Benvenisti sounds off

Meron Benvenisti – a former Labor deputy mayor of Jerusalem, a city planner, and a powerful writer – is understandably bitter about Israel’s ongoing settlement policies in the territories and its discriminatory land use policies within Green Line Israel. He is not apologetic for living as a Jew in the land of Israel/Palestine, and remembers being a boy in Jerusalem under siege in 1948 and playing soccer with youngsters a few years older who were soon all killed in an ambush attempting to defend the Etzion Bloc of kibbutzim that was captured by Arab forces in that war (his brief account in his book, “Sacred Landscapes,” is memorable). Yet my understanding is that he's given up on the two-state solution and therefore is no longer really in our camp.

Some of his pronouncements can be challenged in the article published in Haaretz, May 25. Perhaps Sharon once had a plan to leave the Palestinians in control of 11% of the original Mandate (one half of their 22% left over from the 1948 war), but none of us really know that he had such a plan when he became comatose. I am suspicious of Benvenisti's use of this figure with such precision.

Olmert has more than hinted for some time that his "plan" is/was for the Palestinians to possess about 20% of the original Palestinian Mandate (about 90% of the West Bank). Barak was offering more than 21% (up to 97% of the West Bank plus parts of Jerusalem). The UN partition plan of 1947 offered around 45% with slightly more going to the Jews and 5-10% remaining within an international zone that would have included Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The 1937 British partition plan (Peel Commission) offered the Jews about 15-20% and the Arabs as much as 80%. All of these options were accepted by the mainstream Zionist movement and violently rejected by the Arabs. This is something to think about when reading Benvenisti below:

Time for a new lexicon Ha’aretz – 25 May, 2007
By Meron Benvenisti

If you study the public discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, you will discover a fascinating phenomenon: The concepts that were coined during the 1970s continue to define a reality that has since changed beyond recognition. The old concepts that comprise the dictionary of the conflict have turned into code words that make any argument or clarification superfluous.

Concepts like "dividing the land," "settlements," "occupation," "separation" or "a Palestinian state" are perceived as self-evident and those who use them assume the listener attributes an identical meaning to them. The terms, which were meant to simplify reality, have become absolute concepts with qualitative values. When using these terms, a person defines himself as belonging to a particular political camp: "the West Bank" versus "Judea and Samaria," "partition" versus "giving up parts of the homeland," hityashvut versus hitnahalut (two Hebrew terms for "settlement" - the latter is generally used to refer to settlements located beyond the 1967 Green Line), and so on. Here are a few such concepts:

• "Partitioning the land / Giving up parts of the homeland" - The concept of "partition" has always served as a gauge for peace and compromise, an absolute concept that does not need to be defined in quantitative terms. Thus, according to the original partition of 1947, the Palestinian territory was slated to encompass about half of Mandatory Palestine. The armistice lines reduced this to 22 percent and the Allon Plan left it 14 percent. The "Sharon plan" (dealing with the route of the separation fence, the settlement blocs and Jordan Valley) leaves 11 percent of the land of Mandatory Palestine in the hands of the Palestinians. The size of the "partitioned" land is ostensibly not important and many portrayed the latest "partition of the land" - presented as the "convergence" plan" - as a historic compromise. Those supporting it were considered "leftists" and the Palestinians who rejected it were labeled "rejectionists of peace." Right-wing circles, which once considered concession to be treason, are now prepared to "subtract" densely populated areas "in order to solve the demographic problem." What is left of the principle of partition?

• "Hitnahalut / hityashvut" - The struggle for and against the establishment of Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line has defined the opposing ideological camps since the 1970s and continues to do so - even though in today's reality these settlements have lost their original significance. During the 1970s and '80s, the act of constructing a settlement in the territories played a decisive role in determining political facts. Sometime during the late 1980s, the settlements crossed a critical threshold and attained an ongoing demographic and urban development. A legal infrastructure was created that led to their de facto annexation to the State of Israel, and the number of settlements has since become "irrelevant" because of the sophisticated instruments of Israeli rule, which have completely blurred the distinction between "sovereign Israel" and "the territories." The separation wall and its entrance points - the "sterile" roads, the checkpoints - have taken on the role of the settlements. Ariel Sharon understood that the settlements no longer carried their old significance and therefore did not hesitate to dismantle them in the Gaza Strip. But the left and right continue to quarrel over every prefab dwelling.

• "Occupation / liberation" - The use of the concept "occupation" is the supreme test of affiliation with the "enlightened" camp. From a legal term describing a situation of "belligerent occupation" of enemy territory by a foreign army, it became a definition of political ideology. Those who use the term "occupation" relate to the occupied territories as a "foreign region" that is different from "sovereign" Israel. But where is the border between the motherland and the occupied colony? No model of military conquest can accommodate the Bantustans that have been created in the West Bank and explain how half of the territory has been effectively annexed; only a strategy of annexation and permanent control can explain the enormous settlement enterprise. The "military" component is secondary to the civilian component, and the settlers have turned the army into a militia that serves them. The definition of the occupied territories, after 40 years, is an anachronism aimed at emphasizing the temporary nature of the situation that "must end" when peace comes. All this is designed to avoid making decisions on immediate dilemmas.

Reality has caught up with the lexicon of the conflict, leaving only anachronistic slogans. This contributes to blurring the situation, thus facilitating the continuation of the violent status quo. It would have been fitting if the 40th anniversary of the 1967 war had served as a catalyst for composing a new lexicon.

Our ‘Israel Lobby’

Leaders of Meretz USA joined with Judy Gelman, policy chair of Ameinu, to jointly lobby Congress on May 24, as it struggled to conclude business in time for the summer recess. Through the initiative of Meretz USA president Lawrence I. Lerner, the delegation visited the offices of New Jersey Senators Frank Lautenberg and Robert Menendez, plus NJ Representatives Donald Payne and Albio Sires; the group also met with the foreign policy specialist of New York Representative Jerrold Nadler. These were mostly meetings with staff, but the group also spoke to Sen. Lautenberg, who greeted his long-time acquaintances, Larry Lerner and Rabbi Israel (Sy) Dresner, with special warmth.

The staff persons were attentive but varied widely in terms of the knowledge they displayed on the Israeli scene. We referred them to news sources informed by our overall viewpoint favoring an active US role to facilitate a negotiated two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, and we left them with copies of ISRAEL HORIZONS. The delegation argued the point that Jewish opinion on Israel is not monolithic and not in lock-step with hardline views generally associated with AIPAC, and that this is true even for pro-Israel Jews like ourselves.

In terms of specific legislation, the only item on hand was a resolution congratulating Israel on the 40th anniversary of the victory in the 1967 Six Day War. We advised that such a resolution should not be offered in a triumphal spirit but rather as a reminder of the need to end the conflict through negotiations. We also would object to wording that applauds the reunification of Jerusalem as if it were an undisputed fact, a city that is one-third Palestinian Arab and remains disunited in important ways and whose ultimate status must be negotiated. (In this connection, I suggest reading M.J. Rosenberg’s fine piece, “Congressional Time Warp,” his latest weekly column, which he writes under the auspices of the Israel Policy Forum.)

