The SITUATION: Israeli or Palestinian?

This weekend, I saw the excellent documentary film, "Since We Left" by Mohammed Bakri (an Israeli-Palestinian actor and filmmaker), but was surprised to see that it was not credited in the New York University Alwan Film Festival website and brochure as an Israeli production, at least in part. It was billed as “Palestinian.” Likewise, it was made in Arabic and Hebrew (with English subtitles) but only credited as being in Arabic. Yet the closing credits indicated Israeli funding, and pretty much all the participants — whether Jews or Arabs — are citizens of Israel.

Other films are listed with non-Middle Eastern production cooperation, including: the US, France, Greece, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. I asked three people connected to this festival, whose e-mail addresses were listed, if this was an oversight or a decision to identify the Bakri film as Palestinian but not Israeli. So far, four days later, I’ve received no response.

The film, a personal documentary by this Israeli-Arab writer and actor who got into the news in a way he didn't anticipate, because his nephew was convicted of killing nine passengers in an attack on a bus (not a suicide attack). He was astounded when he learned that his nephew was guilty. And his brother, the boy's father, was devastated.

This was virtually on the eve of another controversy involving Mohammed Bakri: the Israeli premier of his film, “Jenin, Jenin,” which documented the Palestinian view of the Israeli attack on the Jenin refugee camp in 2000 — a response to the suicide murder of 30 people at a Passover seder in a Netanya hotel. The UN studied the Jenin incident and ruled that there was no "massacre" of Palestinians, as alleged. But considering how thoughtful his new film is, I'd be curious to see "Jenin, Jenin" — although I doubt that I’d be persuaded to its point of view.

According to the UN, 52 Palestinians lost their lives in that assault (including, most tragically, an invalid in a wheelchair) and the central part of the refugee camp was thoroughly flattened by armored bulldozers; yet it was not attacked from the air as it would have been if the Israelis didn’t care how many innocents died. About half the fatalities were non-combatants, but if I remember correctly, at least 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in combat, because they sent in infantry rather than bomb and shell the buildings to smithereens.

I was struck by Bakri's friendships with many Israeli Jews, his moderate views in general and his acting role in the Habimah Theater. “Since We Left” shows scenes with his recently deceased father, a veteran Communist (Hadash) politician, which in the Israeli-Arab community is known for advocating cooperation and coexistence with Israeli Jews. He shows his father saying things like "I don't know who is more foolish, the Jews or the Palestinians," and "Jews need to learn that their fate is tied with the fate of the Palestinians and the Palestinians need to learn that their fate is tied with the Jews."

But he put himself out there in the public spotlight as a Palestinian with “Jenin, Jenin” — being subjected to a barrage of invective — even without the nasty matter of his nephew. In particular, he was denounced by right-wing politicians from the floor of the Knesset as a "traitor," and harangued by at least one television talk show host who insisted on his own version of events, ignoring or distorting everything that Mr. Bakri had to say.

LIVE FROM BAGHDAD! Part II

From Lilly Rivlin: I have a friend whose expertise is setting up small businesses for women, minorities, etc. My friend has an assignment to do economic development in Iraq and is writing e-mails that are pretty interesting. This person has agreed that I can share these, but we are doing so anonymously to prevent any negative repurcussions.

... Leaving the central chamber leads to you stone in an mixture of colors and styles. It looks grand without being attractive. It is as if a lot of very expensive stuff was bought on sale and put together by a brother-in-law. In fact, there is a good chance it was. Saddam offsets this antiseptic architecture with insanely ornate, clearly phony French (Louis XVI?) furniture with cheap gold paint now flaking off. The whole thing gives the impression that a tornado swirled "Antiques R Us," "Home Stuff," Burger King, and Graceland together. The idiosyncrasy of it all suggests a quality of absolute rule — what the Man wants, the Man gets. The State Department folks left it as is.

I am getting along better with State and have even begun to like the State Department contract manager everyone else loves to hate. She is tough, smart, ruthless. If she weren't slightly bipolar, she'd be predictable enough to read. I'm working on it. She is a former stockbroker, about my height, wears combat boots, and weighs 46 pounds. She is a big Bushie. She'd actually be pretty if she didn't wear an expression that says, "I have been sitting on a cactus for a week, and I am going to do so until it gives up."

There are a lot of folks here – even officials, and even in the State Department – who want to do right. While I do not always agree with their approaches, I do respect the honesty of their efforts. In defense of a couple I have met, they cannot go out, because they are required by their contracts to take so much security that any Iraqis who get near them become living bull’s-eyes. For example, our contracting officer goes out to meet the hoi polloi, whom you can well imagine she understands perfectly, with two bomb-sniffing dogs, a cadre of soldiers/mercenaries, six SUVs or Humvees, and two – count em – attack helicopters with shooters (mercenaries) hanging out. This tends to make Iraqis feel very relaxed.

