with ensuring that the Iraqi quagmire will not be the only Middle Eastern factor attached to his legacy, and a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is clearly an American interest.
All of these factors require courage and decisiveness on the part of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and active facilitation on the part of the relevant representatives of the international community.
In the longer run, it should be clear that the fate of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem cannot remain divided. And the Hamas Islamic movement apparently is and will remain an inherent part of the Palestinian body politic. However, Hamas will lose influence if it doesn't adjust to the fact that it is in the clear interest of the majority of the Palestinian people to lead a normal life in an independent sovereign state, which by necessity will need constructive, productive relations with Israel - provided the Israeli leadership, with the help of the international community, has the foresight to use this window of opportunity to build a model for such a future relationship with at least part of the Palestinian people.
As one of our Talmudic sages once said: If not now, when?
This was a bad week for pessimists who believe that there is no chance to revive an Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the foreseeable future. The UK's former prime minister, Tony Blair, made his first study visit to the region as he begins his new role as envoy of the Quartet (composed of the US, the EU, the UN and Russia). He was followed by an unprecedented visit by Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Jordanian foreign minister Abdelelah al-Khatib, who met with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to promote the Arab peace initiative. And finally, in preparation for her visit to the region next week, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a briefing that President George W Bush "was the first to call for a two-state solution ... stating very clearly that Israel's future will rest in Israel, in places like Galilee and in the Negev, and that the occupation of the West Bank will have to end and a Palestinian state will need to be established".
Thus, despite the tragic events in the Gaza Strip, the weaknesses of both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, the mess in Iraq and the problems with Iran, several factors in the current configuration suggest a possible window of opportunity for forward movement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.
• In Israel, Ehud Barak's election as leader of a revived Labor party and appointment as defence minister, the dovish, politically experienced Haim Ramon's appointment as vice premier and Shimon Peres' election as a peace-oriented activist president create an opportunity for Olmert to carry out a peace-oriented policy which could encompass significant steps forward, without which his political career is doomed.
• The internal Palestinian tragedy creates a possibility for Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to demand of Israel and the international community significant measures to improve the situation in the West Bank, to serve as a model for a future solution which would include the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, based on the 1967 borders with mutual land swaps.
• The Arab peace initiative, which offers Israel recognition by and normalization with the 22 Arab League states in exchange for withdrawal to the Green Line, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel and an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem, reflects the interest of Israel's Sunni neighbours in a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides a regional framework for progress.
• While Tony Blair may be compromised in the eyes of many because of his role in Iraq, he will want to leverage his position as a high-profile Quartet envoy to try to promote genuine progress, and not only remain within the limited mandate given to his predecessor James Wolfensohn.
• The recent speech by President Bush calling for an international conference this autumn creates a framework for progress, provided that Ms Rice can gain the upper hand against the neocons within the administration. Bush should be concerned with ensuring that the Iraqi quagmire will not be the only Middle Eastern factor attached to his legacy, and a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is clearly an American interest.
All of these factors require courage and decisiveness on the part of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and active facilitation on the part of the relevant representatives of the international community.
In the longer run, it should be clear that the fate of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem cannot remain divided. And the Hamas Islamic movement apparently is and will remain an inherent part of the Palestinian body politic. However, Hamas will lose influence if it doesn't adjust to the fact that it is in the clear interest of the majority of the Palestinian people to lead a normal life in an independent sovereign state, which by necessity will need constructive, productive relations with Israel - provided the Israeli leadership, with the help of the international community, has the foresight to use this window of opportunity to build a model for such a future relationship with at least part of the Palestinian people.
As one of our Talmudic sages once said: If not now, when?
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