In addition, we offered advice to Congresspersons intending to visit Israel, including the promise of contacts in Israel with dovish Members of Knesset and other prominent moderate and progressive Israelis and Palestinians. Meretz USA intends to follow up in cultivating relationships with members of Congress and to cooperate with like-minded organizations, including among moderate Palestinian Americans, with this purpose in mind.

Meretz self-criticism

I don't see Meretz making strategic calculations in order to court votes but rather to advance a progressive agenda — uniquely without concern for achieving power in its own name. Change for the better is most likely to occur at this historical moment with a new prime minister selected by the Kadima party, without going to a general election that would most likely return Netanyahu to power. A very likely scenario is the imminent primary victory of a new leader of the Labor party (either Ami Ayalon or Ehud Barak) prompting an ultimatum to Kadima that either Olmert goes or Labor leaves the coalition forcing a new election; this should result in Olmert’s replacement by either Shimon Peres or Tzipi Livni — both more receptive than Olmert to making or addressing peace initiatives.

The following is from Meretz activist Susie Becher, inspired by views of the anti-Olmert rally that this Weblog featured about two weeks ago. I’m actually partial to the “anything but Bibi” school of thought that Susie deplores, but I respect her opinion enough to include it below:

I think Meretz is too preoccupied with who will head other parties and who will head the next government. Our public statements about the virtues of Livni or Peres and of Kadima vs. Likud portray to the public a party that lacks confidence in itself and its beliefs. This is also the message conveyed to the public by the stands the party has taken (or, rather, not taken) since the disengagement, when it backed Sharon, through the election campaign, when it ran with a slogan that conceded to Kadima before the race had begun, and up to the current crisis, when it is running scared from elections. When potential Meretz voters hear our leadership talk about hooking up with Labor or extolling Peres as the best person to head Kadima, they are likely to conclude that they might as well give their vote directly to one of those parties.

I don't belong to the "anything but Bibi" school. The supposedly liberal-social government of Olmert and Peretz has:
(1) allowed the settlers to make pilgrimages to Homesh and establish new settlements, one right in the heart of Hebron
(2) lost two ministers (and may yet lose a prime minister) to corruption investigations and one to a sexual misconduct conviction
(3) taken a racist, extreme right-wing party in as a partner and handed it no less than the Iranian nuclear threat as its portfolio
(4) said "no" to negotiations with Syria
(5) killed hundreds in Gaza over the summer and is starving those who are left
(6) gone to war with Lebanon and lost... and the list goes on without my even having touched on the social-economic issues.
So what exactly is it that we're afraid that Bibi will do?

I believe we need to highlight the ways in which we differ from the center parties rather than try to show how well we can blend in with them. I think Meretz repeatedly makes the mistake of taking the public's pulse and acting accordingly. Some believe this is the way to win votes. I disagree. The public may like us better if we pussyfoot around, but the votes will go to those who have a clear message and who are not afraid to stand apart in order to deliver it.

Lurie: Livni, Rice and Time Magazine

The following sections of the newest column by J. Zel Lurie, written for the South Florida Jewish Journal, highlight some matters of interest for this blog:

Time Magazine leads its listing of one hundred most influential people in the world with a two-page spread on Barack Obama. ... graced by a studio portrait of Obama taken by a Time photographer. ...

Has Time picked Obama as the next president of the USA? I wonder.

No male members of President Bush’s cabinet nor any of their British counterparts are found worthy of mention in Time’s list of the hundred most influential persons on earth, but there are plenty of women: Condoleezza Rice, the Republican Secretary of State is number 2; Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House, is number 5; Ms. Clinton is number 8; Angela Merkel, the leader of Germany, is number 11; Sonia Gandhi, “the Italian who became India’s kingmaker,” is number 12; Queen Elizabeth II is number 15. And Tzipi Livni, Israel’s foreign minister and a leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Olmert, is number 20. Her name concludes the first section of the list entitled, “Leaders and Revolutionaries.”

Most significant is the brief blurb on Livni, penned by Condoleezza Rice. She notes that they are roughly the same age and in the same job for their respective governments. Both agree that “a Palestinian state is in Israel’s greatest interest.”

“For Tzipi and me,” says Condi Rice. “ it is now the focus of our work together.”

Ms. Rice continues: “Tzipi has not just been my colleague, she has become my friend. We have sat together for hours debating ideas…. Tzipi is a woman of conviction, intelligence and peace. I deeply respect her. I like being around her. And I know that long after we have both exited the world stage, we will still be friends.” ...

Jeff Halper, the founder of the International Committee Against House Demolitions and a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, who hasn’t said a good word about Israel in a donkey’s age, has kind words for the two women. He wrote recently: “For their part, Livni and Rice are proceeding very quietly in stark contrast to the bluster of their male bosses. They have even refrained from releasing a name to their plan.”

Republican Jewish leaders in Washington, who are mostly Likudniks and support the settlers, are worried that the efforts of the two women might result in peace. Elliot Abrams, her deputy, tried to mollify them. He told them that that his female boss is interested in pushing the “peace process” not peace. And President Bush, he noted, has an “emergency brake” which he will pull if the women go too far.

When Abrams pictorial remarks became public last week, Livni countered with an interview to the leading Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 will not be the last.

“We are convinced that to establish a Palestinian state we have to withdraw from other areas,” she said. “We do not want to control the Palestinians.”

Jeff Halper has been seduced into kind words about Livni. He says that she is “one of the few thinking government officials.”

He quotes her as saying: “On the one hand I want to anchor my interest in security, demilitarization and refugees. On the other hand I want to create an alternative for the Palestinians that includes a solution to their national problem.”...

Finkelstein Tenure Debate

Norman Finkelstein is a 50-something itinerant academic who revels in controversy, especially with his delight in attacking Israel and Jewish establishment interests at every turn. He is Jewish himself and enjoys cover by widely advertising himself as a child of Holocaust survivors (both now deceased).

He is not lying in this regard. A long-time acquaintance of mine is related to him by marriage. According to him, his relatives don’t speak to Finkelstein because he arbitrarily defines survivors only as people who were in concentration camps. So this relative’s parents, by virtue of surviving in hiding, were “not” survivors.

He has published a number of books that take a very one-sided pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel stance. A few years ago, he published a widely cited book, The Holocaust Industry, which ferociously savaged Jewish institutions and (shall we say) “professional” survivors. Much of his work is factually on-target but is argued in a tendentious way that reduces complexities to simple moralistic terms of black & white. It’s accurate to say that he feeds on facts, presenting them in ways that inspire hatred or contempt (rather than understanding) toward Jews and Israel.

Back in the late ‘80s or early ‘90s, I wrote a review of one of Finkelstein’s books for ISRAEL HORIZONS. I compared his work with that of a Mapamnik (Mapam being the socialist-Zionist party that later merged with the Civic Rights Movement, RATZ, to form Meretz); the books were quite similar factually in ways that were not complimentary to Israel, but the tone and context were hugely different. The Mapamnik wrote to instill understanding and to foster a new approach toward peace making; Finkelstein wrote only to condemn and to excoriate.