Ths is my first brush with such an insecure environment. Its effect is pervasive. It provides a kind of tinnitus to life, a constant ringing that makes it impossible to hear low noises. One of the effects on my mind is a kind of ADD — I forget or misremember names, something I rarely did at home. One of the things I notice in the surrounding world is that Iraqis from time to time choose to live without fear — without a personal guard or blast walls, something we do not do inside our compounds and zones. I have found many Iraqis to admire for that. If I were braver, somebody else, and not more afraid of my spouse's reaction than Al Qaeda's, I might be tempted to take that risk. But I think I'll stay home tonight and count the ants in the bathroom.

LIVE FROM BAGHDAD! Part I

The following is from a letter to Lilly Rivlin by a participant in last year's Meretz USA Israel seminar, currently doing development work in Iraq. We are posting this anonymously to prevent any negative consequences for this individual.

... the International Zone (IZ) is undergoing "beautification." There is no civil war. And things are getting better (aparently except for Donald Rumsfeld and the three mosques that exploded Friday). The war against "Oceana" [alluding to Orwell's 1984-- RS] continues and will be successful.

Let's talk about the IZ. It is huge, encompassing a lot of empty area, pushing out--maybe doubling--the boundaries of Saddam's most extensive compound . It includes his medical buildings, the legislative building, some administrative ones, a couple of false palaces, a place for visiting dignitaries, etc. A few are pristine but more "need repair"--something about rockets. Most of the IZ simply is unused capacity, even where buildings might accommodate or be made to accommodate offices.

I am no expert, of course, but from what I can observe the air strikes must have been pretty surgical, because there will be an untouched building right next to one with its face sheared off. Etc. I am told that Sadam had a zillion palaces spotted around Iraq, some large compounds, some villas. All prepared three meals a day, because he traveled unanounced between them, never spent more than ten hours a day in one--warding off assassination. Most State Dept and army folks live in temp metal buildings near their work, often sharing a room or bathroom. Of course, I imagine that is not exactly true for everyone there.

We meet the board of the Baghdad Private Business Center now in formation at the Al Sadeer restaurant, in a hotel that I think is unused, except for some shops. It is the only restaurant in the IZ not in an office building. A general got tired of barfights, stimulants smuggled out to other troops, and carrying on (I supposed that could be called messing with privates).

We can look out from the entrance there and see the tomb of the Iran war's unknown soldier. Actually, it really is the tomb of the very well-known soldier. The corpses all are on display. There is an irony in all this that I imagine is not lost on Iraqis. The area was off limits to them during Saddam's time: now an expanded version of it is equally inaccessable to them. Trading one master for a bigger, badder one. Cultural Sensitivity Gone Wild!

The inadequate current U.S.Embassy, home to 3,000 bureaucrats and soon to be replaced by what may be the largest building in the IZ, occupies Saddam's old seat-o-gov palace. Not that the current building is not sizeable. It features a large central domed chamber with nice architecture, flanked by two curving columned wings leading to big cubes on each end. I figure the design must imitate something modest from Babylonia. Looking up, the gorgeous high mosque-like dome shows geometric relief work--but in sand-colored cement.

The SITUATION: Anti-Semitic? Part II

I remember when Tony Judt was a rather obscure academic specializing in modern European history. He suddenly ventured into commenting critically on Israel in the New York Review of Books, and elsewhere, a couple of years ago — suggesting, with a gross overstatement, that “ethnic” states, such as the Jewish State of Israel, are an unseemly “anachronism” — and he became a hero among critics and an anathema among defenders of Israel as a result.

I chatted with him amiably following a public forum at New York University (his primary employer) at about this time and found him to be either disingenuous or clueless as to why he’d be a focus of controversy. He indicated that he had been a mazkir (director) for the left-Zionist youth group, Dror, in his native England during the 1960s. I’m convinced that he’s not an inveterate foe of Israel, but when I questioned him, he indicated that he was not troubled about what had just transpired in his public talk.

The British journalist (Richard Grayson, if I recall correctly) who was interviewing him mostly about Europe and the Iraq situation, was noticeably enthusiastic about his recent writings on Israel and mischievously asked him — to the delight of most of the audience — if Israel was “really a democracy.” (I’m not saying that Grayson is anti-Semitic, but he and most of the audience had clearly caught the anti-Israel bug.) Judt responded to Grayson calmly and in appropriate detail on how Israel has admirable democratic institutions, as well as flaws.

But the professor is maddeningly oblivious to how his dispassionate intellectual pronouncements comfort Israel’s passionate enemies and discomfit Israel’s embattled defenders — of which, although not uncritical, I am one. All too often, intellectuals do not understand that, beyond parsing or refuting analytical arguments, the emotionally-held values of people need to be addressed with sensitivity.

Judt did it again last week in a New York Times op-ed, “A Lobby, Not a Conspiracy,” in which he very mildly criticized the Mearsheimer-Walt paper and its shorter version in the London Review of Books, while rebuking critics of the two professors. In particular, he mentioned Christopher Hitchens’ piece in Slate — which (correctly) mentioned their conspiratorial innuendoes as having at least a vaguely anti-Semitic taint — as part of a “somewhat hysterical” response.