Despite my dislike for Finkelstein's views and my doubt that he engages in true scholarship – as opposed to politically-charged argumentation – I see DePaul's decision on his tenure as its decision. Outside attempts to argue against his tenure are doomed to failure even if they succeed, because they would make him a victim of the all-powerful "Israel Lobby." Obviously, people have the right to make their views known, but the cause of academic freedom is served neither by his obtaining tenure (because he's dedicated to polemics rather than disinterested scholarship) nor by his rejection (because he becomes a "martyr" that extremists will rally around).

Efforts by Dershowitz against Finkelstein have been particularly obnoxious and counter-productive; I am advised by a colleague that Dershowitz was asked by an authority at DePaul to make his case, but this doesn’t negate his reported effort to get the University of California Press to cancel the publication of a book by the Fink via an appeal to Governor Schwartzenegger. Dershowitz has a personal animus against Finkelstein – quite understandably – because the Fink has written his book, Beyond Chutzpah, and otherwise engaged in a very public and caustic campaign against the Dersh's views. Dersh is responding in kind, but this doesn't make him any better in doing so. This resembles an undignified food fight. – R. Seliger

AN ANNOUNCEMENT

The Meretz USA Weblog is continuing, but we'll be blogging less frequently (still, at least once or twice a week) until further notice. Please take advantage of this hiatus to do any or all of the following: read us more carefully, read other materials, watch more television, get reacquainted with your family, get a life and wish us well while we get a life of our own! In the meantime, thanks and continue to stay tuned.

UK Scholar's flawed attack on Nusseibeh

EFRAIM KARSH: A PALESTINIAN TWO-STEP
Published in The New York Sun May 02, 2007

The essential matter that Prof. Karsh (Kings College, University of London) doubts is that Sari Nusseibeh really advocates a two-state solution. Everything else that Karsh writes in this review of Nusseibeh's autobiography ("Once Upon A Country"), including a paragraph that lists alleged factual errors – all quite minor, even if Karsh is accurate – is mud slinging. A better review would be one that may raise this concern – a very important issue – yet also weighs it against evidence that Nusseibeh is a moderate and an advocate of a two-state solution. The fact that Nusseibeh co-authored in 1991, "No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," with Israeli scholar Mark A. Heller, is totally ignored. Likewise, Karsh even ignores that Nusseibeh has campaigned in refugee camps for them to forego a right of return to Israel.

Among the more fair-minded reviews was one written by Jeffrey Goldberg in the LA Times, April 1. But in reading his book now, I can't help but notice an annoying habit of Dr. Nusseibeh to differentiate Zionism from Judaism and "Jews" from "Zionists" in order to undermine Zionism's moral legitimacy. Of course there is a distinction to be made, but this shows that it's difficult for even a moderate Palestinian like Nusseibeh to appreciate that Zionism was a response to anti-Semitic oppression and persecution, let alone the fact that there were binationalist Zionists and others who might have been reasonably accomodated as an alternative to this ongoing multi-generational conflict.

Avineri: Palestinians’ role in ‘Nakba’

Shlomo Avineri is exactly correct on the history and he states it with sensitivity as a dovish Labor Zionist, in this Haaretz article published May 10. We undermine ourselves as Zionists if we don't understand that the Palestinian decision to go to war in 1947-48, rather than accept partition or to even attempt to negotiate for a different deal, has caused them no end of misery. (I believe they repeated and compounded that error in 2000, but that's another matter.)

Until they accept responsibility By Shlomo Avineri

The Palestinians will mark the annual Nakba Day on May 15, as they have done in previous years. We must listen to their voices. As human beings and as Jews we must listen and be attentive to the other's pain, even if the other is – at the moment – our enemy. However, we must listen critically.

First and foremost we may ask, why May 15? It was on this day that the British Mandate on Palestine ended and the State of Israel was established. But the United Nations' resolution of November 29, 1947 also stipulates that an Arab state was to be established on part of Palestine this very same day. This resolution gave the seal of international approval to erecting two nation states on the controversial territory of mandatory Palestine.

Do the Palestinians mention this along with their rejection of the compromise resolution proposed by the international community, in the form of the partition plan?

With all due understanding and empathy to the Palestinians' suffering, the way the Nakba, the "catastrophe," is presented in the Palestinian and pan-Arab narrative raises several questions. It is portrayed as something terrible and evil that happened to the Palestinians. There is not even an iota of introspection, self-criticism and readiness to deal with the Palestinians' own contribution to their catastrophe.

We can understand – without justifying it – the Palestinians' rejection of the partition plan, just as we can understand – without justifying it – the Revisionist Zionist position negating the partition. But most of the Jewish community accepted the idea. And if most of the Palestinians had accepted it, then an independent Palestinian state would have risen on part of Mandatory Palestine in 1948, without war and without refugees.

The Palestinians are not prepared to deal with this complex reality. After 1948 quite a few books were written in Arabic about the Arabs' defeat in their war against Israel. To this day no book has raised the question of whether, perhaps, the Arabs erred in rejecting the compromise - painful as it may be - of the partition? Perhaps they would have done better if, like the Zionists, they had gritted their teeth and accepted the half-full glass?

A much used expression in Jewish tradition says "because of our sins we were exiled from our land." This expression is religious, but it indicates that the Jews viewed their exile in a self-critical manner. It would have been easy, of course, to blame the Romans and the other nations for their fate. But the Jewish narrative did not do so and viewed both the destruction and exile as deriving, among other things, from the Jews' own actions and shortcomings.

Every nation, especially a defeated one, sees itself as a victim. But most of the nations that were defeated – Germany after World War II is the classic example – also looked at themselves, at their society, values and actions.

Far be it from me to maintain that in 1948 the Jews were "right" and the Arabs were "wrong." What troubles me and other Zionist Israelis wishing to be attentive to the Palestinians' pain and willing to help rectify injustices and accept a historic compromise, is the Palestinians' complete unwillingness to acknowledge that in 1948 they and their leaders made a terrible historic mistake - of both political and moral proportions - by rejecting the international compromise they were offered.

It is for this reason that the Palestinians' customary comparison between the Nakba and the Holocaust is so outrageous. Did the Jews of Germany and Europe declare war on Germany? Were the world's Jews offered a compromise that they rejected? Europe's Jews were murdered by the Nazis because they were Jews. What does that have to do with the Palestinians' decision to refuse the UN's compromise proposal and go to war?

It would not be exaggerated to say that there will be no true compromise between Israel and the Palestinians without a readiness on their part - however minute and partial, for the "truth" is always complex - to admit that they, too, are partly responsible for what happened to them in 1948.

Shlomo Avineri is a professor of political science at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a former director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Meretz USA News Update 5/11

HEBRON WATCH: Check out "Hebron Watch," the new feature on Meretz USA's website. "Hebron Watch" will help keep you informed about the Hebron settlers' ongoing acts of hooliganism, as they seek to intimidate the city's Palestinians and destroy their property in a methodical effort to violently drive them out.

Focus on: The Winograd Report

The interim report released on April 30th by the Winograd Committee launched a maelstrom of protest, analysis, and commentary in Israel, including a large rally held four days later. As Ari Shavit points out, the majority of Israelis believe that Olmert must go and the rally drew protestors from across the political spectrum. Yet, not all agree on exactly why or how it should happen.

For one, right-wing critics are tending to dwell on the bungling of the war effort by the Olmert-Peretz team, calling for a redoubled effort to prepare the IDF for "the next war." Likud Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu stated soon after the report's release that "Israel's existence depends on its strength." Netanyahu and other right-wingers are also advocating new elections, which, if held in the near future, right-wing parties are likely to win.

In another corner stand those who come from a "good governance" perspective. These critics are focusing on the Committee's findings that the war's decision-making process was dominated by military considerations, which ignored the important role that diplomatic efforts from the Foreign Ministry could play. Those like Ze'ev Segal are most concerned with restructuring the way the state makes decisions so that Israel does not again go to war without examining all plans and options. Yigal Walt points out that this is a process that has long needed fixing: during the first Lebanon War, decisions were made in much the same manner.

Finally, and perhaps most interesting, is the perspective of the Israeli left, which has endorsed the manifold criticisms leveled against military and government officials by the Winograd Committee (lack of preparation, lack of care for Israel's north, lack of a proper decision-making apparatus, etc.), but tried at the same time to refocus public debate and use the report to reignite the peace movement. They argue that Israel did not concentrate enough on making peace in the time leading up to the war. Meretz member Susie Becher contends: "The most important lesson to be learned from the Winograd findings is not that Israel must prepare itself better for war but that it must adapt its strategic thinking to prepare for peace." Aluf Benn agrees. In his estimation, the Winograd report points out that, deluded by convictions of invincibility, Israel made no serious effort to achieve peace.

Other left-wingers focused more on the future. Peace Now for instance criticized the anti-Olmert and Peretz rally, saying that it offered no alternative direction for the government. And Ehud Asheri despaired, wishing that the demonstration had been aimed at restarting the peace process.

Observers from outside Israel are also concerned. The United States, which recently proposed a plan for easing restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza, is now treating Olmert like a "lame duck." Arab parties have reacted with skepticism and apprehension. Palestinians doubt a revival in peacemaking: Rami G. Khouri writes that many Arabs doubt that there will be positive change and fear that the report may lead only to additional Israeli military action.

Certainly, there is reason for these parties to worry. Even though Olmert has weathered the initial wave of criticism – on Monday, he comfortably survived three no-confidence votes in the Knesset – many believe he is so weakened that he will receive no support even if he makes a major move towards peace.

In other news

* A World Bank report, released on Wednesday, criticized Israeli restrictions on travel in the West Bank. Returning to New York after years in the region, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Under-Secretary General Alvaro de Soto also spoke about Palestinian hardship.
* A US proposal for easing restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza was rejected by the Israeli defense establishment and Palestinian militants, but praised by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Deputy National Security Advisor Elliot Abrams assured Jewish community leaders that it would not lead to Israel being pressed into an "uncomfortable” situation.

Arab peace initiative: Hopes & concerns

My apologies for neglecting today’s blog posting until a relatively late hour. I invite readers to go online to read two articles at the Mideast Web site for an important discussion on the Arab League peace initiative by Walid Salem and Ami Isseroff.

The key issues: does the Arab peace initiative allow for substantive negotiations or is it a dictate, an all-or-nothing proposition? Most importantly, are the Arabs ready to give up on the Palestinian right of return, which in practice would nullify the right of the Jewish people to national self-determination, or is this still being held over Israel as an existential threat? From Foreign Minister Livni’s recent talks with Egyptian President Mubarak, we are finally getting a sense that Israel may be taking this peace initiative seriously. There is even more hope now in pending talks with Israel by Arab League foreign ministers to explain their proposal.

Strategic Lessons of Winograd Commission

The following is a report distributed May 9 by the JCPA (Jewish Council for Public Affairs) the organized Jewish community’s umbrella agency for policy analysis. It’s an article by Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror, program director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

While I take his sober assessment seriously, I also see it as flawed for ignoring the prospects for diplomatic progress as a means of allaying the military threats posed by Hizbullah in Lebanon (via possible negotiations with Syria) and Hamas in Gaza (via engaging with Mahmoud Abbas and the Saudi/Arab League initiative). It also has nothing to say about the genuine humanitarian crisis that Palestinians have been suffering as a result of Israeli and international reactions to Hamas; I find fault both with Hamas, which has totally failed to stop violence against Israel, and the international reaction that has impoverished the Palestinian people – R. Seliger.

In general terms, the Winograd Commission Report dealt mostly with the flaws in the decision-making process in Israel. However, the report contains important insights into the strategic thinking that was predominant in the Israeli political-military leadership from the time of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in July 2006, with the advent of the Second Lebanon War:

* Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000. It was hoped that the withdrawal would erode the legitimacy of any continuing military activity by Hizbullah, especially in Lebanon's internal politics. At that time the Israeli government declared that any violation of Israeli sovereignty would bring about a harsh and immediate Israeli response.

* These declarations stipulated that in the event of any assault on Israeli soldiers or civilians, all of Lebanon, Syria, and Hizbullah would be affected. The purpose of these statements was to build up Israeli deterrence in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Effective deterrence of this sort was critical for Israel, the Winograd Commission Report explains, for a number of reasons: after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon there was a lack of "elementary depth," there were many points of friction with Hizbullah, and finally there were multiple Israeli targets – both civilian and military – adjacent to the new Israeli-Lebanese boarder. At the same time, within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the view developed that if need be, Israel could use "levers of influence" to restrain Hizbullah, such as attacks on Lebanese infrastructure and Syrian targets, as well.

* Despite these strong declarations, Israel only responded locally to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in October 2000. The Winograd Commission Report presents the assessment of Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh that the Israeli government at the time did not respond more forcefully because it did not want to show that its Lebanon withdrawal had actually produced an escalatory effect. Moreover, the Second Intifada had erupted and the Israeli government was concerned about having to wage a two-front war. This policy of restraint continued through March 2002, when Hizbullah attacked inside Israel near the town of Shlomi.

* As a result, another view became deeply rooted in the Israeli national security establishment that Hizbullah's military buildup after Israel's Lebanon pullout was not so terrible as long as relative quiet along the border was preserved. Israel knew that Hizbullah was gaining strength and acquiring weaponry, but it preferred to turn a blind eye. As a result, Israel did not prepare for war with an enemy that was far more powerful than what it was familiar with in the past.

Implications for the Gaza Strip:

* In the Gaza Strip, a similar process is underway. Hamas is getting stronger as it organizes itself, digs fortifications underground, and builds up its military capabilities. Israel will have to ask itself whether it is preferable to delay the confrontation with Hamas, because meanwhile there is quiet or a temporary truce or some other illusory understanding. We are likely to find ourselves in exactly the same position in Gaza that we created with respect to Lebanon.

* The Winograd Commission Report, which does not deal with the Gaza problem, describes Israeli policy toward Lebanon during 2000-2006 as a policy of "containment." Strictly speaking there is a problem with this terminology for what Israel pursued in Lebanon during this period, was not a pure policy of containment, which by definition implies preventing an adversary from reinforcing its capabilities.

* What Israel is doing today in the Gaza Strip is not containment either, but rather a case of ignoring reality completely. It is an extremely costly policy. Few have any idea what price Israel will have to pay if it moves into Gaza in two or three years, when Hamas feels strengthened and has the capability to launch 122mm Katyusha rockets -which Hizbullah possessed in the thousands - as far as Ashdod and Kiryat Gat. Israeli decision-makers will have to take into account that inaction has a price, as well.