In addition to Judt, there was Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan, who lauded Mearsheimer and Walt in Salon, April 18, for “Breaking the Silence.” Judt and Cole are not the only ones (nor nearly the worst) who have applauded Mearsheimer and Walt for taking on the big, bad beast of the “Israel Lobby.”

Mind you there is an Israel lobby, consisting mainly of AIPAC and maybe a half dozen national Jewish organizations and institutions, which is different than the pro-Israel, pro-peace camp that Meretz USA is a part of. And sometimes, as when one runs afoul of any well-connected people or groups, public disagreement with its cherished views involves risk. But you can bet that Professors Mearsheimer, Walt, Judt and Cole are not suffering for their “courage” — except for the fact that Judt is no longer writing articles for the very pro-Israel New Republic, but has replaced this with other outlets and perhaps even enhanced his career.

The SITUATION: Anti-Semitic? Part I

We have no persuasive basis for suggesting that Professors Mearsheimer and Walt, and most of their cheering fans, are anti-Semitic. These guys wrote a paper (and a shorter article) that was shoddy and unscholarly (see my two postings on “Blaming Israel”), but we undermine our criticisms by calling them anti-Semites without real evidence.

(NPR has posted its transcript, including Web links, on its report regarding this controversy.)

There is a better case with regard to the Council for the National Interest Foundation ad in last Sunday's NY Times, but the evidence is still slender. It consists of this organization's traditional anti-Israel stance, its obvious Arabist leanings, and its out-of-the-blue insertion of a reference to Jack Abramoff. (See my earlier entry, "Whose National Interest?) But it's still hard to hit them as anti-Semites when they endorse a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. And this would fall into their trap of identifying ourselves with the so-called Israel lobby that brooks no opposition.

We have to admit that — while we dislike or distrust these guys — their complaint about an Israel lobby that engages in policies inimical to the best interests of both Israel and the United States (such as resisting efforts to facilitate a two-state solution) happens to be true. But this is neither the only nor the most powerful influence on US Middle East policies.

And the notion that there has been a “silence” or “taboo” against criticizing this Israel lobby seems patently false. I recall such tropes as Pat Buchanan’s crude charge, back in 1991, that the first Gulf War was the doing of “Israel’s amen corner.” Someone should do a thorough content analysis of major US newspapers and journals of opinion to explicitly test this contention.

Stay tuned for Part II on Professors Tony Judt and Juan Cole.

The SITUATION: Violence and Response

It was heartening to hear that Israel’s cabinet has decided against a direct assault on the Palestinian Authority in response to Monday’s terrorist attack in Tel Aviv. This was Sharon’s wrong-headed strategy in 2001 — destroying the administrative, security and civilian infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority rather than directly battling the terrorists. Now, a targeted effort is anticipated against the terror cells of Islamic Jihad, which recruited the bomber in the West Bank and the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades that also advocates and attempts such operations.

However insufficient, military action is an understandable response to terrorism. We should be reminded of the high-profile bloody attack against Israeli civilians on Pesakh in 2002, when the bombing of a Passover seder at a hotel in Netanya took 30 lives and prompted a mobilization of army reservists and the reoccupation of most of the West Bank by the IDF. The bitter Palestinian complaint about "occupation" became much more justified after Operation Defensive Shield than before, but most Palestinians did not learn the lesson of cause and effect as a result.

The cycle of violence reflects an incomplete logic that has taken hold of both populations; we’ve heard from both sides that force is the only language that the other understands. But while the wholesale reoccupation may not have been the best response to terror that Passover, it was more-or-less inevitable. Even so revered a dovish figure as Meir Pa’il suggested at the time that Israel needed to reoccupy the West Bank for a short time in order to persuade the Palestinians that they could not win by violence. Arguably, Israel was losing the war known as the Al-Aksa Intifada until that point.

My feeling is that the use of force needs to be as narrowly targeted as possible against the perpetrators of violence. In fact, "targeted assassinations," as ugly as this tactic sounds, is — if carried out carefully to limit non-combatant casualties — the reverse of terrorism, which is so heinous because it randomly murders innocents and regards this as legitimate resistance (as Hamas officials have again been reminding us lately).

THINGS THAT YOU SEE FROM HERE: More on Coalition Politics By David Eden

Regarding the title: It's a line from a well known Israeli song. Arik Sharon used the same line when he was questioned about his pragmatism as PM. To fully understand, you have to know that the next line is "you don't see from there" (dvarim sheh ro'im mi kahn, lo ro'im mi sham). Since I'm writing about the Israeli political scene as an Israeli in the US, I thought it was appropriate.
---David Eden

On the same day that a young Palestinian blew himself up in Tel Aviv, killing at least 9 people and wounding many more, the members of the 17th Knesset were sworn in. And Ehud Olmert’s efforts to form a ruling coalition slipped into high gear. Olmert has publicly committed himself to making the Labor party and its chairman Amir Peretz, the senior partners to his own Kadima party in a coalition that nominally stresses the need to advance Olmert’s “convergence plan” to withdraw settlements from parts of the West Bank. His current negotiating tactics apparently place the nationalist Israel Beitenu (IB), the ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism parties, and the Pensioners party as coalition candidates. This would give him a coalition of 84 members, 70% of the 120 MKs, and also provide a cushion of safety in case right wing (ex-Likud) MKs from Kadima and the IB withdraw their support when the government decides to take steps to move forward on his plan.

Olmert does not need such a large coalition to guarantee that a vote for withdrawal passes in the Knesset, as he can count on Meretz and the three Arab parties as a bulwark against right wing moves to defeat it. His reason for cobbling together such a large and unwieldy coalition is more to prevent Labor from gaining strength. Olmert has agreed to Labor demands to remove unauthorized settlements immediately, but opposes Peretz’ demands to raise the minimum wage to $1000 a month in a short period of time. So Olmert is adamant about including Avigdor Lieberman and his IB party in the coalition, mainly to be a counter-balance to support that Labor’s social & economic concerns will receive in the cabinet from the Pensioners, and possibly Shas.

Olmert will try to muddy the issue of Peretz’ opposition to including Lieberman in the coalition, saying that by including a right wing party he prevents the formation of a strong and united Likud-led front against steps meant to bring peace. But Olmert is a consummate politician, and he strongly believes in the old saying “divide, and conquer.” He knows his own position is assured only if he his able to keep his rivals under control, or off balance. This is true both within Kadima, and as prime minister. In a time when the vast majority of Israelis actively or passively support disengagement from the Palestinians, Olmert must deliver on this, even if this means withdrawal from most of the occupied West Bank.

But to maintain support for his traditional pro-business policies, he needs to prevent the social & economic agenda espoused by Amir Peretz from becoming the main focus of the government’s agenda. This is the main reason why Meretz has been shut out of the coalition negotiations, as it would be Labor’s (natural) ally. Together with the Pensioners and Shas, these parties could push through a more populist economic agenda in the new cabinet, raise Amir Peretz’ popularity, and make him a stronger rival in the next elections.

The SITUATION: Whose National Interest?

The Council for the National Interest (CNI) Foundation is a non-profit lobbying group, founded by former Republican Congressman Paul Findley and currently chaired by former Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey. It generally has a conservative, pro-Arab orientation, meant to counter AIPAC and other elements of the pro-Israel Lobby. It is formally committed to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine but tends to see the issue more simplistically than we would as part of the pro-Israel peace camp.

CNI published a full-page ad on the back cover of the “Week in Review” section of the New York Times, Sunday, April 16, that illustrates this point. It includes a quote from Daniel Levy’s recent article in Haaretz (Levy is a leading Israeli dove, closely associated with Yossi Beilin in formulating the Geneva peace initiative of 2003) uncomfortably placed directly above the disingenuous words of the new Hamas prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, Ismail Haniyeh, stating that, “We in Hamas are for peace and want to put an end to the bloodshed. Though we are the victims, we offer our hands in peace....”

That CNI could spend up to $100,000 for an ad of this sort underscores the interests that CNI represents. This is the old-line, Arabist, pro-corporate, big oil anti-Israel camp organized into a lobby.

CNI’s criticisms are directed almost exclusively at Israel, rather than more fairly going in both directions. This ad blamed the current impasse in the Middle East entirely on the Israel Lobby and on US aid to Israel that is fungible for the building of settlements in the West Bank (the latter point is embarrassingly true).

Today's news of the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, with at least nine dead and nearly 50 injured, together with the Hamas government's reaction that the attack was an appropriate act of “self-defense” and "resistance," expose the flaw in the CNI’s biased perspective. These are fresh outrages that can only lead to further suffering. Israel often responds with some new escalation.

No thoughtful analysis can ignore that since the Al-Aksa Intifada destroyed the peace process and relegated the Israeli peace movement to a minority fringe in 2000-2001, there has been a cycle of violence that has ensnared both sides, and to which both sides have contributed. We may disagree about who is more guilty, but it is wrong to completely condemn one side without mentioning the failings of the other. There is an ugly, bloody dialectic going on, that ultimately does not get resolved into peace and security for both peoples – which has to be our bottom-line concern.

The SITUATION: Jews Oppressed? Con't.

Doug Chandler reports in the current issue of NY Jewish Week, on the New Jersey conference organized by Judy Andreas on anti-Semitism and the Left.

I checked out Judy's reference to the www.unlearningracism.org website and see Judy's point about how to reach out to the Left. I continue to have my disagreements with the far Left in general, but want to give this "Unlearning Racism" perspective (dedicated to the memory of Ricky Sherover Marcuse) more thought.

Judy is surely correct that if groups are categorized as either being "oppressed" or "not oppressed," and Jews are considered as the latter (not oppressed), Jews fall onto the Left's shit list. But my argument is that it is this Leftist analysis that needs to be challenged, because it simplistically depicts reality, reducing whole groups of people into good and bad, oppressed and oppressor.