* Anyone who has dealt with military affairs knows that it is impossible to thwart the firing of Katyusha or Qassam rockets by means of artillery fire, or by means of any land-based or air-based firepower. The Winograd Commission Report details, nonetheless, how many of Israel's operational plans for Lebanon during 2002-2004 did not require the use of maneuver units on the ground.

* It is now clear that the only way to thwart rocket attacks is by controlling the situation on the ground. Qassam rockets are today landing in Sderot and Ashkelon - and not in Kfar Saba - because Israel does not control the situation on the ground in Gaza, whereas it has control of the ground around Qalqilya.

* For political reasons, the IDF was not permitted by the political echelon to cross the Israeli-Lebanese border from 2000 to 2006. This allowed Hizbullah to conduct exercises day and night and to attack at will, while Israel was unable to stop any of its preparations. The only way to deal with such a situation in the long term is to allow the IDF to cross the border and halt such offensive preparations. As long as no responsible government is preventing attacks against Israeli territory, the IDF will have to adopt such an approach both with respect to its northern border with Lebanon and its southern border with the Gaza Strip.

***The opinions expressed in the Middle East Briefing do not necessarily convey those of JCPA*** Nor do they particularly reflect the opinions of Meretz USA.

Anti-Olmert Rally, Part 2

Two Meretz party khaverim have written on the anti-Olmert event: Hillel Schenker and Susie Becher. Hillel wrote unenthusiastically on the UK Guardian weblog:

... [P]eople who talk about the failure of leadership this past summer are "really yearning for a victorious leader to restore their lost pride". What the demonstration should have been about was a call for "a bold diplomatic initiative" for peace. ... which is why I went to last night's demonstration as an observer, and not as a participant.

Unfortunately, the Israeli internal political chaos is happening precisely at a moment when there are signs of possible movement on the diplomatic front, what is called around here a "window of opportunity". We have Syrian calls for talks, we have an Arab reaffirmation of the 2002 Arab League Initiative which calls for peace between Israel and the entire Arab world based upon an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel and an agreed upon solution to the refugee problem, and we even have the bumbling and slumbering American giant insisting on [periodic] meetings between the Israeli prime minister and Palestinian president, with a clearly formulated document of "benchmarks" for forward progress. ...

The following is an abbreviated version of Susie Becher’s online article at Ynet:

It's not all about Olmert: Artificial spirit of anti-Olmert national unity threat to democracy

The airwaves are full of warnings that Olmert's failure to step down is – in the fashionable language of the day – a threat to democracy. The real threat, however, lies in the artificial spirit of national unity that is obfuscating the principles that lie at the heart of the division between Right and Left. ...

Yes, Olmert should resign, but less because the Winograd Committee found that he mismanaged the conduct of the war than because it found that he went to war without considering the whole range of options, including moves on the diplomatic front. Even had the war achieved its aims, the prime minister would not be absolved of responsibility for the lives lost in securing militarily what might have been secured without firing a shot.

The indictment of the government will certainly get worse as the committee looks at the later stages of the war, particularly the shameful decision to launch an offensive as the cease-fire resolution was rolling off the presses, but the biggest mistake was at the beginning – the very decision to go to war. ... Israel has every right to defend itself, but military action is not necessarily the best and certainly should not be the first line of defense.

Lesson for the public

It is true that the committee noted that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon allowed Hizbullah to strengthen its positions along the border, but this is an indictment not of withdrawal but of unilateralism. ... after turning his back on peace with Syria in January 2000, Ehud Barak was left with no choice but to withdraw from Lebanon five months later in a vacuum, with no diplomatic framework to ensure the stability of the area.

The same can be said of our southern border, where the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was conducted in total disregard of the Palestinian side. Here, too, the absence of diplomacy failed to bring about quiet, and here, too, military force is failing as a response to the Qassam rockets that are plaguing our southern cities.

There is no question that the man who was chastised for a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility, and prudence cannot be trusted to implement the committee's recommendations. But there is a lesson here for the public as well.

The committee pointed out that the decisions made by the government last summer enjoyed broad support among the public. ... Today, following the release of the scathing interim report, the public understands that it was misled. ... What remains is for the public to sober up to the fact that it is being misled with regard to the entire regional picture.

One need look no further than the overtures coming from Syria and the Arab League Initiative to understand that the conventional wisdom that there is no one to talk to is nothing but a myth. The most important lesson to be learned from the Winograd findings is not that Israel must prepare itself better for war but that it must adapt its strategic thinking to prepare for peace.

Susie Becher is a member of the National Executive of Meretz-Yachad.

Anti-Olmert Rally, Part 1

In the May 1 visit to Meretz USA of Meretz MK Avshalom (Abu) Vilan, he told us of imploring Gen. Uzi Dayan (the organizer of this past weekend’s oust-Olmert rally) to press the goal of Olmert's resignation but not of a new election, for two reasons:

1. Frequent elections are making Israel’s government unstable; the last election was little more than a year ago.
2. More importantly, Netanyahu would be returned to power at the head of about 35 Likud MKs.

Abu feels that it would be far better that Peres or Livni replace Olmert with a new Kadima-led coalition and that with Meretz’s support, embark upon new avenues toward peace, via the Saudis, the US, Abbas and the European Union. He personally trusts Peres more than Livni, feeling that Livni's not experienced enough and that her right-wing Likud roots make her suspect. But I find Peres ultimately untrustworthy because of his habit as a political intriguer. Hence, I think that Livni might be better, but either one as PM would be a source of new hope.

Below is an abbreviated description of last week’s oust-Olmert rally from the MideastWeb for Coexistence site, by one Joseph M. Hochstein of Tel Aviv:

What made this demonstration different from others was the crowd's diversity. Members of opposing political factions shared the square. Young men wearing National Religious knitted skullcaps prayed in groups alongside secular Tel Aviv residents. ...

The closest the audience came to a display of vocal unanimity was when Eliad Shraga, a reserve paratroop officer who heads the Movement for Quality Government, exhorted them to act as judge and jury and answer whether Olmert was guilty. They found the Prime Minister guilty, of course, but the performance lacked spontaneity. ...

Cheerleading aside, the only words that seemed to evoke a genuinely spontaneous reaction were uttered by Meir Shalev, the novelist. He mentioned 40 years of occupation in a disparaging way, and some people in the northwest part of the square started booing. Later, the Council of Jewish Communities in Judea and Samaria (Yesha) commented that Shalev's remark showed his hate of settlers.

Someone I know refused to attend the demonstration. He said he did not want to help Benjamin Netanyahu become Prime Minister. His meaning became clear from the scene at Rabin Square.

Dark-blue signs calling for Elections now were everywhere. They competed against the red-and-black logo that displayed the demonstration organizers' motto, Bunglers, go home. Many members of the crowd wore dark-blue Elections now stickers on hats and shirts. Young demonstrators displaying Elections now signs took over the top of a Holocaust monument that dominates the southern part of the square. Elections now was clearly a message from the organized political Right.

Despite the Elections now infiltration, people did seem to be making a real effort to keep the non-partisan spirit of the demonstration. Political parties refrained from displaying party signs, and few people in the crowd wore t-shirts with party slogans or symbols. No partisan politicians were invited to speak (unless you include Uzi Dayan, the demonstration organizer, whose Tafnit movement failed to win a Knesset seat in the last election). ...

– Joseph M. Hochstein, Tel Aviv
[Cross-posted from Israel Like This, As If]
http://israel-like-this-as-if.blogspot.com/2007/05/notes-from-may-3-rally-in-rabin-square.html
Original text copyright by the author and MidEastWeb for Coexistence, RA. Posted at MidEastWeb Middle East Web Log

Jewish Jesus conference

The conference, April 29, at New York's Center for Jewish History was impressive for its array of scholars and thinkers and the enormous attendance that it drew. The presentations varied in quality and effectiveness (for an impressionistic overview, read Gabriel Sanders in The Forward).

What is truly exciting is the thought that the Jewish people could reclaim this humongous personage as one of our own. If we can persuade many Jews to give up their aversion to the historical Jesus, who as an individual never intended nor had anything to do with the humiliations and persecutions we've suffered in his name, Judaism and the Jewish people can gain in stature as the “people of Jesus.” It may be tricky to avoid offending some Christians with the distinction between the "religion of Jesus" ( i.e., Judaism) and the "religion about Jesus" (Christianity), but it’s an interesting juxtaposition.

One of the speakers indicated that 19th century Reform rabbis viewed Jesus positively as a great Jewish teacher, while more traditional Jews – especially the Orthodox – view Jesus with such antipathy that they generally refuse to utter his name.

Leon Wieseltier, The New Republic’s literary editor who is working on a book about Jewish views of messianism, opened the conference in conversation with James Carroll, the Catholic author of “Constantine’s Sword” on Christian anti-Semitism. What Wieseltier fears in messianism is a vision of a post-messianic order that is apocalyptic, bearing no resemblance to the world as it is today, a world that is destroyed or transcended into something unrecognizable. He argues for a moderate Jewish view of the messiah as a force for the world’s reform or improvement but not for its total transformation.

As Jews living after the Vatican II reforms ushered in by Pope John XXIII, we are no longer viewed officially by the Catholic Church as being doomed to burn in hell for not having embraced Jesus as our lord and savior. But resonances of this damnation remain. For example, Carroll mentioned the “Aryanization” of Jesus, as illustrated in Mel Gibson’s “Passion” movie: Jesus and his disciples are the only ones who appear bare-headed, while the Jews around them are all depicted in distinct head covering.

Susannah Heschel’s comment that Christians suffer from “shtetl envy” was the most memorable single line that I recall; she elaborated that it marks a yearning among Christians for a way of life that is more fulfilling than a weekly hour in church. There is a basis for positive relations between Jews and Christians; Prof. Heschel memorably spoke of her father, Abraham Joshua Heschel, who, upon visiting Pope Paul VI, was thanked for his books that made it possible for “Catholics to be better Catholics.”

The One-State Illusion

Readers may recall how I tangled with Prof. Tony Judt on his scathing view of Israel and his quixotic preference for a binational state to replace Israel and the Palestinian territories. At a public appearance, I had reminded him of how nationalism was derailing European ambitions for a transfer of sovereignty from individual nations to the European Union (with the defeat of the EU’s proposed constitution), let alone the utopian nature of similarly high-minded dreams for a binational solution in the Middle East.

The news from Tony Judt’s native Britain is delicious. The 300 year-old “binational” experiment known as the United Kingdom is now in jeopardy, with the Scottish National Party having won a plurality of the vote for the Scottish parliament.

It is instructive in this regard to read Uri Avnery’s “Bed of Sodom.” This non-Zionist left-wing Israeli punctures the binational balloon, but the following by Alexander Jacobson in Haaretz, April 28, anticipated the Scottish election and also wrote effectively on the bi-nationalist illusion as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

Who really wants binationalism? By Alexander Jacobson

Have the English and the Scots gone out of their minds? Here in the Middle East, it is clear that there is something to fight about. But what reason is there for the national tension between Englishmen and Scots, who live together happily and prosperously in the United Kingdom?

With great seriousness, senior British statesman have recently been discussing the danger of the dismantling of the unification of England and Scotland. According to recent public opinion polls, the Scottish National Party (SNP), which upholds Scotland's resignation from the union, could win the coming elections for the local parliament. Surveys in Scotland show that more than 40 percent of the country's inhabitants support independence (according to another poll, that proportion reaches 59 percent). Also, 52 percent of the English replied that they are interested in Scotland leaving the union, in the sense of "we are here and they are there." The English press reports with concern on "anglophobic" tendencies in Scotland.

How has this happened? After all, in Israel, we have heard that Europe has almost entirely rid itself of nationalism and the national state, and that in the near future the victory parade of multi-nationalism and post-nationalism will come to the Middle East, where the masses, as everyone knows, are waiting for it with bated breath. However, it appears that the news of the death of nationalism has not yet reached the distant provinces where the English and the Scots live.

There we have two nations facing each other, Protestant Christians both, who have undergone profound secularization and are very close to each other in their modern culture. The two peoples have been living in the same state for 300 years; their representatives sit in the same parliament and in the same governments (and also serve as prime minister); they are partners to the same economic system; they intermarry with no difficulty; they live in the same neighborhoods; they fight in the same wars; they agree on the same values of a modern, democratic and liberal society and they speak the same language.

Not only has all of this not created a common national identity for the two peoples, it is even possible that this is not enough to keep them in the framework of a shared state. This, even though it is one of the most liberal and least nationalistic states in history, and even though the Scots have received an autonomous parliament and government of their own. It is not easy to explain this, but the reality is that most nationalities, even in Europe, aspire to national independence even when they are offered a reasonable and fair alternative to it.

The idea of one state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, which is known to the public as a binational state, has in fact been promoted by the Israeli right, which supports the establishment of Jewish settlements in the territories. Parts of the radical left also believe in the binational idea, but they cannot bring it about.

Beyond every other argument, of principle or practice, there is one question that must be answered by everyone who supports this idea: If the vision is realized, will it indeed be a binational state? If today, hundreds of years after the establishment of the United Kingdom, the Scots are still finding it hard to accept it as a true binational framework and about half of them see it as an expression of the hegemony of the English majority, is it reasonable that a state with an Arab-Muslim majority, in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world, will really be "binational," even if it is officially defined as such? It is clear this will be an Arab-Muslim state in every respect. Or is it the case that someone believes that from the moment he has adopted a fashionable slogan that is detached from the reality even in Western Europe he is exempt from responsibility for the practical significance of what he is proposing to the Israeli public?

Lurie on Palestinian health care

The following is a version of khaver J. Zel Lurie’s column, written April 30, for the May 8 issue of the South Florida Jewish Journal:

Many of the patients in Hadassah’s two hospitals in Jerusalem are Palestinians. This is especially true of [the branch at] Mt. Scopus, which acts as a regional hospital for East Jerusalem. After all, one out of five citizens of Israel is an Arab.... [One should add] ... the quarter million Palestinians in East Jerusalem who have the status of permanent residents of Israel with all Israeli health benefits.