It is also unhistorical. The history of the Jews over the last two millennia is as one of the most oppressed, persecuted and massacred people on earth. Anti-Jewish hatreds are ancient and embedded in majority cultures through at least half the world, with the exception of Buddhist and Hindu societies in Asia. Christianity has poisoned the well for Jews into modern times and has even infected contemporary Islamic societies to the point where anti-Jewish feelings are more prevalent and venomous today in predominantly Muslim countries than in the Christian West.

There are many countries in the world where it's unwise to advertise one's Jewishness, but there are few places where Jewish communities remain that live in oppression. Iran is probably one such place, but Jews are more secure today in North America, in Europe and in Israel than in past centuries. Of course, the European Holocaust remains a living memory, and world Jewry has not even replaced, in raw numbers, the six million lost during that time. And the vibrant and ancient Jewish communities of the Arab world have also been lost-- although most of their progeny have found refuge in Israel and in the West.

The reemergence of anti-Semitism as a problem in Western Europe during the years of the post-Camp David Intifada, beginning in the fall of 2000, has been almost as much of a shock as the Intifada itself. We are now living in an era where the ubiquitous presence and graphic power of the electronic media, in instantaneously distributing imagery of Palestinian suffering at the hands of Israeli soldiers or in disseminating flawed theories of Jewish power in the US (for example) combine with preexisting prejudices to threaten Jews anew.

There is an age-old pattern of tyrannical regimes using the Jews as scapegoats to defer unrest or to fan and exploit this ingrained bigotry to safeguard their hold on power. This was obviously true of Nazi Germany and European fascist regimes in its orbit. This was true of Czarist Russia, this was true of Stalin's Soviet Union and neighboring countries that fell under Soviet domination (with anti-Semitism being disguised as attacks on "rootless Cosmopolitans" and "Zionists"). It has also been true of Arab regimes, which have long blamed their failings on Israel and Zionism.

What is different today is that the problem is not the current reality of anti-Jewish oppression, but the potential and threat of this happening again as Israel and the Jewish people are viewed by manipulated masses as sources of evil in the world that need to be defeated or eradicated. Jews are a vulnerable and threatened people, but not powerless and not (for the most part) oppressed. This is a complicated but problematic reality that defies the dualistic analysis of oppressed versus oppressor, and an adoration for the perceived "underdog," that the Left seems so fond of.

Are Jews Oppressed? Response by Judy Andreas

This may be read as Judy Andreas's response to this piece (essentially Monday's blog entry) by Ralph Seliger. Judy Andreas is Director of Catalyst to Coalition and the FACING A CHALLENGE WITHIN Conference Series Coordinator.

The New York/New Jersey Area FAC conference -- A Progressive Scholars' and Activists' Conference on Anti-Semitism & The Left -- has generated some discussion about whether to consider Jews as oppressed. Here's my take on the significance of this issue.

The Left generally situates goups in relation to oppression in this way:
THESE ETHNIC GROUPS ARE OPPRESSED:People of African descent, People of Asian and Pacific Island descent, People of Latin American descent, People of Native American descent, Arabs.
THESE ETHNIC GROUPS ARE NOT OPPRESSED: White People, Jews.
You see where this leads us.

Imagine the effect on millions of Gentile Progressive who accept this analysis. Many conclude that Jews do not deserve care as people oppressed by bigotry and have no place in coalitions of oppressed peoples. Rather, Jews are seen as well-to-do white oppressors whose power should be resisted. Jews, of course, are also affected by this analysis. (You see how closely this parallels the deeply-held belief about "Jewish power" that has been a prominent feature of anti-Semitism since the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were created in the early 1900's. See Dr. Christopher MacDonald Dennis' academic paper which documents this perception among college students today. Abstract on www.facingachallenge.com, click on "academic papers.")

While you may disagree that situating groups due to privilege is an effective social change strategy, I maintain that it is basic in the culture of the Left, generally. This is the reality that I live in as an activist, whether or not I value identity politics. I believe the point is to use these concepts of oppression to challenge prejudice itself. But, when it comes to Jews, we as a multicultural Left have not yet developed theory, practice or organizations to challenge anti-Semitism.

The FACING A CHALLENGE WITHIN conference series is dedicated to Ricky Sherover Marcuse in the spirit of continuing development of her anti-oppression work. Ricky studied with the Frankfurt (Germany) School of Revolutionary Psychology, from which she created Unlearning Oppression theory and practice. You can learn more about Ricky's life and work at www.unlearningracism.org We need theory such as this that explains how our emotional orientation to Jews underlies our beliefs and actions to effectively fight anti-Semitism....

Click here to read this entire article by Ms. Andreas, and a response by Ralph Seliger, at the Engage UK Forum Web site.

The SITUATION: Are Jews Oppressed?