During my 37 years as editor of the Hadassah Magazine I would visit the Jerusalem hospitals at least once a year. I was struck each year, not only by the Arabs in the waiting rooms, but by the growing number of ultra-Orthodox in their black hats and white shirts with fringes flapping at their sides. In the last municipal election, they elected an ultra-Orthodox mayor.

But my [previous] article ... was not about Israeli Arabs and the health benefits that they enjoy, but about the breakdown of the health system in the West Bank and Gaza, with its four million Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. As the occupying power, Israel has the legal and moral responsibility to maintain the health system in the West Bank and Gaza, as outlined by Dr. Richard Horton, editor of the British Medical Journal. There is also a practical reason. Good health has no frontiers. An epidemic would easily slip across the border despite the separation barrier.

Hadassah also cares for foreign Arabs

Hadassah has the well-deserved reputation of being the finest medical institution in the Middle East. It has cared for Saudi princes and princesses and wealthy Egyptians and Jordanians.

Palestinian hospitals in Nablus and Ramallah are not equipped to handle complicated operations. On past occasions, the Palestinian Authority has found the funds to send a patient to Hadassah. More commonly, the sick Palestinian makes a private deal with Hadassah. [But] When he does, the Israel army does not expedite his transfer to Hadassah. Take what happened at the Etzion District Coordinating Office on April l9. A father from Bethlehem, which is on Jerusalem’s border, had to travel south to Etzion to secure a permit to take his sick daughter to see a Hadassah specialist. He had an appointment for April 19 at 10 o’clock in the morning.

The previous day he took all his documents to Etzion. He was told that one day permits were not issued in advance and that he should return with his daughter early on April 19.

At 7.40 a.m. on April 19, the ‘Machsom Watch’ ladies arrived. They found the windows closed and a distraught father and child. They were told that the soldiers were at a meeting and the windows would not open until 8:30. When the windows opened at 8:30 the Mahsom ladies asked hat the father’s permit be expedited. They received an exceedingly rude reply.

The father from Bethlehem received his permit at 9:40 AM for a 10 o’clock appointment at Hadassah in Jerusalem. I hope that he was not delayed at the Bethlehem/Jerusalem checkpoint, that he did not receive a ticket for speeding, that the Hadassah specialist was able to see his daughter despite her late arrival, and that he was able to help her.

Too bad it’s fiction

“Exiles” by Richard North Patterson is a mystery thriller about a dovish prime minister of Israel who is assassinated by a cabal of Iranian agents and fundamentalist Orthodox settlers.

The plot is absolutely incredible, but it is beautifully written. It was recommended to me as ... “the best book on the Israel-Palestine conflict.” It is hardly that. But I could see what attracted him in a speech the fictional prime minister addressed to the Palestinians:

An end to suffocating checkpoints, arbitrary arrests and petty humiliations. A negotiation of fair borders that provide for our security and your prosperity. A program of compensation to the descendants of Palestinian refugees. A dismantling of illegal settlements. An agreement that Jerusalem will be an open city, the capital of both of our nations. An effort to help build an economy that promises your young people something other than a martyr’s grave. And at last a country of your own.

He continued soberly: “I also offer you these truths. That we as Jews accept our share of responsibility for the violence that caused your grandparents to flee…That all of us – Palestinian and Jew – are responsible for who our children become. That it is our common responsibility to prevent them from making our land a common grave… And that you, the Palestinian people, must do your part by rejecting the witches brew of hatred and revenge offered by extremists like Hamas.”

Too bad, it’s all fiction. No Israeli prime minister is likely to match Israeli security with Palestinian aspirations and prosperity. Yitzhak Rabin was leaning toward peace ... and he was assassinated by an Orthodox fanatic.

David Ben-Gurion’s Boss

Daniel Hillel, an Israeli soil scientist and geographer and author of over 20 books, has a seasonal faculty appointment at Columbia University. He spoke at Manhattan’s Congregation Ansche Chesed on the evening of Yom Haatzmaut, Israel’s independence day.

As an oleh from the US in the early 1950s, Prof. Hillel was part of a group of ten young people who moved, entirely on their own initiative, to found Kibbutz Sdeh Boker in the middle of the Negev Desert. It was wild and dangerous: they suffered through a year of draught and a downpour that flooded their camp; two of the ten pioneers were killed by Arab raiders.

While still a barren site with a few tents and a ramshackle barn, they were visited one day, entirely by chance, by David Ben-Gurion, making an inspection tour of the South. Upon learning of their entirely apolitical and idealistic intent, Ben-Gurion temporarily resigned his job as prime minister (when he was replaced for about a year by Moshe Sharett) and joined them.

Daniel Hillel was given the daunting task of finding and supervising physical tasks suitable for the then 60-something political icon. He benefitted from visiting with Ben-Gurion every night to review his work assignment for the following day. These turned into long discussions about everything under the sun. Usually one-sided affairs with B-G lecturing his young supervisor, Daniel Hillel dared to reverse this pattern on one matter, and one only: he lobbied with Ben-Gurion to be more generous-minded toward the Arabs. These many years later, Prof. Hillel notes with satisfaction that after the 1967 Six Day War, B-G did indeed advise his successors, from his retirement abode at Sdeh Boker, to try to exit the newly conquered territories as quickly as possible.

‘Is it 1938, again?’ Part 2

The inimitable Alan Dershowitz could not attend in person due to illness, but he did speak over a video hook-up that frequently broke down. Despite several annoying technical interruptions, Dershowitz got across his view that it’s NOT “1938, again,” because Israel exists as a powerful state today and Jews are influential in a way that they were not in 1938. He also was with the consensus in seeing Israel and Jews as being “dehumanized” by left-wing Israel bashers; still, he insisted that he speaks as a liberal and identifies with Walzer as “being on the left.” He urged that, “We cannot abandon moderate left ... opinion.”

Dershowitz holds to what he calls a “90 percent case for Israel,” indicating that nobody is 100 percent in the right, that Israel does make mistakes and does bad things sometimes. The example he gave in this connection was of the militant settlers in Hebron.

But Dershowitz is also not the expert that he thinks he is. He wrongly linked the writings of Jimmy Carter and Professors Mearsheimer and Walt with that of Tony Judt in rejecting a two-state solution. Carter’s book, despite its flaws, is a fervent plea for peace between Israel and a new Palestinian state. And unlike Prof. Judt’s view, there is nothing in Mearsheimer and Walt’s work on the “Israel Lobby,” however scurrilous their accusations, that advocates one state in Israel’s stead. Furthermore, Dershowitz lumps together the Barak proposals at Camp David in August 2000 with the Clinton parameters in Dec. 2000 and the aborted negotiations at Taba in Jan. 2001. While not vastly different, these were not identical positions; we’ll never know what might have happened had Barak been prepared to base the Camp David talks on the principles articulated months later by Clinton and what was placed on the table (too late) at Taba.

Nevertheless, it was clear from some in the audience that they were disappointed that Dershowitz came off as liberal as he did. The audience as a whole seemed about equally divided along liberal and conservative lines.

I wasn’t able to attend the second day of the conference and therefore missed hearing such luminaries as writer Hillel Halkin and Prof. Susannah Heschel. I was privileged, however, to kibbitz with them and others at a reception at the end of the first day’s sessions.

Among those I chatted with was the Israeli philosopher-ethicist Moshe Halbertal, reminding him of Meretz USA’s meeting with him some years back at NYU Law School (where he has a seasonal faculty appointment). Regarding his work formulating the IDF’s code of ethics, he remarked upon confronting a spectrum of views ranging from “just bomb them” to just “don’t shoot,” which he regards as equally untenable extremes.

During his presentation, Prof. Halbertal asked for “humility, not silence” of critics in the Diaspora. He fears, above all, a lack of solidarity; “vicarious embarrassment” for Israel’s deeds is actually positive — a sign of solidarity. But he advocated a number of limits on criticism:

• Be informed: don’t make criticism out of ignorance or superficial knowledge. He mentioned an “asymmetry” in the “war of images”: “Threats to us are invisible [until they materialize in attacks]; our actions are very visible [and broadcast around the world].”
• Engage in empathy: “If you think that Israel shouldn’t make any targeted killings, place yourself in the shoes of someone in Sderot [subject to almost daily rocket attack].” “When someone is in a time of crisis, extend your hand to help.” Don’t simply criticize.
• Name your enemy: call it “radical militant Islam” (for example) but don’t blame the entire Arab or Islamic world. And don’t attempt to change the enemy’s political culture; it endangers Israel to try to instantly democratize the Arab world.

The issue is to isolate the extremists; if you identify the enemy with all Arabs or all Muslims, "you play the enemy’s game." It’s the terrorists who want to create a “war of all against all.” The issue of militant Islam is also internal to the Islamic world. “The last thing Israel needs is a war of Islam versus Judaism.” Syria, some Palestinians, Egyptians and other Arabs are all potential allies against militant Islam.

Halbertal doubts the usefulness of Podhoretz’s metaphor of a world war, but he agrees that Iran cannot be trusted to go nuclear because “Israel would be in the shadow of destruction.” Podhoretz earlier advocated that the US bomb Iran, quoting Sen. John McCain to the effect that “The only thing worse than bombing Iran is for Iran to get the bomb.” Podhoretz had noted that the US does not have the military capacity to invade Iran but does see the US – and only the US, not Israel – as having the capability to attack effectively from the air (in a sustained campaign), and thereby delay Iran’s nuclear development by a decade or more. And Podhoretz sees the extreme theological agenda of Iran’s Islamist regime as precluding the fear of nuclear retaliation that normally would deter a nuclear power from risking nuclear war against Israel or other countries.

I’m not willing to simply dismiss these concerns about Iran; it should not be a surprise that they come not only from a raving neocon like Podhoretz, or a somewhat more reasonable conservative like McCaine, but also a liberal like Halbertal. It may not be 1938, again, but in 2007, one shutters in puzzlement as to how to deal with Iran. Which is worse: the prospective bloody “cure” of war or the potentially fatal disease of a nuclear-armed regime dominated by antisemitic bigots and fanatical mullahs? One prays for a third way.

‘Is it 1938, again?’ Part 1

There were reportedly 700 people in attendance at this two-day event at Queens College (See our khaver Doug Chandler’s report online in the NY Jewish Week.) One thing that struck me at a glance was how few were younger than 60.

I missed the opening talk by Malcolm Hoenlein, the executive head of the Council of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and most of Leonard Fein’s response, but I heard that Hoenlein was brilliant – albeit in a hardline way. Norman Podhoretz, also an able speaker, is even more clearly an unapologetic voice of the right. He still sees George W. Bush as Israel’s best friend ever in the White House and even continues to defend the invasion of Iraq – to the point of nonchalantly suggesting that Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction are still buried somewhere in Syria (a regime so hostile to Saddam that it contributed troops to Bush Senior’s 1991 coalition). He also refuses to see the war as lost.

Still, his concern that European policy may be “Finlandized” in the face of Islamist extremism, analogous to the Soviet intimidation of Finland during the Cold War, may be realistic. (Podhoretz refers to the Cold War as World War III and to the current conflict with Islamism as World War IV.) What is overblown was his outrage that the UK had permitted Iran’s capture of their naval and marine personnel without reprisal; he seemed oblivious to the fact of their safe return within a few days. (In this connection, see Nicholas Kristof’s column of April 29, which describes and links online with documents outlining Iran’s “grand bargain” proposal of May 2003 to normalize relations with the US — which apparently included a promise to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, to end military aid to Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad and to facilitate a two-state solution with Israel.)

Podhoretz wittingly told a joke that touts his lack of self-doubt:

An old Hasidic rebbe is on his death bed, surrounded by grief-stricken disciples. “Oy vey iz mer, who will teach us Torah as brilliantly as the rebbe?” says one. “Oy vey, who will show us wisdom like our beloved rebbe?” moans another. “Oy, who will be our example for righteousness without our wonderful rebbe?” asks a third.

The rebbe stirs and in a low voice demands, “And nothing about my humility?”

Yet Podhoretz admits to a contradiction in his positions. He firmly believes in the nobility and rightness of advancing democratization in the Arab world, but does not believe in democracy for the Palestinians. He sees the Palestinians as not ready for – and not even really desiring – a state of their own, because he sees them as continually rejecting one. He has a point about their violent rejection of the deal on offer in 2000, with Barak and Clinton, but Podhoretz is confusing their rejection of the parameters of a deal as they understood it (and were disappointed by) with the notion that they’d not accept a two-state solution at all.

Irving Louis Horowitz, an emeritus professor of sociology and political science at Rutgers, has a physical speech impediment that makes him a challenge to listen to, but this has not undercut his career. His major point, in a session with Michael Walzer and Alan Dershowitz, was that world Jewry’s problem is not really a question of left versus right; it’s more about the need for solidarity between American and Israeli Jews.

Walzer addressed this question of whether there can be a “unified Jewish front.” He applauded the fact that over 80 percent of American Jews voted Democratic last year and emphasized that the “correct choice” for Jews is the “near left.” He does not see “far left Jews” who reject Israel as part of this front. Walzer culminated his talk with five propositions:

1. Jews are both a nation and a religious community. Israel is an expression of our nationhood, not our religion and needs to be kept as such, although not necessarily in the same exact way as the US traditionally separates government and religion. Israel is as legitimate as any other nation-state.
2. The mistake of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza was huge. The withdrawal from these territories will be the final step in the creation of a secular Jewish nation-state and, he hopes, will also create a secular Palestinian nation-state.
3. It is necessary to understand that part of the Palestinians’ troubles are of their own making. (He excoriated the left’s failure to absolutely condemn terrorism.)
4. You never know if Israel has a true partner for peace until Israel tries its best to engage with such a prospective partner.
5. Support for an ongoing US alliance with Israel. Walzer indicated that the leftist term, “critical support,” is appropriate for such an alignment.

Prof. Walzer proposed that this unified front must exclude the pro-settler movement and the far left. He insisted that the Zionist assumption is that this is NOT 1938. He concluded by referring to writer-activist David Grossman’s observation that Israel suffers from a deep sense of “existential insecurity” despite all that Israel has achieved as a creative society and a powerful state.

To be continued.