A non-Jewish leftist has taken it upon herself to address the anti-Semitism she sees as a problem in her political community. Judy Andreas is in her middle 50s, divorced and of white Christian background; originally from Ohio, she has been living for many years within the radical-left milieu of the San Francisco Bay Area as an out lesbian. She argues that her concern for Jews is “simply applying the same principles of caring toward an oppressed community” that the left applies routinely toward other embattled minority groups.

Reinforcing the surprise one feels at the level of her passion and commitment for this cause is that she is of the hard left, not a mere liberal. For example, she not only opposes US policy in Iraq but also condemns the invasion of Afghanistan. On Israel, however, she does not follow the far-left line. For a dovish Zionist like myself, her protective view of Israel is both a comfort and a perspective that I occasionally disagree with, depending upon the exact aspect of the conflict discussed.

More than 300 people, almost all left-wing activists, were drawn to the conference she organized in Oakland, California, August 2004 — “Facing A Challenge Within.” There was sharp contention between pro- and anti-Israel participants two years ago, and it carried on into a post-conference e-mail discussion group, marred by expressions of mutual animosity. But this split was much less evident in Andreas’s follow-up conference at the Double Tree Hotel in Elizabeth, [New Jersey] March 25-27.

For entire article, link to "Jews and the Left: Who are you calling 'oppressed'?" in NJ Jewish News....

Post-Election Coalition Scenarios, Part II

by David Eden

Two other parties that may be possible coalition partners:

· United Torah Judaism – Essentially, it is only concerned with internal issues. Its real demand is maintaining social services and allowances for their constituents. Other issues: Maintaining the powers of the Orthodox Rabbinical Courts over civil issues such as marriage, divorce, burial, etc. are among their top priorities, along with maintaining the Sabbath laws preventing work on the "Holy Day", laws keeping ultra-Orthodox youth out of army service, etc. Although their constituency is sympathetic to the settlers and the Right, the leadership stresses that they are willing to support any coalition that accedes to their demands. As Olmert does not need them to guarantee the stability of the coalition, he won’t be “courting” them. Some of the issues that may affect their position in coalition negotiations are their rivalry with Shas and their often-confrontational relations with Meretz and groups within the Labor party over freedom of religion.

· Meretz – The party that is the Israeli equivalent of the “Democratic wing of the Democratic Party”, Meretz and its predecessors have been at the forefront of not only the contacts that led to direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO (and the ensuing Oslo Accords), but from the earliest days after the creation of the State of Israel also have led the struggle for equal rights for Israel’s Arab citizens, labor & union rights, women’s rights, freedom of the press and freedom of religion issues, gay rights, etc. It endorses negotiated withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank, including parts of Jerusalem. The support of Meretz for Olmert’s disengagement plans are virtually guaranteed whether they are coalition partners or not. Although Olmert will probably prefer to keep this party out of the coalition, as its demands on social and economic issues would mean that it would be Labor’s ally in the cabinet, he may ask them to join the coalition based on Meretz endorsing him in their meeting with the President. This would further demonstrate that the main priority of his new government will be to continue on the path set by the withdrawal from Gaza. Having Yossi Beilin or Haim Oron at the cabinet table, will provide some balance to the presence of some of Kadima’s former Likud ministers (i.e. Shaul Mofaz or Gideon Ezra). If the party is left out of the coalition, Olmert will keep Meretz as an “ace in the hole” that could be brought into the coalition if another partner (Shas) bolts in a bid to halt a proposed withdrawal.

All dressed up and nowhere to go – the 3 “Arab” parties:

· Ra’am/Tal, Hadash, & Balad – These parties control a total of 10 representatives in the new Knesset. Drawing virtually all their support from Israel’s Arab citizens, these parties are destined to remain largely ineffectual, as they will rarely be able to influence government decisions when their votes do not alter the balance of power. Although firmly opposed to unilateral steps by Israel, they cannot in good conscience oppose any Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, and when the issue is presented for a vote in the Knesset, will be torn between voting for these measures, or abstaining as a protest against unilateral moves. But their Knesset representation of 10 seats will be counted in coalition negotiations. If Olmert could be 100% sure he has the unwavering support of ALL members of Kadima and Labor, he could theoretically form a strong pro-negotiation government (Kadima, Labor, Meretz, & the 3 Arab parties – 63 MKs) or even a minority government (Kadima, Labor, & Meretz – 53 MKs) with the outside support of the 10 MKs from the Arab parties. Either of these scenarios is extremely unlikely, but will be a consideration (or “threat”) in negotiations with other parties.

Left behind – the core of the Opposition:

· Likud – If the Likud continues to be led by Benjamin (Bibi) Natanyahu, the Likud is doomed to concentrate on infighting and mutual recrimination between their leaders. Reduced from 38 MKs to only 12, their loss is not only ideological, but also personal for many of its leaders. Over the years, Natanyahu’s relationship with Olmert has gone from rivalry (they both competed for leadership positions in the Likud) to outright enmity. Other Likud members will try to force Natanyahu to resign both from his leadership position and from the Knesset, and effectively withdraw from politics for the foreseeable future.

· Ichud Leumi (National Union-NU)/Mafdal (National Religious Party-NRP) – The combined list of the 2 parties most identified with the settlements, these parties ran their campaign almost exclusively opposing any future Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. They are certain to remain in the Opposition in the 17^th Knesset.

Some observations on Labor:

· Going into the campaign, the future of the Labor Party was not certain. When Shimon Peres left this bastion of Israel’s traditionally Ashkenazi elite to join former PM Ariel Sharon in forming Kadima after losing the party chair race to Amir Peretz, he took with him many of Labor’s most ardent members and supporters. Peretz is an unlikely leader for Labor, he is Sephardic (born in Morocco), was neither a high-ranking officer or academic, and is definitely “a man of the people”. There was, and is, strong opposition to him from other party leaders, as well as in the rank and file. Other Labor MKs who served as generals are probably better prepared to be Minister of Defense, which is the 2^nd most prestigious job in the government. Olmert has changed his rhetoric regarding his insistance on keeping the key Finance Ministry for Kadima, and has said that Peretz is a “worthy” candidate for the post. But he obviously prefers that Labor take the Defense Ministry. Many in Labor will demand that one of the “generals” get the post, but if Peretz is able to influence Olmert’s economic and soacial agendas without being Finance Minister, he may well choose Labor’s top cabinet post for himself, as is his right as Party Chair. As Defense Minister, he will have the opportunity to gain experience in a field he does not have, as well as filling one of the key spots in determining Israel’s future in the coming years. He will also be cementing his role as a key player on Israel’s political scene.

David Eden was a member of Kibbutz Yasur, & the political aide of MAPAM (a predecessor of Meretz) Chair MK Elazar Granot (1986-1990). Married to a Princeton resident since 1996, he currently works for an independent social policy research firm.

Post-Election Coalition Scenarios, Part I

by David Eden

As the President of Israel begins the process of appointing a Member of Knesset (MK) to form the next government and be Prime Minister (PM), he is holding meetings with representatives of all parties elected to the 17th Knesset (Parliament). During these meetings, each party will advise President Katsav as to their preference, and he will decide which candidate has the best chance to form a coalition. While the main issue in the elections was future steps that would lead to further disengagement and Israeli withdrawal from areas of the West Bank, the economy, budget, and social issues will be key factors in forming the new coalition. In their efforts to influence the outcome, and the issues that they will be able to push forward, improbable combinationsof parties will be proposed. Alliances will be made and broken, just to gain any advantage in negotiations. In the end, Ehud Olmert, will be the one.

A Breakdown of the Parties on the Issue of Disengagement:

There is a clear majority for withdrawal from West Bank, either through negotiations with the Palestinians or unilateral action by Israel:

63 – Kadima 29, Labor 19, Meretz 5, Raam/Tal (United Arab List) 4, Hadash (Communist led list) 3, Balad (Arab centered party – rival to Raam/Tal) 3

Undeclared position

7 – Pensioners

Uncommitted

6 – United Torah Judaism

Against Gaza Disengagement, but maneuvering to be potential coalition partners (both of these parties have strong social issues constituencies:

12 – Shas

11 – Israel Beitenu

Withdrawal Opponents

12 – Likud

9 – National Union/Mafdal (National Religious Party-NRP) (Alliance of 2 Right wing/pro-settler parties)

Olmert will have a lot of headaches putting a coalition together. It is 100% certain that he will have to bring Labor into the coalition. Theoretically, Olmert could form a coalition without Labor, and also without Likud and (hard Right) National Union/NRP, although such a coalition (Kadima, Shas, Israel Beitenu, Pensioners, & UTJ – 65 MKs) would probably not be cohesive or supportive of withdrawal from Occupied Territories in the West Bank, and this would be unacceptable to both the majority of Israelis and the US. The presence of Labor as main coalition partner will anchor Olmert's new coalition firmly in the pro-withdrawal camp. Still, there are a lot of possible conflicts between Kadima and all its possible partners, mainly regarding economic/social issues - these will be a problem for Kadima to accept, in view of their Free Market/Privatization policies.

There are several issues that possible coalition partners have to deal with. With the core of 63 pro-withdrawal MKs, Olmert has the luxury/dilemma of being able to play some of the players off each other as they negotiate joining the coalition, possibly "bringing down the price". To guarantee a "stable" coalition, other than (his own) Kadima and Labor, Olmert only needs the support of 2 of these 3 parties. The political jockeying will also set up political rivalries that can make his own position easier to maintain. The 3 parties in the running to be junior coalition partners:

· Shas – This party cannot afford to be left out of the coalition. With its widespread education/welfare services, it needs to be in the government to get funding for their programs, otherwise they are in danger of losing the support of large segments of their constituency. If they are desperate, they will be more accommodating to Olmert. One possible obstacle to their joining the government is that their spiritual leader opposed the withdrawal from Gaza. In the past, however, he has supported territorial compromise, saying that saving the lives of Jews is more important than keeping all the territories. Olmert will certainly use the tactic of simultaneously negotiating with both Shas and Israel Beitenu, hoping to lower the cost of their demands. One possible factor that may influence the outcome is that Shas has often cooperated on social issues with both Labor and Meretz, and the 3 parties may well support each other in presenting something of a united front in negotiations with Olmert.

· Israel Beitenu – Led by Avigdor (Yvette) Lieberman (immigrated to Israel in the 70's from Moldova-USSR). Lieberman was Likud leader Bibi Natanyahu's chief of staff, and is identified with the Right. Opposed the withdrawal from Gaza, and proposes a territorial and population exchange as a solution to the issue of Israel domination of the West Bank: towns and villages of Israeli Arabs (citizens of the State of Israel) along the borders would be placed under Palestinian Authority control, in exchange for Israeli annexation of areas of the West Bank where there are Jewish settlements. Dual purpose is to assure that settlements will remain part of Israel, and that Israeli Arabs are removed from the Jewish State. Endorses reduced rights for non-Jews in Israel, including abrogation of voting rights. More of a Nationalist than a traditional right-wing party, the party has the support of possibly 50% of the (million) Russian immigrants who arrived in the last 15-20 years. As their representative, the party is concerned with social issues: employment, health insurance, education, etc., this pushes them towards the center of the political map. They will also take the position that if Olmert chooses to bring Shas into the coalition instead of Israel Beitenu, he is actually preferring Sephardic Jews at the expense of the large Russian population in Israel. (There is a racist undertone to relations between Russian immigrants and some of the other ethnic groups in Israel, Jewish as well as non-Jewish). A possible stumbling block is that Labor will find it difficult to sit in a coalition as a partner with Lieberman, as most Labor supporters consider him a racist.

· The Pensioners Party – The Pensioners ran a single-issue campaign. Veteran intelligence officer Rafi Eitan, who was involved in the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair, holds the # 1 position on their election list. With a strong security orientation, and an opponent of concessions to the Arabs in the past, it is believed that he has moderated some of his positions (similar to Ariel Sharon). One of the real surprises of the elections, it seems that the Pensioners drew support from mostly Center Left and Center Right voters, and as such may be an easy fit for joining Olmert's coalition. If they succeed in joining the probable Labor – Shas social issues alliance, the tri-partite group will probably have a strong influence on the new government's economic and social policies. If they remain out of the coalition, the individual Members of Knesset from this list will be courted by many other parties. If they do not maintain cohesion, it is doubtful they will be able to garner much support in future elections.

The SITUATION: Raving Mad Voters

Because of Israel's system of proportional representation, and a low threshold for getting into the Knesset, at least 30 parties and lists competed. It has been suggested that young people going to Turkey for a drug-infested "rave" celebrating the solar eclipse, and not staying to vote for the Green Leaf (marijuana) party, prevented it from winning seats in the Knesset. Its party supporters went to the wrong party.

A likely minister in the new government, Rafi Eitan, head of the new party for penshioners ("Gil), that rose from nowhere to win seven seats, would probably be arrested if he visits the US; this 80 year-old former Shin Bet and Mossad intelligence operative was Jonathan Pollard’s handler. Eitan has been personally close to Ariel Sharon since at least 1970, but was not offered a secure seat on the Kadima list after Sharon’s stroke. He then decided to launch his own party and it drew a lot of protest votes — apparently from many young people.

Recent elections usually have a centrist party that makes a stir and then disappears. The last one of this sort was Shinui — the change party — which combined a fiercely secularist slant with a pro-market economics orientation and a moderately dovish foreign policy. Shinui was once a part of the left-wing Meretz alliance, but half went on its own in 1997 and was wildly successful in 2003 with 15 seats. It suffered internal division and fielded two separate lists in this election, neither of which got into the Knesset; most of its constituency was lost to Kadima.

Kadima occupied most of the center in this election, but because it started out as the governing party, there was room for another force, with Gil, the pensioners’ party, emerging from the center as a vehicle for protest. This tendency toward protest votes may also track with a recent decline in voter participation. In 2003, 68 percent of eligible voters went to the polls — a record low for Israel until this past week, when turnout declined to about 63 percent. This is still high compared with the US, but Israel's electorate is increasingly alienated and disillusioned.

Israel's election system gives much too much power to small parties and narrow sectoral interests — making governing parties subject, in effect, to blackmail in a desperate effort to broaden its governing coalition to command a Knesset majority. This also divides rather than unifies Israel's diverse population. (As votes were being counted, the sixth Knesset candidate on the Shas list was indicted for bribery.) This system should be reformed to at least raise the vote threshold to four or five percent, rather than the less than two percent of today.

We were disappointed that Meretz’s sixth candidate, a remarkable ultra-Orthodox woman named Zivia Greenfeld did not make it. She would have added spice and depth to political debates, confounding stereotypes and preconceptions.